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ABSTRACT 
The spate of civil wars in sub-Sahatan Afica has not only consumed people and 
resources, it has raised issues regarding theù latent and patent causes, their impact on 
dobal security and on the regime of laws on the use of force. This thesis is a 
C 
contribution to the discourse on those anxieties from a nuanced perspective using the 
Liberian civil war as a case study. This approach has its obvious limitations, least of 
which is the danger of illicit generalizations inherent in using one instance as 
representative of all. Liberia's emergence as a state and its polity, however, has 
parallels in other Afkican states. 
These states emerged fiom European colonization and exploitation of Afnca, 
which phenornenon was packaged as a proselytizing mission to "save the heathen 
savages" of  that continent. The temtories in Afiica, which subsequently emerged as 
states in the Euroçentric model, had little or no semblance to the pre-existing polities. 
African states therefore owe their contemporary genesis and existence to global 
morality and international law. It thus follows that those global changes in security, 
econornics and politics would reverberate in them, sornetimes with deadly 
consequences. While the European (re)partitioning of Afnca created socio-political 
contradictions potentially inimical to a stable polity, a huge portion of the blarne for 
the ubiquitous and chronic civil conflicts in that continent should be placed at the door- 
steps of Afncan states themselves. 
By decades of compt and inept misde ,  and systemic abuse of human rights, 
these states denied themselves of interna1 legitirnacy capable of withstanding extemal 
pressures. Such is the case with Liberia. It was created and sustained by a peculiar 
American mix of racism and its messianic ardour to Save its fieed slaves fiom a self- 
created racial oppression. The interna1 contradictions in the new state were not so 
obvious because of global pre-occupation with the politics of anti-colonialism and 
intrigues of  the Cold War. This did not however stop the massive flow of military aid 
and arms to that country and to the continent. With the end of the Cold War, the 
seething discontent rose to the surface and the anns came handy. 
The discontent in Liberia, which found expression in a violent rebellion, was 
soon fanned across the sub-region by the inconsistencies of the Berlin boudaries in 
Afnca. Faced with a defective global machinery for the resolution of amed conflicts, 
what should the neighbouring States do? The West Afi-ican states found an answer to 
that conundnun by forcefully intewening on the grounds of a collective security 
interest in Liberia. In an age of widening conception of collective security, the West 
AfFican states have urged as legal justifications, the invitation by the incumbent 
President of Liberia, collective self-defence and an ex post facto ratification by the 
Security Council. The last justification in itself presents additional problems and 
worries regarding the citeria for such ex postficto ratification and dangers of abuse. 
Would it become a hollow ritual to sanctiQ unilateralism in the use of force? What 
should be the advisable role of regional bodies in i d e n t i w g  and removing threats to 
collective security when the Security Council seems paralysed? 
This thesis attempts to tease out and examine the various ramifications of some 
of these issues and concludes that the threads of legitimate govemance, state stability 
and coherence in the world order are interwoven and integral to a holistic concept of 
collective security. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
COLLECTIVE SECLlRITY AND THE LEGALITY OF THE ECOWAS 
INTERVENTION IN TJ3E LIBERIAN CIVU WAR 
On the eve of Christmas 1989, Charles Taylor, a Liberian fugitive, led a band of 
armed dissidents allegedly trained in Libya and Burkina Faso, and attacked Northern 
Liberia fiom Cote d'Ivoire. It marked the beginning of a militarized rebellion against the 
authoritarian government of Samuel Kanyon Doe. Within six months of the crisis, half of 
Liberia's population of 2 million had been intemally and extemally displaced and over 
200.000 lay dead as direct victims of the rebellion. As the crisis raged, the United 
Nations, short of its platitudes on peace, focused its attention on the Middle-East where 
the events in KuwaitlIraq were unfolding. The detennined efforts of the Liberian 
Representative at the United Nations failed to elicit serious response from the Security 
Council. The persona1 and political interests of some West Afincan leaders in the crisis 
and the cross-border ethnicity of West Afiïcan countries added fuel to the raging human 
tragedy. Soon the rebellion acquired an ethnic character and colouration and became 
more fiactious and deadly. 
It was under those circurnstances that Presidents Babangida of Nigeria and 
Rawlings of Ghana, acting under the aegis of the Economic Community of West AWcan 
States (ECOWAS) spearheaded a regional campaigo to bring the crisis to an end. After 
fniitless attempts at achieveing a negotiated settlement, the ECOWAS decided to 
despatch a peacekeeping force. It was a decision taken in the face of opposition from 
several fronts. On the opposing side were mainly the Francophone states of Cote d'Ivoire. 
Burkina Faso and Togo. On the othe other side were the Anglophone states of Nigeria, 
Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone. On the battlefrelds, the decision to intervene was 
bitterly opposed by the leading rebel faction, the National Patriotic Front of Libera 
O.lfPFL). However, other factions such as the independent National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (INPFL) and the nunp of the Liberian -y, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), 
supported the ECOWAS decision. In addition, the embattled President Doe of Liberia 
wrote ECOWAS asking for its intervention in the crisis. 
The intervention by a majority of ECOWAS member states (later ratified by al1 
rnembers) spanned a period of seven years and culminated in the holding of elections and 
the inauguration of a democratically elected government in Liberia. While the dust of 
conflict in Liberia may have settled, severaf issues arising fiom the causes ofthe conflicts 
and the unprecedented intervention by a regional organization in what ostensibly was a 
domestic matter of a sovereign state are stili extant. An inquiry into some of those issues 
forms the subject of this thesis. 
The Liberian state in its structure, polity and organization raises questions with 
regard to the cnsis of statehood in Afnca and the urgent need for a redefinition of the 
parameters of legitimate govemance in that continent. Further, the causes of the Liberian 
conflict evoke interesting issues conceming the impact of global events and phenornena 
on the stability and security of most Afkican states. The intervention is significant 
because it marked the first active collaboration in peacekeeping by a regional 
organization with the United Nations. This unprecedented development presents a fecund 
area for exploring the fiontiers of international law. 
This thesis explores some of the aspects relating to the United Nations Charter 
regime on the use of force. In this broader context, some observations are pertinent. First, 
the intervention impacts seriously on the contemporary regime on the use of force by 
regional bodies, especialiy, when undertaken without the prior authorization of the 
United Nations Security Council. Second, the intervention raises the question of whether 
a regional organization can use force to maintain peace within its area of relevance, given 
the paralysis of the Security Council and the increasing marginalization of Afnca as  an 
actor or subject of Security Council's states interest. With chronic UN indifference or 
ha1 f-hearted responses to militaristic conflicts in Sudan, Zaire, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Somalia, Burundi, and other 
flashpoints in Africa, the temptation for relatively powerfbl neighbouring states to seize 
the initiative and intervene cannot lightly be discounted. Moreso, when the chords of 
ethnic affiliations have s w i v e d  the European knife of division of Afnca at the 1883 
Berlin Conference. One can only refer to the Watutsi (Tutsi) crisis in CentraEast Afnca 
which has found expression in the infamous Rwandan genocide, Zairean war, and several 
other ethnic motivated crisis in that part of the continent. Consequently, the dangers of 
abuse inherent in the ECOWAS precedent may be worse than the Security Council's 
no torious indi fference. The question then becomes how to improve the relations hip 
between the Security Council and regional organizations in the maintenance and 
enforcement of peace. 
Notwithstanding the diversity of the issues raised in the Liberian conflict and the 
consequent miiitary intervention by ECOWAS, this thesis is limited in its scope of 
inquiry. lt is pnmarily focused on a nuanced exploration of the conception and practice of 
collective security and the inter-dependence of global peace and legitimate governance at 
the municipal level. Towards achieving this objective, the historical, contemporary, legal 
and social factors which trigered off the rebellion in Liberia occupy a substantial space in 
this thesis. This aspect of the discussion hm been particularly difficult. This is so because 
the injustice and brutality in Liberian political and constitutional history,' as in most 
Afncan States, could have been avoided, or at least, substantially reduced. 
In examining this situation, this thesis locates the seeds of the conflict, not only in 
Liberia's (and by parity of reasoning, other Afncan states') historical foundations but 
within the international statist h e w o r k .  In determining the quotient of culpabi l i  ty 
attributable to those Afncan countries, the objective is to suggest international legal 
mechanisms by which the municipal factors of disturbance may be curbed. It also seeks 
to address the means by which the regime may be rendered more accountable to the 
required political order and to the international comrnunity to ensure collective security. 
Further, the relevant doctrines on the enforcernent of peace are scmtinized in the 
context of contemporary state practice. This naturally raises the question of whether we 
are at the threshold of an era when regional organizations assume primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of global peace on their own t e m s  without substantive reference to 
the United Nations Security Council. This implicitly questions the role and responsibility 
of members of the Secwity Council, especially the permanent members. 1s theeir primary 
responsibility owed to al1 states? Or is it a hostage of their respective national interests? 
When China, Great Britain, Russia, France and the United States sit at the Security 
Council, is it in the interest of humanity as a whole as they purport or is it prirnarily for 
the protection and propagation of the limited Chinese, British, Russian, French or 
I Cassel Abayomi, Liberia: Hisros) of the First Afir'cun Republic (New York: Fountainhcad Publishers hc: 
New York, 1970) at ii. 
5 
Amencan agenda? If the answers to these questions are in the affirmative, it may then be 
asked whether that is a cue for the contemporary epidemic use of force by regional 
bodies? 
In other words, is there an emerging pattern of the United Nations "Franchising" 
out its obligations to regional bodies? ït may weIt be argued that in some cases, there has 
not been a wilful or deliberate "fianchise*' to regional bodies by the UN. Rather, the 
responsibility has been wrested tiom the Security Council (in the face of its inaction) by 
unilateral actions masked as multi-Iateralism. When this happens, the Security Council at 
best, rnerely assumes the role of a helpless legitimizer. At worst, its aggrieved members 
purport to decry the situation by rnaking ineffective and belated calls for compliance with 
the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter. 
There is a gap in a body of rules and principles to guide regional bodies and or 
multi-lateral organizations deciding to act on behalf of the United Nations in securing 
peace. There is hardly a clear modus operandi at international law goveming the 
emergency relationship created between the United Nations and such regional 
bodies/multi-lateral organizations when the latter take steps ostensibly calculated to 
secure or restore peace or remove threats to international peace. With this ad-hoc and 
emergency relationship quietly assurning the character of a rule (as evidenced by regional 
initiatives in Bosnia and Kosovo by NATO, the OAS in Haiti, the ECOWAS in Liberia 
and the ongoing SADC intervention in Zaire), practical and theoretical problems arise- 
The problems arising fiom this r e c h g  practice are examined in this thesis. Especially, 
as such interventions stretch the traditional concepts of aggression, non-intervention, state 
sovereignty, enforcement actions, and invitation of foreign intervention by effective 
governments. 
Furthemore, in identifyrng the Liberian crisis as a product of the end of the Cold 
War and consequent active globalization of human rights, marked by a carnpaign for a 
redefinition of the parameters of legitimacy of govemments,Lthis thesis argues that 
international law has not remained irnpervious to these changes. It has moved almost in 
tandem with the times and is in tum responding to and influencing the emerging practice. 
In the context of the Liberian cnsis, this thesis explores how the emerging regime 
impacts on the notions of collective security. 
In the context of these emerging trends and issues, this thesis evaluates the 
arguments on collective security as canvassed by the ECOWAS interveners in Liberia. It 
approaches and concludes its analysis in three progressive and complementary parts. The 
first approach is an examination of the causes of intemal violent conflicts in Afnca and 
concludes with a set of preventative measures. This phase has both domestic and 
international aspects. The second phase is on the adequacy of contemporary international 
law regime on the use of force by regional organizations and concludes with arguments 
on the probabie grounds for the legitimacy of ECOWAS intervention. The third phase is 
on the impact of nsing regional assertiveness in the management of interna1 conflicts of 
international character on the UN Charter. It concludes with a set of proposals for 
containing and managing the growing assertiveness of regional security organizations in 
their ready willingness to use force without the pnor authorization of the Security 
Council. 
In executing this three-phased approach to the Liberia. crisis, this thesis is 
Reginald Ezetah, "Are We in a Grotian Moment" (1997) 13 International Insights, at 'll .mereinafter, 
Ezetah] 
divided into six chapters. The present chapter is merely introductoty and offen an 
overview of the discourse in the entire thesis. However, chapter two of this thesis is 
divided into five sections. The overall aim of this chapter is to situate the Liberian crisis 
in its historicaVregiona1 context. It examines the Liberian crisis as symptomatic of the 
phenornenon of troubled statehood in Africa and its impact on the political stability of 
neighbounng states having identical or closely retated ethnic groups. It will demonstrate 
that the notion that the Liberian civil war was a domestic problern of Liberia downplays 
historical and contemporary factors such as boundary problems caused by colonial 
intrusion in Afnca. 
The "internal confiict" argument, which has been advanced by international Law 
scholars to question the legality of the intervention, poses a formidable barrier and 
challenge in appreciating the role of that factor in f i c a n  regional security. Explicitly, it 
contradicts the "regional security" argument made by the West African states as 
justification for the intervention. Chapter one contends that in coming to a decision on the 
legality or otherwise of the intervention, it is usehl to adequately situate the crisis in its 
proper historical and geographic context. In deconstructing the "internal conflict" 
argument, section one of chapter two introduces the subject while section two engages in 
an historical examination of Liberia and argues that its emergence as a state was not 
necessarily as a result of its capacity to be a state but largely a result of changes in 
international politics. This pattern of creation of states in AEca, reaching its bizarre 
height with the Berlin Partitionhg of Afiica in 1884, threw up a host of peopled 
temtories of diverse ethnicity internationally recognized as states but lacking the 
institutional structures necessary to sustain a modem state. 
Further, the contemporary absence of a general idea or consensus of statehood 
within those territories is shown as rooted in the manner in which these states came into 
being and the poverty of vision and lack of transparent leadership endemic to the 
continent. In the Liberian case, the intemal contradictions and fnistration of its hopes of 
becoming a beacon in M c a  was largely self-inflicted. The practice of black-upon-black 
discrimination in Liberia Erom its origins is identified as the fundamental cause of this 
lack of societal cohesion. This section argues that the internat political dynamics of 
Liberia, which resulted in tragedy, were largely sustained by the myopia of the 
international community. Those inherent weaknesses as exempli fied by ethnic 
discrimination, aristocratic opportunisrn and intimidation of the populace paved the way 
for the eventual collapse of Liberia. 
A situation where a group of people constituting less than five per cent of the 
populace had absolute political control for over 125 years was bound to unravei 
sometime. In s ~ m ,  section one exposes the democracy in Liberia, an aristocratic 
dictatorship, as a travesty. It argues that this sharn created a fragile polity and its fkagility 
was demonstrated by the ease of the emergence of the dictatonhip of Staff-Sergeant 
Samuel Doe which forms the general discussion in section three. 
Section three of chapter two examines the emergent regime of Samuel Doe as a 
final precursor to the rebellion. It explores the origins of the tyranny and the intimations 
of its appetite for excessive bloodshed, cruelty and chicanery which distinguished it fkom 
the previous regimes. This section equally examines the feeble attempts by some West 
African states to deny the Doe coup d'etat the legitimacy it needed to sustain itself. It is 
nearly impossible to escape the conclusion that Doe's tyranny was largely the result of 
the prevailing Westphalian regime of non-intervention in the intemal affairs of sovereign 
states and of Cold War politics. However, the seeds of Doe's eventual downfall, largely 
sown at the inception of the regime were to bloom as soon as the Cold War ended. 
Section four of chapter two analyzes the emergence of the militaristic rebellion in 
Liberia, its character and motives. It explores the roles of various states in West Afnca in 
the conflict, its ethnic dimensions, probable destabilizing influence in the sub-region and 
its relationship to the Iegal parameters of the State of Liberia. In this context, the veracity 
of the allegations of sabotage and subversion levelled against some West Afncan 
countries (Heads of States) by Doe is scrutinized. The real motives behind the ECOWAS 
intervention are also explored. 
Section five of chapter two examines in detail the interna1 and external causes of 
instability in West M c a  and indeed AîÏica as a whole. Liberia is used as a case study. 
An attempt is made in this section to underscore the destabilizing tendencies of colonial 
boundaries in Afnca vis-a-vis the sanctity attached to them by heads of African states. 
This section explores the threat to regional security posed by the many breaches of 
humanitarian law by the Doe regime and the consequent crisis. 
Within the global order, section five of chapter two also contends that the 
legitimated tyranny of Doe lasted so long, not because he was invincible but as a result of 
changes in global politics. The international complicity in legitimizing these breaches of 
human nghts by the incoherent and self-serving application of the doctrines of non- 
intervention to Liberia is examinecl. While ostensibly keeping to the letter of that 
doctrine, Doe's regime was the largest beneficiary in Sub-Saharan Afnca of American 
economic and military aid until the end of the Cold War. Once the Cold War ended, Doe 
lest his relevance and shortly thereafier, the interna1 violence erupted. In sum, chapter 
two relates the Liberian tragedy to history, the perversion of the Liberian municipal polity 
and to template shifis in global morality and security realignment. 
The issue of collective security dominates discussion in chapter three. It has three 
sections. Section one of chapter three is merely introductory of the subjects forming the 
substance of the entire chapter. Section two examines the origins, constitutional structure 
and jundical nature of the ECOWAS. Close attention is also paid to the regional politics 
in and post-colonial influence on ECOWAS; especially the Anglophone versus 
Francophone divide, and its impact on the capability of the organization to £Ûnction as a 
regional mechanism for integration and economic growth. It also traces the evolution of 
the ECOWAS as a regional securïty organization and its ingenious provisions regarding 
collective security in the sub-region. Similarly, the dominant role of Nigeria and Cote 
d'Ivoire in the regional organization is examined in the context of their impact on the 
intervention by ECOWAS. The justifications by ECOWAS for its intervention in Liberia 
are noted for subsequent anaiysis. The rebuttals by critics of the intervention are equally 
noted in this section. However, as this thesis is pnmarily aimed at addressing the practice 
of collective security in the nuanced contexts of kgitimacy of govemance in multi-ethnic 
juridical states, the primary focus is on those justifications and opposing views which 
bear directly upon the question of collective security. 
Section three of chapter three extends the debate fürther by examining the origins 
and practice of collective security, its evolution fiom a narrow concept to one which now 
includes legitimate concems for economic development, protection of the environment, 
democratization, population explosion and mass migration. This section also explores the 
hijacking of the concept of collective security by regional and other foms of multilateral 
security arrangements short of a unified and effective global collective security system. It 
also relates this trend to the historical pretensions of the Holy Alliance. The question here 
is whether ECOWAS had a legitimate collective security interest in the tragedy in Liberia 
when it intervened. Chapter three is therefore concemed with the doctrine and practice of 
collective security in the context of the West Afican region and its peculiarities. 
Chapter four is devoted to analysis of the doctrine and practice of collective self 
defence as an important aspect of collective security. The objective is to ascertain 
whether the legal defence of collective self defence avails ECOWAS. The arguments 
here are decidedly nuanced and located within the security peculiarities of the sub-region. 
Towards a better appreciation of the arguments made in this part of the thesis, chapter 
four is divided into five sections. Section one is introductory and periscopes subsequent 
discussion contained in that chapter. Section two examines whether Doe could in the 
circumstamces of the rebellion invite ECOWAS intervention and the capacity of the 
ECOWAS to act on such invitation. Even if Doe could not invite extemal intervention, 
the question still remauis whether ECOWAS, acting under the principles of its Protocol 
on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD) and the traditional principles of the nght of 
CO llective self defence, was entitled to intervene. 
Section four examines the impact, if any, of the UN Charter on the traditional 
elements of the doctrine. Attention is also paid to its doctrinal modification and 
adaptation in the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD). The 
characteristics of the PMAD, which in addition to the traditional concems for extemal 
aggression, has provisions relating to mutual assistance on extenially supported intemal 
rebellion are dissected in the context of the Liberian crisis. This prepares the ground for 
subsequent discussion in section five. 
Section five explores such questions as whether the PMAD provisions afford 
legal justification for ECOWAS intemention in Liberia, the impact of PMAD on the 
general notions on collective security vis-à-vis the question of what constitutes intemal or 
domestic matter in an increasingly shrinking globe. Further the suitability of such 
agreements as the PMAD for developing states like Libena caught in the grips of a 
dictatonhip is closely analysed. Would such interventions not sustain the heavy hands of 
tyrants in that part of the globe? How would the UN secunty system cope with the 
growing regional assertiveness in the enforcement of peace? While this section and the 
entirety of chapter four does not pretend to have definitive answers to these and many 
questions, it explores the nuances of the issues raised and concludes that the ECOWAS 
action in Liberia is defensible under the doctrine of collective self defence. 
Chapter five has three sections of which section one is rnerely introductory. 
Section two chronicles the expanding meaning of the phrase, "threat to international 
peace" in its role as the trigger mechanisrn for the provisions of chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter. It details the response of the UN to the tragedies in Haiti, Somalia and Sierra 
Leone. The objective is to demonstrate that in recent times intemal crisis and tragedies 
are increasingly being construed as threats to international peace. However, this section 
argues that recent state practice shows an untidy and incoherent cornpliance with the 
relevant Charter provisions. In most cases like that of Liberia, the relationship between 
regional bodies and the Security Council in the application of chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter is accidental and leaves much to be desired. This regrettable aspect appears to 
present the Security Council with the need to rati@ whatever presumptous o r  
unathourized measures that have been adopted by rnuiti-lateral security organizations 
without the pnor authorization of the Council. The cases of Liberia and Kosovo are in 
point. 
Section three thus examines the juridical nature of UN Security Council 
resolutions and traces its process of ratification of the ECOWAS action in Liberia. In this 
section, attention is also paid to the probable reasons why the Security CounciI readily 
ratified the ECOWAS action. I's value as a precedent also forrns an aspect of the 
discussion in section three. Section three and indeed the whole of chapter five concluCe 
with the observation that in view of the Security Council's ratification, the ECOWAS 
action, notwithstanding some of its obvious defects was lawful at international law. 
Chapter six is the concluding chapter. Like the entire thesis, its contents are 
divided into three parts. The f k t  identifies the causative factors responsible for the 
Liberian crisis and posits certain preventative measures. The second part examines the 
adequacy or otherwise of contemporay noms  regulating intra-state conflicts. The third 
and final part evatuates the impact of the growing cases of regional enforcement actions 
on the Charter regime. How can the international order utilize the advantages of regional 
bodies without sacrificing a global mechanism for the maintenance and enforcement o f  
peace? The common theme of the conclusion is that individual liberty, state stability, 
regional security and systemic coherence are inter-linked. These are some of  the lessons 
immanent in the Liberian crisis. 
CHAPTER TWO 
2.0: LIBERIA-A DUBIOUS DEMOCRACY AND THE SEEDS OF TRAGEDY 
The civilized Liberian, to maintain his standing as a light and a 
mler of the country, must live in some way aloof fiom the people he 
govems. This is the custom in America and it is far more necessary in 
~ f n c a . '  
2.: LNTRODUCTION 
Liberia is AErica's oldest republic and was founded by freed slaves fiom the 
United States of Amenca. tt once was perceived as a fÎee and democratic society. Its e1ite 
largely made up of the fkeed slaves fiom the United States held absolute sway over the 
country and the pre-existing indigenous peoples of the country. The fkeed slaves, barely 
constituting five per cent of the entire Liberian population, ruled for over 125 years, 
warding off the political turbulence in neighbouring countries and lording themselves 
over the majority number of members of the native ethnic groups. As the wave of coup 
d'etats swept over Africa in the mid-sixties and seventies, Liberia appeared immune to 
that phenomenon. This apparent immunity was not to last forever. In April 1980, a 
handful of semi-literate soldiers of indigenous extraction, led by Samuel Doe stmck a 
fatal blow to that regime. The injustice of the old order was replaced with a more terrible 
one, culminating in human and matenal disaster for Liberia and its neighbours. 
This chapter oulines and examines the history of Liberia and the phenomenon of 
black-upon-black discrimination and section 2.2 argues that Liberia's emergence as a 
state was not necessarily a result of its capacity to be one but largely a function of 
3 Charles C. Boone, Liberia As I ffiuw Ir (Connecticut: Negro Univmities Press, 1970) at 8 1. The 
"civilized" Liberian at the material tirne refened to the settlers from the United States. See also, Roger 
Clark, "Steven Spielberg's Amîstad and Other Things 1 Have Thought About in the Past Forty Years: 
international (Criminal Law), Conflict of Laws, lnsurance and Slavw" An inaugural Lecture as Board of 
Governor's Professor. Rutgers School of law, Camden 19 November 1998 (Unpublished essay on file with 
the author) at 1-80. [Hereinafter, Roger Clark] 
international morality which papered over its intemal problems and inadequacies. 
Further, like most Afican countries, the inability of its elite to create an inclusive idea or 
consensus of its statehood exacerbated the intemal contradictions in that country and 
paved the way for the emergence of military dictatorship. 
Section 2.3 examines the military tyranny of Samuel Doe in Libena, and its 
appetite for excessive bloodshed, cruelty and chicanery. It spawned the eventual 
rebellion. Similarly, it examines the feeble attempts at legitimacy of governance by some 
West Afncan states. It argues that the length and success of Doe's tyrmy owed largely 
to the prevailing Westphafian regime of non-intervention in the interna1 affairs of 
sovereign states and to Cold War politics. 
Section 2.4 analyzes the emergence of the militaristic rebellion in Liberia, its 
character and motives. It explores the roles of various states in West Afnca in the 
conflict, its ethnic dimensions and probable destabilizing influence in the sub-region. 
Section five examines the international aspects of the Liberian conflict and impact of 
extemal forces on Libena and other Afncan countries. The destabilizing tendencies of 
colonial boundaries in &ca vis-avis the sanctity attached to them by heads of African 
States is also underscored. This section also explores the threat to regional security posed 
by the humanitarian aspects of the Liberian conflict. In surn, chapter two situates the 
Liberian tragedy in its history, the perversion of its municipal polity and in the 
contemporary template shi£ts4 in global law, morality and security. 
Jeffrey Roy, "The Emerging Ncxus of Transnational Govemanace and Subnational States: Shifting 
Templates of International Thcory" (1997) 13 International Insighrs 17 1. 
2.2: LIBERIAN STATEHOOD: HISTORY AM) CONTEXT 
Liberia was conceived by political expediency in response to the paroxysm of 
white racisrn in the United States of America. It was bom out of the fear by the white 
Americans who could not contemplate CO-existence with their freed black slaves? The 
institiitionalized ensiavement, exploitation and denigration of the bIack race in the United 
States is an embarrassing proof of humanity's amazing capacity for cruelty6 
In the course of the journey of the estimated 40 million blacks to the Amencas, 
the West Indies and different parts of the world for subsequent sale and exploitation, at 
least two and a half million of their skeletons today lie buried at the bottom of the 
~tlantic.' The magnitude of the evil of slavery and the suffering endured by the slaves 
raised the question, "where was God at that time?" The propagation of the practice of 
slavery by a people who fled fiom tyranny is a riddle. As one writer observed, "it is 
stranger than fiction, yet it is tme that the very same people who fled from British 
oppression to America to be Eree, as soon as they inhaled the first breath of fieedorn, they 
tumed boldly and enslaved others."' 
The economic impact of this diabolical trade is no less profound. The productive 
value of slave labour in the United States prior to independence is said to be 02bil1ion.~ 
For Afnca, it was an unmitigated disaster so much so that the world's second largest 
continent was set back for almost a thousand years and is still in relative economic coma. 
5 But see, Marc Wcller, Regional Peacekeeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis 
(Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1994) at 1 8- 19. (Hereinafter, Weller] He argues that Liberia was a 
genuinc gesture to hurnanity. 
'Supra note 1 at 8. Records indicate that well over 4 0  million blacks were cruelly shipped across the 
oceans for enslavement in diffèrent parts of the world The greatcst forced human migration in recorded 
history, the slave trade Iasted over 400 years. Sec also, Leronc Bcnnct Jr., Before the Mayflower: A Histoq 
ofBlock America 6" ed. (Ncw York: Penguin Books.. 1993) at 29; Roger Clark supra note 3 at 23-44. 
Supra note 1 at 10. 
%id- 
Ibid. See also Kappman Edward, Great American Tdals (Washington: Gale Rescarch Press, 1994) at 9 1- 
94, 
~owever ,  there were still people in America who questioned the humanity and justice of 
slavery as they believed it constituted "a monument of reproach ... to principles of civil 
liberty."'* Perhaps, this different attitude was not so much a moral conversion as it was a 
calculated reaction to the economic and political dynamics of the institution of slavery ' ' 
First, the rapid increase in the Negro population was already a matter of grave 
concem in the United States of Arnenca as the industrial age was undermining the 
econornic raison d 'etre of slavery - cheap labour for agri~ulture. '~ By 1820 there were at 
lest  a quarter of a million fieed slaves in the United States and there was the question of 
what to do with them. This question merged with the fear by the slavers of the Iooming 
prospect of equality at law with fieed slaves. Thus, the legislature of Virginia had in 1800 
requested its members in the United States' Congress to "correspond with the President 
on the subject of purchasing land without the limits of this state whither Dersons 
obnoxious to the law or daneerous to the Deace of societv mav be removed."13 What was 
to be done with the fieed slaves? It was at this historical juncture that the Amencan 
Colonization Society was born. Itts objective was to "rescue" free people of colour and 
to colonize them outside the United States "where they might enjoy the blessings of 
Second, the season of unease and fear was fûrther fbeled by the Negro revolt Ied 
by Nat Turner in August 183 1 .15 He organized an insurrection against slave-owners and 
in the process more than 60 slave-owners were killed. As a fearful precedent, this act of 
violent defiance struck terror into the hearts of several members of the establishment and 
thus strengthened the case for colonization. The Society persuaded the fieed Negroes to 
emigrate to Afnca and those who bought the argument reasoned thus: "1 am an Afncan 
'O Ibid. 
" Roger Clark, supra note 3 at 14. 
" E. Dunn and S. Holsoc, "Hisrot-ïcd Dictionary of Liberia" (London: Scarccrow Press, 1985) at 5.  Save 
for Cuba and Brazil, the institution of slavery was no longer economical in othcr places. 
'' Wilson Charles, Liberia (New York: William Sloan Associates., 1947) at 8. (cmphasis addcd) 
" Ibid, at 13. 
" ~ u ~ r a  note 3 at 34. 
and in this country, however rneritorious my conduct and respectable my character. I 
cannot receive the credit due to either. 1 wish to go to a country where 1 shall be 
estimated by my merits and not by my c~rn~lexion." '~ It was to West Afnca that they 
would eventually go. 
In 1816, Paul Cuffee, a half-Negro fiom Massachusetts perfonned the first 
expenment on emigration to West Afkica when with pomp and merriment he set sail with 
38 fieed slaves. Soon Alexander Hamilton, James Monroe, President lames Madison, 
Bus hrod Washington (brother of George Washington), Daniel Webster and Henry Clay 
were persuaded of the "peculiar moral fitness in restonng the Negroes to the land of their 
fatilers.'" ' 
However, a large majority of the Negroes kicked against the objectives and 
activities of the Society dismissing them as "unrnerited stigma attempted to be cast upon 
the reputation of the f?ee people of colour."'* ï h e  Society succeeded in gathenng 
information about the M c a n  Coast nom the British home office and slavery abolitionist 
groups. At this juncture, the United States' Congress passed the "Slave Trade Act of 
1819" empowering the United States President to "make such regulations and 
arrangements as he may deem expedient to safeguard, support and remove Atncans 
stranded in the United   ta tes."'^ This legislation afforded the legal basis for the dispatch 
by the govenunent in 1820 to Afnca of the vesse1 "The Elizabeth" with 300 Afncans 
rescued fiom slave carrying ships. 
On April25, 1822 the immigrants landed on the West Coast of Aûica at a place 
called Montserrado and t w k  possession of the ceded Providence Island. The seeds of 
Liberia had been sown. By 1837 the idea of a colony on the West Coast of Afica for 
fieed slaves fiom the United States became an unfolding reality. The little band of 
16 Supra at 27. 
l7 Ibid 
'* Ibid. 
19 Supra note 1 at 34. 
colonists at Montserrado (later renarned Monrovia in honour of President James Monroe, 
the fifth U.S President) organized and expanded their original temtory by purchasing 
land fiom the natives. To convince the majority of the Negro population who remained in 
the United States to emigrate to Monrovia, the reports by the Society spoke glonously of 
a people who now "enjoyed the liberty once denied them and know nothing of that 
debasing inferiority stamped on us [them] in ~ m e r i c a . " ~ ~  
The new colony was threatened fiom diverse quarters and its status denied. The 
British and the French encroached upon and significantly decreased the original extent of 
the colony but the United States declined to intervene and in desperation, the young 
colony on July 26, 1847 declared itself a republic. It chose the name "Liberia" fiom the 
Latin for freedom-liber and the ''ria" for euphony.21~ecognition of the new republic was 
quick in coming from the least expected quarters. Great Bntain, Denmark, Belgium and 
France were quick in granting recognition to the young republic. Ironically, it took the 
United States 15 years to recognize Liberia because the American South resisted the idea 
of receiving a black envoy in ~ a s h i n ~ t o n . ~ ~  Yet, the mode of govemance in the young 
republic was tailored d e r  that of the United States of Arnerica. Its Declaration of 
Independence read like the American Declaration of Independence. And like the 
American original, no native Liberian was signatory to the all-important document. It's 
Constitution defined "Liberians" as "onginally the inhabitants of the United States of 
~ r n e r i c a * ' ~ ~  Its motto read " the love of liberty brought u s  here." in effect, the natives 
who were not "former inhabitants of the United States" were not deemed to be 
"Liberians." The politics of exclusion had begun. 
Liberia was thus founded upon and sustained on the supposed superiority of the 
Americo-Libenans over the natives. As Liebenow larnented, 
20 Supra at 49. 
" Supra note 12 at 1. 
i i - Gus Liebenow, Liberiu: The Ewlutiun of Pnvilege (lthaca: Corne11 University Press, 1969) at 5. 
[Hereinafter, Liebenow] 
" Charles Boone, supra note 3 at 82. 
[Tlhe experiment in colonization was not the 'in-gathenng o f  
Afnca's Iost children. These were Americans, and their views of Afiica 
and the Africans were essentially those of nineteenth-century whites in the 
United States. The bonds of culture were stronger than the bonds of race, 
and the settlers cIung tenaciously to the subtle differences that set them 
apart Eom the tribal 'savages' in their midst. It was not then (nor is it 
today) unusual to hear tribal people refer to the Arnerico-Liberian as 
'white' 
In living out their American fantasies, they became more Amencan than their 
former masters in the United ~ t a t e s , ~ ~ r n a k i n ~  a fetish of their exposure to the west.16 As 
they regarded the natives as the country's greatest problem27a state policy of political and 
economic exclusion of the natives was created and thus subverting the very logic behind 
their colonization in Afnca. A country founded for Afiicans long tom fiom their roots 
and with the fond hope that they would feel at home in Afica amidst their kin was 
detennined to distance itself culturally and spiritually tiom its roots. It looked up to 
America and desired everything Amencan. A people rejected by America was bending 
over backwards to love America Yet, the love was hardly reciprocated. 
According to Merran Fraenkel, whose incisive and monumental work on Liberia 
remains a classic, 
[Tlhey identified themselves closely with the way of Iife of the 
New World, despite their repudiation of the role in which they had been 
cast in it.. .They were expatriates rather than repatriated: they were not 
buoyed up-as were the Jews in Israel for example-by the idea that they 
were returning to their ancestral continent. Indeed, the entire Declaration 
contains no mention whatsoever of Afnca as the land of their forefathers, 
despite the fact that, for some of thern, Afnca may have been only one or 
two generations back.. .Afica was a strange and barbarous continent; their 
'' Liebenow, supra note 22 at 15. 
15 Merran Fraenkel, Tribe and C h s  in Monrovia (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) at 14. 
[Hereinafter, Fraenkel] To the consternation of the natives, the Americo-Libcrians wore three piece suits in 
tropical heat; had large houses and kcpt their Christian faith and Anglo-saxon narnes. It was only in the 
early 1970's that the Liberian leaders deigned to Wear any clothes indicative of thcir African pedigree. For 
over 150 years, the official attire in Liberia and which was sbictly enforced was a suit. 
16 Ibid. 
"~nderson Earle, Liberia-America S Afican Friend (North Carolina: Chape1 Hill, 1964) at 8. 
'native land' was America. 28 
This rejection of their Afncan heritage was also reflected in the country's foreign 
policy and in their attitude to the struggle for independence by colonial Africa. The 
prevailing emotion exhibited by the ruling class in Liberia to the emergent wind of 
freedom md end to colonialisrn in Afnca was sheer apprehension. According to the then 
Liberian Secretary of Defence in his Annual Report for 1960, 
[Wjith the attainment of independence of Our sister Afiican 
brothers contiguous to our borderline, problems which we never thought 
of are arising and have to be grappled with every degree of eficiency and 
alertness. Not only are the problems of the crossing into our temtories of 
citizens of other States involved but also the question of national 
ideologies, some of which are divergent to ours and destined to threaten 
and uproot the very foundation upon which our democratic institution was 
f ~ u n d e d . ~ ~  
It also denounced the pan-~f?ican30 rhetoric of Marcus Garvey on "Afnca for 
AfXcans" and at the San Francisco debates on the proposed United Nations, the Liberian 
Legation reminded the pan-Afncanists that Liberia was there "to represent a nation not a 
race."3' In the pertinent remarks of Fraenkel, "their self-identification as 'inhabitants' of 
North America', and their apparent lack of any feelings of sentiment towards Africa, 
were of vital importance in determinhg the manner in which the new settlement 
d e v e ~ o ~ e d . " ~ ~  It was also to set the stage for the tyranny of Samuel Doe-a native Liberian. 
The first Amenco-Libenan settlers also had pretensions of superiority over some 
of their very class. Thus, the mulatto affected superiority over their contemporaries of 
darker pigmentation and for some time monopolized politics and commerce on that 
b a ~ i s . ~ ~  The Negroid West Xndian statesman, Edward Wilmot Blyden who emigrated to 
Liberia in 1 855 was politically fiustrated by the mulatto on the basis of colour and broke 
- - - . - - - - -- - - - 
Fraenkel, supra note 25 at 8-9. 
' 9  As Quoted in Liebenow, supra note 22 at xviii-xix 
30 Amate OC, Inside The OAU: Pan Aficankm in Pracrice (New York: St. Martins Press., 1986) at 35. 
3 1 Supra note 27 at 35. 
32 Fraenkel. supra note 25 at 9. 
'' Supm at 7. 
ranks with the mling Republican Party in 1867 in opposition to the "mulatto 
oppression."3J in the fullness of tirne, the mulatto oligarchy naturally withered away and 
metamorphosed into an oligarchy of the very dark pigmented Arnerico-Liberians. In al1 
these ebb and tide of class power in Liberia, the lot of the natives' stagnated. Worse still. 
the Americo-Liberians were in political control even in the remote hinterlands. One may 
then opine that the clear stratification of the Liberian society at inceptjon was a tool and 
at once, a consequence of intra-racial economic exploitation and political exclusion. 
Strictly speaking, it was a black-upon-block apartheid regime lacking normative 
legitimacy. 
In addition to this testy relationship with the natives who themselves had dif ise 
geographic boundaries, the encroachrnent on the young republic's temtory by the 
European powers continued and3%etween 1847 and 1910 Liberia had Iost 44% of its 
original temtory. By its Treaty of 1885 with Great Britain, it had been forced to pan with 
a sizable portion of its coastline to British S iem Leone. This phenornenon attracted the 
anger, if not the action of the United States which in the Tafi Commission Report of 1909 
Iamented that Liberia "as an independmi power may speedily disappear fiom the 
map."36 
For 125 years, the Arnerico-Liberians, who constituted less than 5% of the 
Liberian population, excluded the natives fiom the government of Liberia and 
monopolized al1 political, economic and social positions of erninen~e.~' It was only in 
1963 that an attempt was made to uni@ the laws of the land and integrate the disparate 
native groups.38 If democracy is to be understood as the spread of potential political 
34 Holden Edith, Blyden of Liberia (New York: Vintagc Press, 1966) at 350. 
3 5 Licbenow, supra note 22 at 22-24. The de- jungle of the hinterland did not help manen as it remained 
virtually inaccessible in the face of the inability of the new republic to build neccssary road networks. 
36 Supra note 12 at 21. 
37 Liebenow, supra note 22 at xvii. In his words, the Americo-Li'berians and their descendants became 
"rnasters of the art of survival." 
38 Loewenkopf Martin, Politics in Liberia: The Conservative Road To Development (California: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1976) at 3.[Hereinafter, Loewenkopfj 
power tô wider groups in s o ~ i e t ~ , ) ~  there was no democracy in Liberia. The rule of the 
T N ~  Whig Party (TWP) was a governent  of the few by the few and for the few, a 
classic exemplar of aristocratie dictatorship. in spite of  the occasional political 
differences amongst the settler elite, there was one body against whom they fôund unity-- 
the natives. Prior to the arriva1 of the settlers fiom the United States, the political 
structure of the disparate native groups varied from one ethnic group to the ~ther. ' '~ The 
stabi lized and sophisticated groups existed alongside the amorphous and di ffûsely spread 
groups. As Liebenow observed, the amorphous ethnic structure and spread of the native 
groups in Liberia did not help mattersa' Most Liberian native groups lacked the political 
sophistication and solidity of 42contemporary States or of the famed empires and 
kingdoms of pre-colonial West Afnca such as the Mali Empire, the Songhai Empire, the 
Benin Kingdom or the Oyo ~ r n ~ i r e . ~ ~  
The political structure of the native groups was pnrnarily based on kinship 
cemented by religious, cultural and social ties. The diffise nature of political authority 
built as it were on lingual, cultural and religious pecuIiarities was alien to the settlers. 
Commenting on the fluidity and flux nature of pre-colonial boudaries and societies 
amongst Liberian ethnic groups, Liebenow m e r  observes that "there has always been a 
certain amount of fluctuations of tribal boundaries. The constant search for new 
agricultural lands or the flight from a rb i t rq  rulers have constantly driven people into 
previously uninhabited and uncharted sections of ~ i b e r i a . ' ~  For some of the ethnic 
groups, membership in a group was by a mere sense or consciousness of b e l ~ n ~ i n ~ . ' ~  
39 Supra at 9. 
4 0  Liebenow, supra note 22 at 21. The Mandingoes appear to have dominatcd a substantial part of the area 
as their "military and political organization . . .was much more sophisticated than that of the non-Muslirn 
tribes." 
4 I Supra at 3 1 .  Sec also, Gabriel Ornoden, "Brief History of Liberia" in Margaret Vogts ed., Liberian Crislr 
and ECOMOG: A Bold Anempt ar Peacekeeping (Lagos: Gaburno Publishing, 1992) at 23. 
'' Supra at 36. 
43 Ibid. Liebenow asserts that the major Likrian ethnic groups were settling in the country almost at the 
same time as the Arnerico-Liberians. 
44 Supra at 36. 
Supra at 38. 
Thus, the political boundaries between the native groups was so difhse that it 
had meaning only in the context of culture and language. Liebenow thus concludes that 
"apaxt fiom the Mandingo-dominated kingdom of Kondo at Bopolu, Liberia had nothing 
resembling the complex trading kingdoms found elsewhere in West ~ f n c a . " ~  There are 
sixteen major native groups in Liberia and only two, the Bassa and the Kpelle constitute 
more than ten percent of the total population.47 The rest of the ethnic groups respectively 
constitute five percent of the entire Liberian population. The eventual controi and 
domination of the natives by the settlers was by a gradua1 process of expansion by 
conquest aided by supenor firepower and deeds of cession of landed temtory to the 
immigrants. 
The relative ignorance and poverty of the natives was a tool with which the 
settlers perpetuated their hegemony. For instance, franchise was dependent upon proof of 
literacy in English language and property rights.48 Perhaps not surpnsingly, while the 
natives lived in the hinterlands, the schools where literacy in EngIish language could be 
acquired were located in the distant coastal areas inhabited by the settlers. The eariiest 
natives who acquired the franchise were those who served and waited on their settler 
masters. To further reduce the native nwnber in this enchanted circle of enfianchised 
citizens, the government opened its doors to fkeed slaves fiom the West Indies. This 
ingenious plan failed largely as a result of the emancipation of slaves in the United States 
and tales fiom Liberia in the United States of the numerous confiicts between the settlers 
and the natives.49 
in futile rejection of this intemal colonialism, the Krus, a seafaring native group 
revolted in 1915 and the Golas also engaged the settler govenunent in a bloody war in 
46 Ibid. See also Pfaff William, "A New Colonialism? Europe Must go Back Into Atnca," Foreign Aflairs 
74 (1995) 2-6. 'Ihe question of the impact o f  colonialism on boundarics of Afncan ethnic groups as it 
;,ffects the Liberian civil w u  is addressed in section Tive o f  thir chapter. 
Liebenow, supra note 22 at 37. 
48 Ibid. See also, supra note 22 at 18. 
49 Liebenow, supra note 22 at 2 1-26. 
1918. These were military efforts by the natives to put off the yoke of the settlers. These 
rebellions were viciously put d o m  with arms and soldiers of the United States' =y. 
The outcome of these conflicts, to bonow the words of Maugham, was that the "natives 
were broken" and "no more troubles were experiencedWM fiom them. The hegemony of 
the settlers was further sustained by the instrumentality of a monolithic party machinery 
built around the True Whig party.'' Membership and ascendancy in the TWP was a direct 
fiinction of rnembership in the Masonic Order which in itself refùsed admission to the 
nativess2 This ubiquitous and powerhl organization founded in 1 867s31iterally controlled 
Liberian politics and economy. What was good for the members of the Masonic Order 
was good enough for the party and, in turn, the country. 
The emergence of William Tubman in 1944 with his promise of enhanced native 
participation in the govemance of Liberia wilted as the ruling elite once again preferred 
to inject "new blood" of t h e i  own "race."" This was a revival of the policy of 
encouraging the emigration of Negroes From West Indies. As this project failed to stem 
the tide of native agitation for equal access to power, the elite resorted to terror. Thus, 
when Didhwo Twe, a native and leader of the opposing Refonnation Party opposed 
Tubman's re-election bid for the presidency in 195 1 elections, he was speedily charged 
with treason on very spurious evidence. He fled the country and of course, Tubman won 
the ele~tion.~' Later Tubman sought to integrate the natives but a large number of the 
elite were opposed to the idea 
The position of Tubman was a response to the climate in Afnca at the prevailing 
50 R.C.F. Maugham, The Republic of Liberia (New York: Negro Univenitics Press, 1969) at 57. 
' Hereinafter, the TWP. This pofitical party founded in 1860 dominatcd the entirety of Liberia for 125 
years. Although Liberia has ncver k e n  offrcially a ont-party statc, for the pcriod of the dominance of the 
TWP, Liberia was to al1 intcnts and purposes, a one-party statc. 
'' Nelson Harold, Liberia: A Country Smdy (Washington: Amcrican University, 1985) at 104. 
53 /bÏd. The pervasive and ubiquitous nature of the Masonic Lodge in Liberia was equally rcflectcd in the 
habit of the masons whereby rnembership of the Lodge was not treated with secrecy; instead it was a badge 
of honour used to "open doors" in LI-a. Almost every Likrian of substance was of the Masonic Lodge. 
54 Charles Boone, supra note 3 at 45. 
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penod. -The other natives in colonial Africa were agitating for self-nile. Politically 
inspired riots were already widespread in countries like Sierra-Leone, Guinea, Ghana, 
Nigeria and the other West African countries. Liberia, thus operated a form of intemal 
colonialism, a subtler form of apartheid which the natives could not ~nde r s t and .~~  Given 
that al1 the other countries in Afnca were labouring under "white" colonial rule, it was 
natural to reduce coloniaIism to a "white against black" paradigm. To be coionized and 
suppressed by their own race was beyond their comprehension and unlike their kith and 
kin in colonial Afnca who were eagerly looking forward to seeing the backs of the 
European colonizers, the Liberian natives were stuck with the Arnerico-Libenans. 
It is under these prevailing circumstances that Tubman's resolve to quickly 
integrate the natives in the politics and govexnance of Liberia should be seen as a 
mastentroke to Save the status Tubman quickly liberalized Liberian citizenship 
rights to gant citizenship to al1 the native Liberians. The franchise was also apparently 
liberalized. As a master politician, he contrived a system of cosmetic integration of the 
natives but which essentially sustained the settler domination of Liberia. Thus, in 1946 
although the natives constituted ninety seven percent of the population, they had only 
twenty percent of the seats at the Lower House. Worse still, the native seats were held by 
Tubman's lackeys and c h ~ n i s - s i n ~ e r s . ~ ~  For instance, in 1 955, this Iegislature, acting on 
the Tubman view that opposition parties were "dangerous, unpatriotic, illegal ... and 
unconstitutional'*~9~~tlawed al1 major opposition parties. 
The elections, especially the presidential election, were a total sham. For instance, 
56 Fraenkel, supra note 25 at 15. 
57 Liebenow, supra note 22 at xx. Note that Tubman stood between Schyla and Charybdis. The natives 
outnurnbered the Americo-Likrians by ovcr 100 to 1. True democracy would in effect uprwt the existing 
order. On the other hand, sustainhg the statu quo in it's entirety would equaiiy create a bloodbath which 
could wipe out the dite. To worsm matters, some of the countries in West Africa attained independence 
from their colonial rnasters. Nknrmah of Ghana and Sekou Tourc of Guinea with thcir pan-African rhetonc 
were at this tirne stolring the fie of political fieedom for African natives. 
58 Supra note 52  at 113. The nomination by the T.W.P ensurcd that native "troublemakers" could not fmd 
their way to the Congrcss. 
59 lbid. 
in the 1959 elections Tubman scored 530,474 votes as against 55 votes recorded for his 
opPoneni.* In faimess to Tubman, similar feats had been recorded by past Liberian 
Presidents. For instance, in the 1923 elections in which 6000 voters had been registered, 
President King had miraculously retumeu 45,000 votes to clinch the pesidency!" The 
educated native elite were not spared by the Americo-Liberians. In 1968, Edward 
FahnbuIlah, a Liberian diplomat of native extraction, was charged with treason and in 
spite of the scanty and dubious evidence presented, convicted and his property 
confiscated. The trial fiuther polarized the settler elite and the natives.62 Three years afier 
the spectacle of the Fahnbullah trial, President Tubman died and was succeeded by his 
deputy, William f o l b e d 3  in spite of Tolbert's liberal posture, "the upper levels of 
governent and the economy were still controlled by about a dozen interrelated 
Arnerico-Liberian fami~ies . '~  
The declining economic fortunes of the country M e r  worsened the situation. 
Opposition against the regime gained strength and courage. The heart of this newly 
strengthened attitude lay in the student body especially inside the University of Liberia. 
The Togba Tipoteh led Movement for Justice in Afnca (MOJA) was the most prominent 
of these groups and was aIso supported by extemai bodies of opposition such as the 
United States based Progressive Alliance of Liberians (PAL) led by Bacchus 
~ a b r i e l . ~ ~ T h e  PAL soon metamorphosed into a political party -The People's Progressive 
Party (PPP) and declared its readiness to oppose Tolbert in the elections6%ut the Tolbert 
regime refused to register the PPP.~' 
Following a controversial subsidy placed on the price of nce (Liberia's staple 
* fbid. 
O 1 Supra note 52 at 1 14. 
6'fbid. 
b3 Supra note 12 at 53. Tolben med to heal the wounds of the Fahnbullah trial by releasing the diplomat 
from prison and rehabilitatiug him. 
M Supra at 62. 
65 Supra at 128. 
66 Keesing 's Contemporav Archives (1980) (Longmaa Group Limitcd, London) at 30405. 
67 Ibid. The Liberian Supreme Court overtumed this decision on January 8, 1980. 
food) the MOJA issued a 'General Declaration of Rice and Rights" enjoining the 
populace to march in protest against the rice subsidies? According to Amadu Sesay, "the 
rice riots of April 1979 marked a tuming point in the history of ~ibena. '"~ The issue here 
was that the government insisted on subsidizing imported rice and refused to extend a 
similar policy to locally cultivated rice which was even cheaper than the imported one. 
The Americo-Liberians dominated the rice import business in Liberia. While the landing 
cost of the imported rice was $30, the govemment was willing to pay the difference of $8 
per bag to stabilize it at its standard prize of $22 per bag. Meanwhile it could have paid 
the local farxners $3 per bag of rice to reduce the cost of locally grown rice fiom $25 to 
$22 per bag of n ~ e . ~ '  Therefore, the proposed subsidy was generally perceived as a 
means to further enrich the dominant class who monopolized the nce imporation 
business. The PAL preference for stoppage of rice imports and encouragement of local 
nce farmers was rejected by the governemnt. 
Consequently, PAL called for a public demonstration but on the proposed date, 
just as it was proposing to cal1 off the strike and defuse tension, govemment forces acting 
precipitously,7'descended on the hapless demonstrators. in the process over 200 people 
were feared dead. Harsh prison sentences were imposed on the alleged perpetrators of the 
no t. The PPP ieadership was charged with capital off en ce^.^^ Apparently, the Tolbert 
govemment was running short of ideas on rational govemance of Liberia. In his last 
tirade, the embattled President vowed to deal with the opposition in such a way " that 
they will never nse again."" 
- - 
68 Supra note 12 at 129. 
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2.3: THE DAWN OF DICTATORSHIP AND THE SOUND OF REBELLION 
Had we been candid about the standards of govemment in Libena it would 
have been very darnaging to US interests.. .Great powers don? reject their 
partnen just because they smell." Chester Crocker, Former US Assistant 
Secretary of State for Anican Affairs (1981-88), 4 February 1993. 
We had the Liberian Executive Mansion pretty well wired. So we knew 
what was going on in the Mansion. Womanising until 3 am? Chester 
Crocker. 
Perhaps 1 made a wrong career choice if it was people like that 1 was 
going to meet. Doe was unintelligible? George Schultz, US Secretary of 
State 1980- 1988. 
On the night of 1 lth day of  Apnl 1980, a group of seventeen semi-illiterate junior soldiers 
of native background led by a scmfQ 28 year old Master-sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe 
stmck a fatal blow to the 133 years old rninority rule of Libena. In that night of the long 
knives, President Tolbert and 27 of  his guards were butchered. Like al1 coup d'etats. it 
was a secretive plot which upstaged the prevailing political order.'? in his maiden 
broadcast to the nation, the miiitary juta read out a litany of evils allegedly committed 
by the defunct oligarchy. It imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew, closed all Liberian borders 
and set up a Military Tribunal to try the members of the defûnct regime for alleged 
corruption, treason and vioiation o f  human rights. 
This body of seventcen was composed of seven sergeants, eight corporals and two 
privates. None had gone beyond high school. Their modest ranks were soon to be 
74 Mark Huband The L Ï b e h  Civil War (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998) at 27. 
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77 David Steven, Third World Coups d 'etat and International Securis, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1987) at 7. In a ratha belated substantive analysis of the causes of the Doe coup, Mr. 
H e m  Cohen, the then United States' Assistant Secretaxy of State for Afncan Affairs, in his testimony 
before the United States Congress, observed that "it (the coup) rcpresentcd the takeover of Liberia by the 
rnajority of the people. You must remember that for over 100 years, a minoriq of Liberians controlled that 
country and essentially excluded the majority of the population. . .Tky did nothing to bring up the 
indigenous people.. .It was an interna1 colonial systern.. .Doe was living in terrible squalor, which 
essentially representcd the conditions of the indigcnous people. See Weller, supra note 5 at 50. Yet, the 
United States accorded the rninority govcfnment legitimacy and never for once used its good offices to 
raise the issue. 
dropped for more glorious epaulettes. The junta called itself the "Peoples Redemption 
Council" (PRC). The first few days of the coup was marked by excesses in vendetta on 
and widespread looting of the assets of the vanquished elite which were punished with 
extra judicial l ~ i l l i n ~ s . ~ ~  
This penchant for bloodshed was to characterize the regime. Apart fiom declarïng 
martial law, it disrnissed the top echelon of the Liberian civil service, assumed legislative 
and executive powen,79suspended the Constitution of Liberia and disbanded the Supreme 
Court. Assets and property of the top mernbers of the True Whig Party were summarily 
confiscated and bold promises to right the wrongs of the past were announced. While the 
coup d'etat was welcomed by a large majonty of Liberians as it dispensed with the hated 
oligarchy of the Tme Whig Party, its excesses were condemned by some Afncan 
countries for at least, three reasons. 
First, the assassinated President Tolbert was at the material time, the Chairman of 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and was widely respected by his colleagues 
with whom he had developed some deep personal relationships. One of Tolbert's sons 
was rnanied to a daughter of the Ivorian Head of State, Felix Hougheout ~ o i g n ~ . ' ~  His 
murder by Doe's forces at the premises of the French embassy where he had sought 
refuge was to play a significant part in Boigny's subsequent support for the rebellion 
against Doe. 
Second, although a considerable number of Afncan rulers came to power via the 
instnimentality of coup d 'etats, Doe's coup was by al1 comparative standards excessively 
bloody. No less than 200 pesons were killed in the first three days of the putsch. This 
bloodletting continued with the brutal execution of the 13 top members of the Tolbert 
regime. The procedure adopted in their hasty trial and execution did not have any 
redeeming qualities. They had been summarily tried without any legal representation and 
78 Supra note 66. 
79  Supra, at 30406. 
'O Supra note 38 at 238. 
in spite-of weak and brief global protests, were executed in a gross and sadistic manner: 
tied to stakes and without blindfolds, they were machine-gumed to death before a gleetûl 
crowd. The International Commission of Jurists issued a statement on Apnl 23, 1980 
describing both the trial and execution as violations of accepted international No 
sanctions or other serious normative measures were adopted or pursued by the 
international conununity against the Doe regime. Third, Doe's coup came at a time when 
Afnca was coming to terms with the tragedy of the tyranny in ugandas2 and Bokassa's 
excesses in the Central Afncan Republic. 
For these and other reasons, Liberia's delegation to the contemporaneous special 
session of the OAU Council of Ministers was refùsed admission to the conference venue 
in Lagos, Nigeria. Similarly, the Liberian delegation led by Doe himself was refused 
participation at the Economic Cornrnunity for West Afkican States (ECOWAS) Summit 
convened in Lome, T O ~ O . ' ~  Cornmendable as these measures were, hindsight shows that 
the international community should have completely refùsed to accord the Doe regime 
any legitimacy at all. Doe's response to these measures betrayed his rashness. He recalled 
the Liberian ambassadors in Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra ~eone"and on June 14, 
1980 Liberian troops invaded the French embassy and arrested Adolphus Tolbert, the 
brother of the slain President Tolbert. Similarly, in February 1883 when a Sierra Leonean 
newspaper allegedly libeled him, President Doe unilaterally closed the borders between 
Liberia and Sierra Leone and threatened to keep it closed until the Sierra Leonean 
goveniment shut down the offending n e w ~ ~ a ~ e r . ~ ~  This rashness and contempt for the 
due process of law portended the greater evil, bloodshed and severe regional dislocations 
which Doe would precipitate. 
'' Supra note 66 at 30406 
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'' West Afiica Magazine, 7 March 1983 at 598. Note that Sierra Leone rcfiised the dcrnand and theu 
international borders were for that reason closed for over 8 rnonths 
85 Ibid. 
-The new helmsmen lacked the sobriety required of their new station in life. 
Barely a fortnight after taking power, they announced rapid promotions for themselves 
ranging fiom the comrnissioned officer ranks of Major to five-star General. Doe leapt 
fiom the lowly rank of Master-sergeant to the dizzying height of a five star General of the 
Liberian Armyg6and increased the salaries of the military by 150 percent. It is equally 
siginificant that of the 27 cabinet members constituted by the PRC, ten were fiom the 
Krahn-speaking part of Liberia- the same ethnic background as Doe; 5 members were 
fiom the Kru speaking part; 7 from the GioMano speaking region and 4 fiom the mixed 
Lofa speaking parts of Liberia. in effect, the soldiers had learnt the politics of ethnicity 
and exclusion fiom the old order." This was soon to becorne a factor in the ultimate 
cnsis. 
Within the caucus of the PRC, cracks soon appeared. It was becoming clearer that 
Doe's rabble-rousing rhetoric on "African socialism" and diatribes against the 
"corruption of capitalism" was a cover for his quest for ultimate persona1 control of 
Liberia. For instance, some members of the PRC preferred a leaning towards the 
communist Soviet U-Uon. This attitude appeared not to go down weil with Doe and his 
then deputy, Bng-Gen Quiwonkpa who preferred to sustain the Liberian connection with 
the United statesg8 Doe's camp prevaiied and the pro-socialist camp led by Major- 
General Weh Syen was marked for destruction. Both camps disagreed openiy. The pro- 
American camp ordered the Soviet embassy to reduce its embassy staff by half for acts 
described as "unbecoming attitude."89 The Libyan Legation, called "the Peoples 
~ u r e a u , * * ~ w a s  asked to shut down and leave Liberia within two months. This antagonism 
with Libya was to become a critical factor in the subsequent crisis as the rebels were 
86 Binaefer Nowrojce, "Joining Forces: United Nations and Rcgional Peacekceping-Lessons From Liberia" 
( 1995) Vol. 18 Harvard H. R. Journal at 134. [Hereinaftcr, Nowrojee] 
87 Sunra note 50 at 220. 
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89 Ibid. 
alleged to have Libyan support. 
Three months after this split, 13 lower ranking officers sympathetic to the Weh 
Syen camp were implicated in an alleged coup plot against Doe and executed for treason. 
Three months after the executions, Weh Syen himself and four members of his camp 
were allegedly implicated in another coup plot and also executed for treason. Doe 
constantly changed his cabinet and created a personality cuk9' As at December 199 1, 
only two of the original 17 members of the PRC were alive." The only potentiai threat to 
Doe's persona1 rule of Liberia was his charismatic deputy, General Quiworikpa, a 
GioMano of the Nimba County of northem Liberia. The Gio/Mano ehtnic group 
straddles Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. Doe's prompt demotion of Quiwonkpa was rejected 
by the latter. 
Quiwonkpa was consequently dismissed fkom the Liberian A m y  and expelled 
from the PRC.~) One rnonth later, he was implicated in a 'plot' to overthrow Doe 
allegedly sponsored by the defimct Soviet Union and   ha na.^^ In spite of their 
protestations of innocence, the ambassadors of both countries in Liberia were 
respectively asked to leave w i h  foriy-eight ho~rs.~' General Quiwonkpa fled to Cote 
d'Ivoire through Nimba but Doe quickly rounded up those suspected to be sympathetic to 
Quiwonkpa and had them tried for treason. Doe's crackdown on the perceived opposition 
and rivals was not restricted to his primary constituency - the military or the traditional 
political class. It extended to the student body in Liberia. 
The students had expressed shock and disapproval of his brutal execution of the 
1 3 members of the Tolbert cabinet and were agitating for refonns. Doe banned by decree 
9 1 Supra. at 32297. 
9' lbid. 
93 Keesing 's Conzemporary Archives ( 1984) (London: Longman , 1984) at 327 1 5. 
94 Ibid. Allegations of plots to "dcstabitize" Afican statcs arc oficn made by African leaders to divert 
opular attention fiom burning issues. See Raymond Copson, infia note 95. 
k'5 Raymond Copson, Contct  Among The A ' c a n  States (Unpublished Doctoral monograph. JO hn Hopkins 
University, 197 1 )  at 53. The indiffennce of  the Soviet Union to the Liberian tragedy is not unrelated to the 
cold relations between thesc two countries throughout the nile o f  Doe. Ghana/Doe relations was hardly free 
of recrimations over Dock constant allegations that Ghana wantcd him out of the Likrian Prcsidency. 
the hol-ng of parties in the higher institutions o f  Liberia on the grounds that they were a 
subterfuge for inciting the youths against his "revoluti~n."~~ In 1984, a civil 
demonstration was brutally quelled by Doe's security forces and at least 40 people were 
killed in the process.97 It is equally significant that Doe's regime was rnired in fraud and 
~ o m ~ t i o n . ~ *  
The clamour for a speedy return to civil nile did not affect Doe's intention to 
succeed himself as the President of Liberia. A cornmittee headed by Amos Sawyer was 
set up to draft a new constitution for ~ x b e r i a ' ~  Doe forrned the National Democratic 
Party of Liberia (NDPL) and named himself as the party's presidential candidate. Other 
political parties such as the United People's P w  (UPP) led by Gabriel Bacchus 
Mathews, the Liberian People's Party (LPP) led by Amos Sawyer, the Liberian Action 
Party(LAP) led by Tuan Wreh, and the Unity Paity(UP) led by Edward Kessely were 
floated. As the new Liberian constitution pegged the qualifjmg age for the presidency at 
35 yean, Doe's true birth date of May 6, 1952 disqualified him fiom m i n g  but by 
diverse means, his age was "corrected" to show that he was bom in 1950 . '~  To make 
assurance doubly sure, he rescheduled the e!ection tirnetable and fixed the presidential 
elections for 8h October 1985.101 He resorted to a systematic and vicious crackdown on 
the opposition. On August 19, 1985, he "uncovered" a plot by Professor Amos Sawyer, 
the leader of the LPP to overthrow hùn. Sawyer was arrested alongside three othen and 
irnrnediately charged with treasodo2 In an official statement, Sawyer's plot consisted of 
a campaign '20 create confusion, fear, distxust and division among the people" and thus 
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supporters intended to blow up important public buildings and 
of ~on rov i a . ' ~ '~nce  again, the students demonstrated agaiwt 
set fire to the capital city 
Doe's increasing tyranny 
and in response, Doe's presidential guards opened fire on thern.'05 
Bolstered by the huge aid and finances pumped into Liberia by the United States, 
Doe had ample resources for his unprecedented repression of the Liberian people. 
Between 1980 and 1985, Doe received over USDSOO million in aid and military wares 
from the United States. While this aid was supposedly meant to bolster Liberia's defense 
from the forays of Libya's Ghaddafi, "it is unlikely that President Doe would have been 
r r 1 0 6  able to entrench himself in power without this unconditional support. Doe dissolved 
the PRC and constituted an Interirn National Assembly with hhsel f  as the head.Io7 It is 
significant to note that it was under the regime of Doe that his ethnic group, the Krahn- 
speaking part of Liberia and the Mandingoes, gained relative political ascendancy over 
other ethnic groups in terms of domination of political appointments in ~iberia. '~ '  
As the election date drew near, President Doe banned the popular Liberian 
People's Party led by the embattled Amos Sawyer on the ground that it advocated 
"foreign i d e o l ~ ~ i e s " ' ~ ~  and had thus innùiged the elec%ral laws. In addition, some 
opposition figures were mested for "spreading lies, nimours and misinf~rmation""~and 
charged with treason.' '' It was under this situation that the presidential election was held 
on the 151h of October 1985. The electoral commission had as its vice chaiman Mr. 
David Gbala, an NDPL Poe 's  political party) activist. 
Despite credible allegations of electoral irregularities, on October 29, 1985, Doe 
was announced the wimer of the elections with 50.9 per cent of valid votes cast.'I2 The 
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opposition parties protested and contended that Jackson Doe (no relation to President 
Doe) of the Liberian Action Party (LM) had "won" the election with 63 per cent of the 
total votes cast- The other results showed that Doe's NDPL had "won" 22 of the 26 
Senate seats and 5 1 of the 64 Lower House seats. 
The opposition parties refused to take their seats in the congress descnbing the 
elections as "a mockery of the law and of the people of ~iberia"'" Amidst this confusion. 
General Quiwonkpa, who had fled Liberia to Cote d'Ivoire on allegations of treason,"' 
launched a dramatic but tragic coup attempt on the 12* of November 1985. Dunng his 
exile in Cote d'Ivoire and in the United States, Quiwonkpa had made public his resolve to 
retum to Liberia and stage a coup against Doe.ltS The coup attempt lasted three days and 
unofficial accounts put the death toll at more than 1,000.~'~ Opposition politicians were 
placed in "protective custody"' 17by Doe. 
According to some independent sources, "Quiwonkpa was captured, tortured, 
castrated, dismembered and parts of his body publicly eaten by Doe's victonous troops in 
r r l l 8  di fferent areas of the city. Doe recalled the Liberian ambassador in Sierra Leone for 
aIleged Sierra Leonean cornplicity in the coup attempt. Nationals of cther West Afncan 
countries such as Ghana, Guinea and Cote d' Ivoire were allegedly involved in the coup 
attempt."9 The Gio/Mano people of Nimba County, Quiwonkpa's ethnic group, were 
routinely victimized for their alleged support for the coup attempt. ' 20 
I l 3  Ibid. 
I I4  Ibid. See also, Huband supra note 74 at 37-4 1. 
' Ibid. 
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As the economic situation worsened,"'~ibena's political isolation increased."' In 
spite of his transformation to a civilian president, Doe 's heavy hand still rested on the 
~ ~ ~ o s i t i o n l ~ ~ d e s ~ i t e  a Un ted States' Congress non-binding resolution urging the 
administration to suspend aid to L.iberia.12' Some opposition memben such as Mrs. 
Johnson-Sirleaf went into exile for fear of their 1 i ~ e s . l ~ ~  
The opposition h m  the Nimba ~ount~"~reared  its head again on 4" September 
1987 giving rise to a Liberian Treaty of Non-Aggression and Security Co-operation with 
Sierra Leone and ~uinea.'" However, on March 22. 1988, the Doe govemment 
announced the uncovering of a plot to assassinate ~ o e . ' ~ '  Six months later, another coup 
attempt, was launched fkom the Nimba ~ o u n t ~ ' ~ ~ a n d  Doe's erstwhile deputy, Nicholas 
Podier was officially implicated and died in the alleged putsch.'30 Although the alleged 
coup plotters of March 1989 received stiff penalties for their alleged treason,I3'the fatal 
threat to the regime was to ~ t a r t ' ~ ~ o n  December 24, 1989.'~' 
l Z 1  Ibid. World demand for Likria's major produce of iron ore. rubber and tirnber was falling rapidl]. Note 
also that the resources of Liberia was deploycd by Doe to wage his politics of persona1 swivai. See 
Huband, ibid at 43. 
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"' Keesing 's Contemporary Archives (1988) Vol. XXXnr (London: Longman Publications, 1988) at 
35884. 
IZ9 Keesing i Contemporary Archives (1989) Vol. XXXV (London: Longman Publications, 1989) at 36610 
The govemment movcd in over f ,000 soldien to quel1 the insurrection. In the proccss, atracities of ethnic 
character were committed by the troops. This set the stage for the massive exile of the GioMano who 
supported the subsequent rebeliion by Charles Taylor. 
130 Ibid. See ako Amnesry Intemarional Annual Repon 1989 (Amnesty International Publications, London, 
1989) 62-63. The Amnesty report showed that hc was not involvcd in the pIot. His death was extra-judicial. 
131 Amnesfy International Annual Report 1990 (Amnesty intcniatioaal Publications, London, 1990) at 15 1. 
132 Supra. 
Keesing's Contemporaty Archives 1990 (Longman Publications, 1990) at 37132. 
2.4: A BRUTAL AND FRACTIOUS REBELLION 
Real power you take. It's not given to you. 
Charles Taylor in conversation with his fellow dissident, 
Tonia King, Abidjan, 1987"' 
On the fateful night of Chritmas eve 1989, 24 amed men of different West 
Afncan nationa~ities '~~ crossed over into Nimba County of ~ i b e r i a " ~  from the 
neighbouring Cote d 'Ivoire and attacked a border customs post killing an army oficer 
and replacing the Liberian flag with an "unknown flag."13' The hitherto exiled Charles 
~ a ~ l o r ' ~ ~ c l a i r n e d  that a group led by him, the National Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPFL) 
was responsible for the rebellion. Within the first weeks of the rebellion, a massive 
refbgee crisis had developed and the conflict had uprooted "60 per cent of Liberia's 
estimated population of ~,soo,oOO.""~ 
As the rebels increased in number and acquired more ~ e a ~ o n s ' ~ * i t s  ethnic 
tendencies"'began to emerge. The Mandingoes and Doe's Krahn ethnic groups who were 
alleged to be the backbone of Doe's regime started receiving the butt of the excesses of 
the rebellion. Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian aligned himself to the Gio/Mano of 
the Nimba County who had borne the brunt of Doe's excesses. They now seemed to be 
taking retribution over the series of ~ ~ ~ r e s s i o n ' ~ ~ r n e t e d  out to them by Doe's 
134 Huband, supra note 74 at 45. 
135 Ofodile Anthony, "The Legality of ECOWAS intervention in Likria" (1994-95) 32 Columbia Journal 
of Transn '1. Law 38 t at 384.wereinafier, Ofodile] 
136 Kofi Oteng Kufour "The Legality of the intervention in the Lihrian Civil War by the ECOWAS" 
( 1993) 5 A. J.I. C.L. at 527-mercinafier, Kufour] 
137 Supra note 133 at 37174. 
13' Supra note 99. 
139 Supra note 133 at 37644. Sources fiom the Office of the UN High Comrnissioner for Refiigees claimed 
that 500,000 people had fled fiom the confüct to the neighbouring couutries-some 300,000 to Guinea, 
120,000 to Cote d'Ivoire and 80,000 to Sierra Leone. A M e r  1,000,000,000 were believed to have been 
internaily displaced. Monrovia's population jumped fiom 400,000 to over 1 million. 
''O Allegations and probable proof that the rebels were traincd and armai by Libya, Burkina Faso and Cote 
d' Ivoire are addressed in the next section but sufficc it to state that some of the capturcd rebels admitted 
receiving training in Libya and Burkina Faso. 
IJI Konneh Augustine, Religion, Commerce And the Inregration of rhe Mandingo in Liberia. (New York: 
University Press of America, 1996) at 132. 
Amnesp (ntemational Annual Repon 199 1 (Amnesty International hiblications, London, 199 1 ) 142. 

communications system allowing the tracking of shipping and submarine movements in 
the Atlantic, a powerful Voice of America radio transrnitter situated near Monrovia, a 
communications and information-gathering centre at the embassy for contact with U.S 
embassies throughout Africa and refueling facilities at the Robertsfield international 
airport for the US Air F ~ r c e . ' ~ '  The Marines were only ordered to "evacuate the 
rernaining U.S citizens and protect the U.S e r n b a ~ s ~ . ' ~ ~  
There was an impasse as the various factions would not let Taylor seize the whole 
of Monrovia. The deadlock over the capture of Monrovia by the NPFL is attributabie to 
the breaking away from the NPFL of its advance group comrnanded by Yomie Johnson 
who formed the iNPFL. Thus, at the moment when ultimate victory was within the grasp 
of NPFL, Yormie Johnson's founding of his W F L  (Independent National Patriotic Front 
of Liberia) did not only hstrate  Taylor's bid for control of the capital but set the stage 
for further factionalization of the rebel lion against the Doe regime. 
The Economic Comrnunity of West AErican States (ECOWAS) emerged as the 
solitary initiator for a settlement of the conflict as the United Nations and the 
Organization of Afncan Unity, Save for scattered homilies on the wisdom of peacefbl 
settlement of crises did nothing to resolve the crisis. The ECOWAS approach was 
primarily aimed at a peacefûl and negotiated end to the cnsis. However, Taylor's NPFL 
faction, in the hope of wresting control of the capital city and the presidential mansion 
from the other contending factions, boycotted al1 peace talks."' Taylor's conduct and 
attitude is probably explicable on two geo-political and j uridical grounds. 
First, although the NPFL had effective control over a substantial part of Liberia, 
its frustration and fixation with capturing the capital city largely lay in the fact that the 
breakaway M F L  which controlled the Monrovia seaport and the major land access to 
l Ibid. 
l s 2  Supra note 133 at 37645. 
Is3 S q m  at 37602. ~creinafier, ECOWAS] The ongin, structure and legal charactcr of the ECOWAS will 
be exarnined in the ncxt chapter. 
the capital city, Monrovia, although very determined, did not have Taylor's superior 
firepower. Taylor reckoned that sooner than later, the iNPFL would yield to his superior 
men and firepower. In addition, the rump of the Libenan army, which had an unassailable 
controI over the presidential mansion and its immediate environs, showed itself as 
undisciplined and rapacious. 
The military and political significance of this situation is that in Afncan political 
experience, control over the capital-city and contenders for state power generally regard 
the presidential mansion as the ultimate syrnbol of effective political control in the 
state.'" It matters little that the force(s) in control of the capital and presidential mansion 
has no control or c m o t  extend similar control over the hinterlands of the country in 
question. Politically, effective control of other temtories in an Afkican country, no matter 
how extensive, is not the sarne as effective control over the capital city. The power which 
controls the capital city and the presidential mansion is the President and the forces in 
control of other parts of the country remain rebels until they have oveMn the capital city 
and installed one of theirs in the presidential mansion. Thus, control over the capital city 
differentiates the "rebel" fiom the officia1 "governrnent." Proof for this proposition may 
be found in the cases of the cluonic "rebellions" in Angola, Zaire, Uganda, Mozambique, 
and in other countries. Taylor therefore believed that given more time and in view of his 
considerable control over large Liberian temtory, the other factions would weaken or 
self-destnict, thus enabling him to achieve his dream of  ultimate control over Libena- 
Taylor simply could not afford letting go of Monrovia. 
On the other hand, this conception of power partly explains Doe's tenacious grip 
on the presidential mansion and Yoxmie's Johnson stranglehold on the main access to the 
capital city, Monrovia. In Taylor's calculation, the ECOWAS peace proposa1 would rob 
him of the momentum he had gained and would give his opponents a much needed 
154 Christopfier CIapham, Afiica and the Inrernational System- The Politics of Survival (London: 
Cambridge University Press., London, 1 996) at 20 [Hercha fier. Clapham on Aficun Politics of Sumival] 
respite and time to search for more arms and troops. It is therefore understandable why 
Doe and Johnson's INPFL welcomed the ECOWAS interference and Taylor opposed it. 
Taylor's rnisgivings were fùrther fueled by the closeness between Nigeria's General 
Babangida and Doe. What has baffled scholars is why President Babangida of Nigeria 
played such an active role in the Liberian crisis. spending well over US$ 8 billion in a 
conflict which posed only a remote threat to Nigerian security and for which there was 
"little solid gain for ~ i ~ e r i a . " l * ~  In a continent with weak institutional structures for 
modern govemance and for the formulation of foreign po~ic ies , '~~i t  is perhaps useful to 
go beyond the national interest paradigrn in understanding the reasons for Nigerian 
leadership in the ECOWAS intervention in Libena. 
Both dictators were speculated to share sympathies and mutual business interests 
which possibly translated into military support for the beleaguered Doe. Is7 This aspect of 
the peace process and its overall impact in complicating the intervention will be 
addressed in the next section but suffice it to note that as a result of this relationship 
betweeen Doe and Babangida, Taylor deeply distmsted the Nigerian-inspired ECOWAS 
peace plan for Libena. By July 20, 1990 Doe had grudgingty (after realizing that the 
ECOWAS was determined to do away with his presidency) accepted an ECOWAS peace 
proposal. This provided for a cease-fire, deployment of a peacekeeping force in Libena 
and the formation of a government of national unity. 
In a move, which was to characterize the conflict, the NPFL rejected the peace 
proposals.158 Doe's final isolation was to occur on July 21, 1990 when al1 his ministers 
signed a public statement urging him to resign "in order to Save Liberia fiom fbrther 
155 Stephen Wright & Emcka Okolo, "Nigeria: Aspirations of  a Regional Power" in Stephcn W r i g h ~  ed., 
A rican Foreign Policies (Colorado: Wcstview Press., 1999) at 127-9. 
1 6  l Robert Jackson & Car1 Rosberg, Pemnal Rule in A@: Prince, Autocrat. Propher, Tyranr (Berkely: 
University of California Press, 1982) at 1.  Sec also, Jona Rono, "Kenyan Foreign Policy" in Stcphen 
Wright, ed., Afncan Foreign Policies (Colorado: Wesîvicw Press., 1999) at 100-9 
157 Clapham, Abcan Po1iric.s ofsunival, s u -  note 154 at 124 and 203. 
IS8 Supra note 133 at 37602. 
99159 destruction of lives and properties, and also to ensure his personal safety. The solitary 
efforts of ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ c o n t i n i i e d  at its 13" Summit of Heads of States in Banjul, The 
Garnbia on May 28-30 where it resolved to send a peacekeeping force to ~ibena. '"  l e  
objective of the peacekeepers was to oversee the cease-fire agreement and bring the civil 
war to an end?" Johnson's iNPFL (with it's secure access to the capital city) welcomed 
the ECOWAS initiative. However, Doe's personal end was drawing near. In a meeting 
arranged by the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with the Johnson 
led INPFL on September 11, 1990 President Doe was fatally shot and his corpse seized 
by the INPFL rebels? 
The circumstances under which Doe died, till date, remains controversial and 
radically altered the role, perception and stance of the ECOMOG in the confiict. 
Although Johnson and his INPFL forces killed Doe, the incident took place in ECOWAS 
controlled premises. Second, it has remained a mystery how Johnson and his armed 
escorts, in spite of the presence of ECOMOG security operatives, were allowed to bear 
arms and attend a meeting uninvited. Moreso, when Doe's military guards had already 
been disamed. Third, speculations surround how Johnson, without invitation to the 
meeting between ECOMOG and Doe got intelligence reports indicating the time and 
venue of that fatal meeting.lU The sequence of sloppiness, fuuiness, improbable 
coincidences and unanswered questions on the exact roles of the parties in the fatal 
- -. 
Is9 Ibid. 
160 The Security Council considercd the situation in Liberia for the fvst time on 22 January 199 1, a littie 
over a year after the conflict broke out See, Yearbook of The United Nations (199 1 ) (New York: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1992) at 132 
l6 'lbid. The ECOWAS set up a 4,000 strong ECOWAS Cease-fuc Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
comprised of soldiers from the Anglophone counuies of Nigeria, Ghana, The Gambia and Sierra Leone. 
Guinea was the only Francophone participant. The peacekeeping group arrivcd Liberia on August 25. 1990 
under the command of General Arnold Quainoo of Ghana. 
Ici2 Ibid 
Ici3 Supra note 133 at 37669. Doc's mutilated body was put on display shortly afterwards and although 
Doe's death etTectively removed bis grouping fiom the bid to rctaia power, a substantial number of troops 
under the command of the head of the prcsidential guard emerged on the bloody scenc to f o m  the nucleus 
of another faction ostensibly committcd to the protection of the Krahn's and the prcsidential mansion. 
164 Weller, supra note 5 at 98-101. 
shooting of Doe, largely fuelled the impression of ECOMOG's complicity in Doe's 
death. This in turn affected the credibilty of the ECOMOG as an impartial arbiter in the 
Liberian crisis. 
However, contrary to general assumptions that the departure of Doe-dead or alive- 
would bring peace to beleaguered Liberia, the factions persisted in their fighting, 
massacring Liberians and foreigners caught in the ~onflict.'~' While the ECOWAS 
insisted on a democratic transition, some of the factions, believing that they could win 
power by force or use their respective degrees of control over Liberian temtory as 
bargaining chips, insisted on prolonging the ~onf l i c t . ' ~~  Thus, the ULIMO-I and the AFN 
(Armed Forces of Liberia) having secured access to the presidential mansion believed 
itself to be in possession of the symbol of power in Liberia. On his part, Charles Taylor 
of the NPFL, being in effective control of more than eighty per cent of Liberian temtory 
laid clairns to the ~residenc~.'~'~eanwhile, the ECOWAS organized a conference of al1 
leading Liberian politicians during which Amos Sawyer was appointed the Intenm 
President of ~ ibe r i a  168 Simultaneously, the NPFL forces restarted its bombardment and 
shooting of ECOMOG troops in ~onrov ia . ' ~~ l t  was under these circurnstances that the 
ECOWAS peacekeepers acting on an enhanced mandate to use "al1 necessary 
9 9  170 rneans to bring the conflict to an end practically joined the fray as combatants by the 
deployment and use of military force1" against the w h g  factions. "2 
By October 1990, the ECOMOG had taken Monrovia fiom the rebels and 
established a buffer zone of 20 kilometres around its perimeter, creating safe havens for 
16' Weller, supra notc 5 at 89. 
1 66 Supra, at 88.  
167 Supra at 62.  
168 Intenm Governmcnt of National Unity of Liberia, Final Communique of  the National Conference of Al1 
Liberian Political Parties, Patriotic Fronts, Interest Groups and Conccrncd Citizens, Banjul, The Gambia, 
29 August 1990. Reproduccd in Weller, supra notc 5 at 89-93. 
'69 Weller, ibid. 
"O Weller, supra at 100. 
171 Supra note 133 at 37700. General Dogonyaro of Nigeria rcplaced General Quainoo of Ghana. Weller. 
supra note 5 at 99. 
17- Quoted in Wellcr, supra note 5 at 109. 
the mounting number of refugees fleeing the hottest areas of the conflict."' Fmstrated 
from seizing the capital, Taylor declared himself President of Liberia, moved into the 
Liberian hinterlands and established his operational headquarters at Gbamga, 150 
kilometres northeast of the Liberian capital, Monrovia. One of the foreign factors in the 
conflict betrayed itself when the NPFL insisted to no avail that Libyan troops be added to 
the ECOMOG contingent. This request was rejected by the Nigerian led ECOMOG as the 
Libyans had been fingered as one of the major financiers of the NPFL.'" However, 
Taylor's intransigence mellowed aîter a delegation Eiom Nigeria persuaded Libya's 
Ghaddafi on November 21,1990 to reconsider its support for Taylor. 
Similarly, the government of Burkina Faso which had despatched 400 soldiers to 
heIp Taylor's NPFL rebelIion, was advised by the United States to desist fiom aiding the 
NPFL rebels. According to Herman Cohen, "we informeci the President of Burkina Faso 
that we disapproved of his sending amis to the NPFL in transit Eiom Libya.'175 This 
cleared the way for m e r  negotiations leading to the Bamako Accord of 28 November 
1990 which provided for a cease-fire agreement.'76 However, Taylor's NPFL disagreed 
with the ECOWAS on the proper .;tatus of the Amos Sawyer led interim govement.  
This necessitated fùrther talks at Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire between al1 the relevant 
parties leading to the signing of another peace accord in October, 199 1. While the cease- 
fire agreement held, the disaming aspect failed as the NPFL accused the ECOMOG of 
supporting the interim government at Monrovia headed by Amos ~aw~er." '  
New factional groups with clearly ethnic agendas soon emerged and one of such, 
. - - - -  . 
173 Weller, supra note 5 at 102. 
174 Supra note 133 at 37908. 
175 Supra note 132. 
''' "ECOWAS Authority of Hea& of State rnd Govcrmmnt, Decision A/DEC. LI1 1/90 Relating to the 
Approval of the Decisions of the Comniunity Standing Mediation Convnittcc Takcn During its First 
Session From 6-7 August 1990, Bamako, Republic of Mali, 28 November 1990." Reproduced in Weller. 
su  ra note 5 at 1 1  1-120. 177 Africa South of The Sahara (1998) 27' cd. (London: Europa Publications Ltd) at 598. See also. 
Yearbook ofrhe United Nations 1992 (New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) at 19 1.  
the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) '~~ with its base in 
Sierra Leone launched armed attacks against the NPFL from the northwestern part of 
Liberia bordering Sierra ~e0ne . I '~  The Yamoussoukro Accord finally CO llapsed when the 
NPFL executed six Senegalese soldiers of the ECOMOG contingent and cornmitted other 
atr~cities. ' '~ One of the most shocking acts by the NPFL was the murder of five 
American nuns in late October 1 993.18' 
As the crisis degenerated, the Permanent Representative of Cote d'Ivoire at the 
United Nations addressed a letter dated 15 January t 99 t to the President of the Security 
~ o u n c i l ~ ~ ~ r e ~ u e s t i n ~  that body to consider the Liberian crisis in its deliberations and to 
support the appeal for humanitarian aid to Liberia. The confïict was M e r  spreading to 
neighbouring countries. On the loU of April 1991, Sierra Leone wrote to the Secunty 
Council detailing the attack on its temtory on 23 March 1991 by NPFL 
Sierra Leone w m e d  that "because of the seriousness of and persistence of the attacks she 
reserved the right to use al1 necessary means, including assistance fkom friendly 
countries, to protect the lives of its people and defend itç territorial integrity. ,9184 
With al1 these echoes of tragedy and-probable prospects of an exacerbated 
regional crisis, the United Nations only accepted the ECOWAS i n v i t a t i ~ n ~ ~ ~ t o  participate 
in and oversee the proposed Yamoussoukro taks on peaceful settlement of the conflict.Ig6 
But the ink on the Yamoussoukro Accord had hardly dried when the rebeIs took up their 
178 Ibid. The U L M 0  split along etbnic Iines with ULIMO-K led by Alhaji Korornah supporting and 
defending Likrian Mandigoes. It was allegcd to have strong backing fiom other Mandingoes in Guinea. 
The ULiMO-J was a prcdominantly Krahn anny and was alleged to be operating fiom Sierra Leone. 
179 Ibid. 
18 mis issue is addressed in chapter two. 
181 Amnesty /nternational Reporz 1993 (Amnesty Intemational Publications, London 1993) 191- 192. 
I s 2  Supra note 156 at 133. See also "Letter fiom tbc Charge d'Affaires a.i of the Permanent Mission of Cote 
d'Ivoire to the United Nations Addrcssed to the Prcsident of the Security Council, 15 January 199 1 " 
Reproduced in Weller, supra note 5 at 127. 
183 Ibid. See also, Weller, supra note 5 at 142. 
Ibid. 
l a s  Ibid. 
Weller, supra note 5 at 15 1. 
arrns again.'" Thus, another peace accord concluded in Geneva under the auspices of the 
UN and ECOWAS was signed in Cotonou, Benin Republic and replaced the 
Yamoussoukro Accord. It provided for another interim government, reduction of the 
Nigenan contingent in the ECOMOG and disarmament of the warring factions. Once 
again, Taylor refused to permit the disarmament of the NPFL troops on the grounds that 
the Nigerian quota in the ECOMOG had not been reduced. 
To reduce the suspicion by the NPFL of the alleged partiality of the ECOMOG in 
the disarmament process, the ECOWAS, by letter dated 29 July 1992, invited the United 
Nations to set up an Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).188 The UNOMIL was also 
to CO-operate with the ECOWAS and the OAU in supervising the transitional process and 
overseeing the elections proposed under the Cotonou ~ c c o r d . ' ~ ~  Renewed hostilities 
occurred as another anned faction called Liberia Peace Council (LPC) headed by Dr. 
George Boley emerged, thus further complicating an already bioody and fiactious 
battlefield. This group was Iike the ULIMO-J, made up of Krahn speaking Liberians and 
soon engaged the W F L  in bloody battles in alleged protest against atrocities committed 
by the NPFL. l W  Another rebel group, the Lofa Defence Fcrce (LDF) also emerged to 
pursue an ethnic agenda. The Cotonou Peace Accord was partly implemented as an 
Interim govemment headed by David ~ ~ o r n a k ~ o r ' ~ ' w a s  constituted and troops fkom 
Uganda and Tanzania joined the ECOMOG force to reduce the Nigenan contingent in 
ECOMOG. 
By this stage there were six different groups fighting each other in Liberia: the 
NPFL, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K, LPC, LDF and the AFL (the rernnants of the Liberian 
A m y ) . ' 9 2  Further fighting continued and al1 the factions were committing atrocities 
'" Ibid. at 273. This aspect of the crisis will k addmwd in chapter 5. 
Ia9 Ibid. 
1 9 0  Amnesty International Annual Report 1994 (Amnesty international Publications, London, 1994) at 196- 
197. 
191 Keesing 3 Contempora~y Archives 1994 (Longman Publications, 1994) 39898. 
19' Ibid at 39996. 
against the civilian pop~lat ion. '~~ Amidst this chaos, some of the rebel groups such as the 
NPFL suffered hirther intemal crises of leader~hip . '~~~nother  peace ageement initiated 
by President Rawlings of Ghana was signed by the leaders of the NPFL, the AïL and the 
ULIMO-K at Akosombo, Ghana. The unwillingness of the warring factions to comply 
with these series of peace agreements wore thin the patience of the UN, the OAU and 
ECOWAS. Thus, the govemments of Ghana and ~i~eria'~'declared their readiness to 
reconsider their participation in the peace process if the rebels persisted in the war. These 
threats were made good when Ghana and Nigeria ostensibly started to pull out their 
soldiers fiom the ECOMOG force and the UNOMIL followed suit by reducing its 
numencai presence. lg6 
The brutalized Liberian civil population rose up to "cal1 on the ECOMOG Peace 
Keepers to be decisive in enforcing cornpliance of the factions in heeding cease-fire 
regulations so as to Save the Libenan Peace Process to which they have committed so 
much in human and material tems fkom ~ol la~se ." '~ '  The rebels then showed a 
discernible attempt to keep within the terms of the Akosombo ~ c c o r d . ' ~ ~  However. 
reports of hrther fighting and atrocities continued as the NPFL troops were reported on 
September 8 1994 to have seized 43 members of the UN observer mission.'99 The last 
attempt at finding a peaceful settlement to the crisis was in Abuja, ~ i ~ e r i a ~ ~ w h e n  al1 the 
warring factions agreed to a comprehensive peace plan; but by this time, over 200,000 
Liberians had penshed in the fiatricida1 c ~ n f l i c t . ~ ~ '  
193 Amnesry Inrernational Annual Report 1995(Amnesty international Publications, London 1995) at 195- 
197. 
194 Thomas Wocwiyu, led a revolt against Charles Taylor and claimed îhat Taylor had bcen removed as the 
leader of the NPFL. Taylor sought refiigc in Cote d' Ivoirc but returncd to Liberia afier the revolt had only 
succeeded in creating a splinter group called the CRC-NPFL. There were now 7 rebel groups. 
195 Supra note 19 1 , at 403 10. 
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200 Keesing 's Contemporas, Archives 1995 (London: Longman Publications, 1995) at 40669. 
'O1 Amnesry lnternarional Annual Repon 1996 (Amnesty international Publications, London, 1996) 2 10- 
Pursuant to the Abuja Accord, a transitional Councii of State was inaugurated on 
September 1, 1995 and the ECOMOG troops were widely distributed in Liberia to 
ovenee the r e m  of Liberians to their war-tom country.20z The nurnber of Liberian 
refbgees returning fiom Guinea was put at 410,000, Cote d'ivoire 305,000 and Ghana 
15,000. ECOMOG started disanning the estimated 60,000 troops loyal to the various 
w arring groups203as the m e d  factions were now tram fonning themselves into po litical 
parties to contest the elections slated as part of the peace process. The NPFL transformed 
into the National Patriotic Party (NPP) and the ULIMO-K transformed into the Al1 
Liberian Coalition Party (ALCP). 
The peace process gained impetus as the francophone countries in the sub-region 
now sent 2,300 soldiers to build up the ECOMOG contingent to 13,000. Similarly, the 
United States and Great Britain sent rnilitary aircraft for the airlie of troops fiom the 
francophone couatries. And as the return to political activities heated up 13 candidates 
emerged to contest the Liberian presidency. With his stronger organization and finances, 
Charles Taylor, in spite of allegations of rigging and electoral malpractice, including 
intimidation of voters, realized his ambition of becoming Liberia's president. He was 
swom into office in August 1997 and the Liberian Constitution of 1985 was rein~tated.'~' 
- - 
'O' Supra note 200 at 40856. 
'O3 Ibid, at 41 354. Sec also Amnesty Internafional Annual Report 1997 (Amnesty International Publications, 
London, 1997) 2 18-220 
201 Arnnesry Inrernaiional Annual Report 1998 ( Amnesty international Publications, London, 1998) at 235. 
2.5: THE LEGITIMACY OF EFFECTMTY AM) THE NEW EFFECTIVITY OF 
LEGITIMACY: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
I want my name to be littered over the pages of history as being the man 
who started out the way it should be started. If 1 had some chances, 1 
would really start some trouble in this region.'05 Charles Taylor, Gborplay. 
May 1990. 
The first Liberians to be enlisted by Taylor were a 40-strong group 
assembled by Cooper Miller, a former soldier who had gradually brought 
his followers into the Ivory Coast.. .They were taken to Danane . . .from 
there they took the bus to Ougadougou (Burkina Faso) and were installed 
at a military base outside the city. From there they were transported by 
plane to ~ i b ~ a . ~ ~  Mark Huband. 
While in Libya we did military training at Tarjura base s u p e ~ s e d  by 
Prince Johnson and Paul B. Harris ... then we did commando training, 
jumping fiom multi-story buildings and barbed wire training at the seaside 
base ... Taylor wanted to recruit Chadians to fight with them against Doe 
and some of them did go with Taylor back to Liberia Samuel Lartor, ex 
NPFL rebel 
1, Prince Johnson, the commander of the special forces, have decided to 
give an order to have al1 foreign nationals arrested on the ground and kept 
in my camp. British, Indian, American-1 will arrest you al1 and cause a big 
regional conflict, Then the worId will intemene. We will start with US 
citizens ... they will be held hostage ... 1 want the UN to send a 
peacekeeping force right away. 208 Prince Yormie Johnson, Leader of the 
NF'FL. 
Although the Liberian conflict has been characterized as a pureiy intemal conflict 
by some observers, it has been obsewed "every intemal war creates a demand for foreign 
in ter~ent ion ."~~~ For diverse reasons, this is certainly the case with Liberia. In 
appreciating the regional dimensions of the Liberian conflict, regard should be had to the 
interlocking nature of West African states.*1° In addition, reference should be made to the 
' O 5  Huband, supra note 74 at 205 
'm Supra at 52-53. 
'O7 /bid. - - - - ~  
'O8 lbid. 
'w Nwafor Azinna, United Nations Use of Force Armed Forces in Internai War: Conditions for the 
Maintenance of International Stabilm (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1969) at 16. 
"O George Kelly & Lin& Miller, Internal Wars and Inremarional Systems: Perspectives on Method (New 
questionable roles of some countries in the sub-region in organizing, encouraging and 
fueling the conflict. Furthetmore, the global factors which catalyzed the u~avel l ing  of 
some Afican countries; especially Liberia, Zaire and Somalia and the impact of this on 
regional stability and secwity ought to receive sorne consideration. A consideration of the 
Liberian conflict fiom these perspectives raises doubt as to the extent of the interna1 
character of the Liberian rebellion. This would probably enable an empathetic 
examination of the rationale for the intervention. In addition, this approach irnplicitly 
questions our contemporary appreciation of the notions of the law on non-intervention in 
the domestic affairs of states. That is to Say, while states purport to keep faithfiilly with 
the letter of the law on non-intervention, there is a disturbing impression that state 
practice, whether by deliberate omission or subtle commission, may in fact be violative 
of the spirit of the noms  on non-intervention. 
Prior to the emergence of the Doe military regime, Liberia enjoyed a relatively 
peaceful CO-existence with its imrnediate neighbours. This state of affairs predated the 
colonial era. As a matter of fact, the colonial delineation of AFica at the Berlin 
Conference of 1844 wittingly or othewise carved out and dispersed homogenized ethnic 
groups into disparate states.'" In effect, "almost al1 Liberian tribes are also found in 
9,212 neighbouring countries. The same goes for vimially al1 Afiican countries. This is one 
major potential and actual cause of dispute in Afnca Burkina Faso and Mali have fought 
three bitter wars in a penod of 10 years over disputed colonial boundaries and there are 
over 103 examples of borders that divide ethnic groups across different Afncan 
~ountnes.~" 
The Berlin Conference of 1884 was motivated by the European concerns for 
convenient colonization and economic exploitation of Afnca. Little regard was paid to 
York: AMS Press., 1969) atl. [Hereinaftcr, Kelly & Miller] 
'" Liebenow, supra note 22 at 45. 
'" Fraenkel, supra notc 25 at 27. 
'" Copson, supra note 95 at 56. See aIso, Stedman on Conflicts, in Brown, ed., supra notc 223 at 236. 
the convenience of cultural and ethnic homogeneity of the affected African peoples. 
While ethnic homogeneity may not be necessary for the creation and sustenance of states, 
the experiential reality is that it has largely become a controversial instrument for the 
acquisition and maintenance of power in Afkica. This will be explained in due course. 
This trend has apparently become more pronounced since the eclipse of the ideological 
divide between the East and the West and the growing sense of ethno-nationalism and 
geo-political irredentism. 
For Liberia and West Afnca, the table beiow illustrates the population spread and 
division of some of the native ethnic groups in and around ~ i b e n a . ~ ' ~  
1 Mende 1 
Liberia Mali Guinea S/Leone CfIvoire 
According to Liebenow, "the majority of the sixteen Liberian ethnic groups 
straddle the borders between Liberia and the neighbouring states of Sierra Leone, Guinea, 
and the Ivory Coast. in some cases such as the Mende, the major portion of the tribe 
"' Ethnologue, o d i n e : < h t t p l l . s i l . o r g ! e t b n o l o g u d c o u n û i  . last modificd on 1 February 
1999.This phenornenon gives rise to irredcntism and accusations of subversion. Kwame Nknunah of Ghana 
was given to issuing threats to the effect that Ghana would invade Togo so as to unite the Ewes in both 
countries. Togo accuscd Ghana of complicity in the assassination of Togolese President, Sylvanius 
Olympio. See, Copson Supra note 95 at 100. Cote d'Ivoire constantly accused Guinea and Ghana of 
supporting Camille Adam's inedentist movemmt in Cote d'Ivoire. 
raides across the border.. .Even today the majority of Liberians identify much more with 
their ethnic group than they do with the modem state of ~ i b e r i a " " ~  A close sîudy of the 
table above partly explains why the ULIMO-K (predominantly Mandigo), in  the Libenan 
civil war had considerable support l5om Mandingoes in neighbouring Guinea Similarly, 
the Dan/Gio (mainly in the Nimba County) were alleged to have considerable support 
from their kith and kin in neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea. This tendency also 
helps to explain the relative ease of the cross border refùgee movement in times of 
humanitarian crisis. Indeed, an outbreak of humanitarian disaster is not necessary to 
triggger off massive hwnan migration in that part of the world. As Liebenow presciently 
noted, "artificial and largely unregulated international boundaries have provided no 
obstacle to Mende, Gola, Kissi, and Vai, who move back and forth to renew old ties with 
kinsmen in Sierra Leone; to Grebo, Kru, and Krahn who visit their relatives in the Ivory 
Coast; to Loma, Kpelle, Mandingo, Mano, and Gio who have maintained their econornic 
and social links with kinsmen in Guinea. ,1216 
This phenomenon of "nations without states" repeats itself across Africa. For 
instance, the Ibibio nation with its political and spiritual capital in Calabar o f  present day 
Nigeria (which had as early as 1472 estabhshed formai trading and diplomatic relations 
with the Portuguese), has 5,200,000 of it's people on the Nigerian side and nearly 
900,000 in neighbouring ~ameroon .~"  Similarly, the Karembu of the famed Kanem- 
Bornu empire has 4 million of their people in present day Nigeria and over 3.7 million in 
the adjacent states of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Yet, the colonial boundaries made by 
Britain, France and Germany have not diminished the fervour and passion for their strong 
cultural links reinforced by traditional festivities such as the ~urbar ."*  This duality 
creates a delicate mix of tension and ease and when the former takes precedence 
215 Liebenow, supra note 22 at 3 1-32. 
'16 Supra at 36. 
"' Minahan James, Nations Without States4 HLFtorical Dictionam of Contemporas, National Movemenrî 
(London: Greenwood Press, 1996) at 99. jHcrcinafter, Minahan] 
""finahan. supra at 273. This is a colurfiil horsc riding ccrcmony of the Bomo people. 
especiaMy in times of crisis. A serious strain on the bilateral and rnulti-lateral relations of 
the West Afncan states is thus imposed on several occasions by these factors. The tension 
is heightened by ethnic politics of African leaders who are the most vocal supporters for 
maintaining inherited colonial boundaries regardless of their inherent problems and 
 contradiction^.^'^ In fact. absolute respect for the integrity of the colonial boundaries is a 
findamental n o m  of the OAU Charter and state practice in ~fkica.'~' It is remarkable 
that of the 53 Afncan countries, only Eritrea has successfully overturned the integrity of a 
colonial boundary and attained recognition as a sovereign state by breaking away fiom 
~ th io~ ia . ' ~ '  Interestingly, many Aficans especially the border citizens with kith and kin 
separated by the Berlin designed borders do not share the same enthusiasm for the 
juridical  tat te.^^^ A combination of some of these factors have led schoiar~~~'to conclude 
that they generate intemal conf l i~ t s~~~and  also encourage the intemationalization of 
intemal conflicts in Some of those factors need M e r  elaboration. 
First, apart fkom the problems associated with the Berlin demarcated boundaries, 
the nascent Afncan states were hardly ready for the demands of statehood. In most 
kifrican countries, the departing colonialists barely created or sustained those institutions 
necessary to support a modem state as constmed under the dominant Eurocentric 
paradigm.226 This is largely attibutable to the clamour for independence and self- 
- p~ 
'19 Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, Intematio~l Relations and the Third Word (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press., 1990) at 22. [Hereinaficr, Jackson, Quai-States]. See also, Clapham, Afican 
Politics of Survival. supra note 154 at 4. 
"O OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, May 25, 1963.479 U.N.T.S. 39. See Article 3 (3) and (5). 
"' Christopha Clapham, 'The Foreign Policies of Ethiopia and Eriaca" in Stephen Wright. ed .  Afiican 
Foreign Policies (Westview Press., Boulder Colorado, 1999) at 84. Sunilar campaigns labelled as 
"separatist", "secessionist" and"inedentist" in Su&m,Nigtria/Biafra,CongoKatanga, Ghana/Ewe/Togo and 
SomaliKenya have not bcen succcssful, 
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detemination of peoples which reached its peak after the defeat of Nazi Germany and 
caught the colonial powers in Africa and Asia ~ n p r e ~ a r e d . ~ ~ '  Instead of the proposed 
centuries of col~nization,~~~~uro~ean c lonists were compelled by international rnorality 
to hand over power in the colonies. The mantle fell on the few native elites who in the 
absence of strong governmental institutions, with its checks and balances, largely 
appropriated the inhented power for t h e r n s e l v e ~ . ~ ~ ~  In some cases such as Belgian Congo 
and French Guinea, the departing colonies deliberately looted and impoverished the 
colonies in contempt of the way local agitators for political independence hurried and 
harried them out of the country.230 However, in almost al1 the cases, the Berlin designated 
state boundaries with its inherent weaknesses were scrupulously mantained. 
Second, the nascent states or "quasi-states", in their ostensible bid to quickly gain 
the kingdom of economic well-being long denied them by European colonization and 
exploitation, emphasized the state as the leading engine for economic growth and 
insisting on national unity at the expense of sub-national ethnic and political 
identit ie~."~~' In the attempt to enforce state unity at al1 costs among ethnic groups with 
"vastly diffezent political values and instituti~ns,'*~'~the state became the greatest 
institution of patronage. The minority elite maintained power and sustained it on that 
basis. According to Stedman, "the lack of domestic economic capital ensured that states 
would be important sources of resources and would becorne the subjects of intense 
distributional c~nflicts.'"~' in addition, some newly independent African states went on 
the populist but ill-advised nationalization of foreign  industrie^.^'^ This merely provided 
more avenues for the opportunistic power holders to dispense patronage to a few cronies 
227 /bid. 
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and ethnic jingoists. As Stedman M e r  observes, "office holders appropriated state 
resources to consolidate their power bases and reward their network of clients. National 
interests were subordinated to the interests of politicians and their supporters, who 
viewed public office as private property."2'5 
Third, power in West Afkica was and to a large extent still is, maintained by a 
convenient play of the "ethnic ~ a r d . " ~ ' ~  This is a system of mobilizing ethnic sentiments 
to colour important issues and deprive them of objectivity. For instance, a cal1 for a 
constitutional reform may be poriayed by govemment propagandist machinery as a cal1 
by the proponent's ethnic group for dismemberment of the state and thus give political 
advantage to another group. These perversions weakened the interna1 legitimacy of the 
Afncan States, rendering them excessively vulnerable to extemai forces. 
in effect, instead of the state becoming an effective mechanism for the articulation 
of the means and framework in which life, liberty and happiness may be pursued by the 
citizens, it becarne engaged in a war with the people. Accordingly, Doe constmed 
criticisms against his govemment as attempts by other ethnic groups to unseat his own 
ethnic group fiom powe:. He became the champion and Goliath of the Krahn ethnic 
group and was so perceived by members of the other ethnic groups. To sustain himself in 
power, it therefore became convenient to mobilize his ethnic group by giving them 
preference over other groups. The loss of power by a leader like Doe, was thus 
drarnatized as a calamitous loss to his ethnic group. To avert this tragedy, he made his 
ethnic group, the Krahn, believe that they would face retribution or possible annihilation 
from and by the other ethnic 
To M e r  compound this dreaded scenario, he, like most other African dictators 
of his ilk, maintained his power by divide-and-nile tactics pitting his Krahn and the 
-55 lbid. See also, Clapham on Afican Politics of SuMvaZ, supra note t 54 at 187. 
36 Donald Rothschild, "Ethnic Bargainhg and Stace Brcakdown in Afnca" (1995) 5 Nationalhm and 
Ethnic Politics at 54-72. 
"' Amnesty /nfernational Annual Report 1992 (Amnesty International Publications, London, 1992) at 173. 
Mandingoes against the other ethnic groups. In the course of the subsequent crisis, the 
factions naturally split along ethnic lines, which of course, ran deep into the territories of 
other neighbouring states. Where coercion and coaxion failed, recourse was had to brute 
force. In effect, the unity of several West Afiican states like Liberia has been sustained 
on a peculiar mixture of force, coaxion, ethnic patronage, respect for colonial boundaries, 
and the prevailing international morality on the notions of sovereignty. The consent of the 
governed has been of  little relevance. These inequities and iniquities in the Afncan states 
largely went ignored for at least three reasons. 
First, the new Afkican states were creatwes of a world order fashioned on the 
Westphalian paradigm with its excessive deference to the canons of non-intervention in 
intemal affairs of other states. Second, the notion of statehood being largely jundical, 
especially for post-colonial Afiica, threw up empty shells like Chad and Niger as states. 
These sparsely populated temtories with little or no institutional structure of govemance 
or reasonable degree of effectiveness over their arïd and expansive temtones, by virtue of 
the prevailing order, have attained recognition as states, at least j ~ r i d i c a l l ~ . ~ ~ ~  Third, prior 
to the end of the Cold War, the notion of collective security did not encompass "the 
development of human dignity and basic ~ i ~ h t s . " ~ ' ~  Although, it was embedded in the 
United Nations Charter, of which later, peace and collective security were 
interchangeable with the absence of war. The Cold WarlWestphalian notions of state 
sovereignty ensured that whatever went on within the borders of such countries was not 
the legitimate subject for external c ~ n c e r n . * ~ ~  
For AfÎican rulers who had effective control over their temtories, it was a license 
to pillage the state and oppress their peoples as Cold War imperatives afforded ample 
shield and extemal distraction. It was a triunph of legitimacy of effectivity instead of the 
- - - 
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effectivity of legitimacy. In effect, most of those juridical states, regardless of their 
absence or poverty of intemal legitimacy in governance, survived at the sufferance of the 
prevailing worId order and morality. The Westphalian doctrine of "cuius regio, eius 
religzo" was in Afiica, read to mean that the prince (change President) was fkee to do as 
he liked within the boundaries of the juridical state. Most Afiican states thus became 
synonymous with the persona of those who mled them; hence Nkrumah's Ghana, 
Kenyatta's Kenya, Banda's Malawi, Eyadema's Togo, Boigny's Cote d'Ivoire, Mobutu's 
Zaire, Mengistu's/Selassie's Ethiopia, Keita's Mali, Kerekou's Benin, Sekuo Toure's 
Guinea, Nyerere's Tamania, Kaunda's Zarnbia. The juridical state in Africa was merged 
and synonymous with its d e r .  
The crisis of legitimacy in govemance was occasionaly resisted by boiling 
popular discontent, riots, strikes and popular demonstrations but violent foms  of 
discontent, ethno-nationalism, self-determination and warlordism remained largely 
subdued. This state of affairs spanning almost three decades survived because of the bi- 
polarization of global politics and the prevailing regime of strict juridical statehood and 
sovereignty. In addition, that global regime enabkd some African states to assert some 
geo-plotical relevance, get funding from the superpowers and Western dominated 
international financial institutions without questions on political and econornic 
accountability. Thus, mlers of states like Liberia, Zaire and Somalia (among others), 
being of strategic geo-political importance to the United States and the defûnct Soviet 
Union, swived on American or Soviet patronage and protection. It is here that the global 
community is ùidicted for its complicity in the reign of terror and bastardization of 
govemance inflicted on the people of Afnca and indeed on ail deveioping nations. 
Under the old regime, effective controllers over the capital cities of the Afican 
countries and possessors of the keys to the presidential villas were feted, feasted and 
hugged in the Kremlin, Bonn, the White House, the Elysee palace and other centres of 
global power and legitimation. According to Clapham, this was the regime of "letter-box 
s o ~ e r e i ~ n t ~ . " ~ ~ '  Whoever happened to be the occupant of the presidential mansion was 
entitled to regard himself as the Head of State of that country. it helped a lot if that 
occupant of the presidential mansion served an economic or geo-political purpose 
ageeable to any of the contending superpowers. Their means of occupation of the 
respective presidential mansions and sustenance of that occupation were intemal matters 
which their oppressed peoples should sort out by themselves. It was the classical age of 
the politics of patrimony in Afnca. 
Thus, by an adroit mixture of coercion and corruption of the domestic order and 
deft manipulation of the international security paradigm, a host of Afican mlers held 
sway in their respective presidential mansions for de cade^.^" The notion of collective 
security excluded an activist, progressive and cosmopolitan perception of justice and 
respect for human rights in the plenihide of its contemporary expanding ramifications. In 
this withered conception of collective security and preoccupation with the nuances of the 
Cold War, Mobutu of Zaire who fionted as a bulwark against communism, with the 
support of the United States, ruled and ruined his country with an iron fist for 32 years.2" 
The great powers always despatched foreign troops to Save Mcbutu each time an attempt 
was made to forcefully w e a t  However, Mobutu's political relevance to the U.S, 
France and Belgium expired with the end of the Cold War and he shortly fell fiom power, 
died in exile in Morocco and left his country ernbroiled in a chronic civil wa.. His 
persona1 fortune in European banks was estimated in 1982 at about $5 billion, the 
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equivalent of Zaire's external debt.24s Bernard Kouchnev. the French Minister for 
Humanitarian Affairs scornfùlly described Mobutu as a "waking bank account in a 
,9236 Leopard skin hat. Yet, he was most welcome at the Elysee Palace. 
Similarly, Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Siad Barre of Somalia sided 
with Socialism's political agenda and received Soviet military and economic support 
which allowed them to tyrannize their countries for 17 and 22 years respectively."' 
According to Kofi Quashigah, "in their (the superpower) relationships with the Afncan 
nations other determinants, such as morality and justice oflen played very minimal roles. 
The human rights implications of their policies in Aûica were not often of prime 
~ 2 4 8  consideration in the policies of the developed nations. As contemporary events such 
as the Liberian cnsis indicate, this regime underrnined and stultified the emergence in 
Afnca of a legitimate systern of govemance which probably would have avoided its 
internecine conflicts threatening collective security o f  the entire continent. 
Another aspect of the Cold War nvalry in f i c a  which irnpacted heavily on 
global collective security was "the massive export of weapons to Afnca which the 
,9249 archetypal authoritarh regimes used to prop themselves up. To maintan the balance 
of terror al1 over the world, govemments in AErica, irrespective of their degrees of 
illegitimacy were substantially bolstered with arms by the superpowers in preparation for 
any eventual global showdown. Liberia alone received well over $500 million in military 
aid. For a country that has never engaged in an inter-state conflict and had reasonably 
'" Africa Now, March 1982. Sec also, Quashigah, "Protection of Human Rights" supra note 239 at 103. 
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office. 
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good refationships with its irnmediate neighbours, those guns and bombs were used on 
Liberians. This point has been corroborated by Congressman Ted Weiss in his speech 
on the Liberian cnsis in the US ~ o n ~ r e s s . ~ ' ~  According to the Congressman, 
[Tlhe United States certainly did not cause the current crisis in 
Liberia; this is a conflict between Liberian people over Liberian 
grievances. But as a result of the Administration's long silence, the United 
States must share some of the responsibility. Our Govemment failed to 
publicly demonstrate a cornmitment to protect human rights in Liberia. 
More importantly, we tumed a blind eye to the aspirations of the Liberian 
people themselves, who should have been able to depend on the United 
States to speak out in defense of democracy and human ~ i ~ h t s ; ~ '  
However, the regime of interna1 illegitimacy and external legitimacy was not to 
last forever. The end of the Cold ~ d ~ ~ i n s ~ i r e d  a movement towards political and 
economic accountability in Africa. This movement which has been hailed in some 
quarters as the d a m  of a Grotian ~ o m e n t , ~ " a  juridical revol~tion,~"is still unfolding 
and its impact on the collective security and stability of West Afiican states deserve some 
close consideration. 
Orphaned by the end of the Cold War, these types of govermnents whose geo- 
political relevance had just expired, were confkonted with the imperatives of legitimizing 
themselves with their people. It was a demand and necessity strange to them. Sorne of 
them who had used the universal preoccupation with the Cold War as a shield to cover 
atrocities perpetrated against their own peopleLISwere faced with the 'pay b a c k  
-- - - -  -- - 
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syndrome. The people hitherto oppressed did not only seek economic/ political liberation 
but craved vengeance. The demand for this historical indebtedness, in the form of 
warlordism and other fonns of militaristic dissent, came at a critical time. The Soviet 
Union's Perestroika and Glasnost and the United States' domestic probiems did not 
warrant superpower concern in Afiica's perennial conflict. Accordingly most of the 
Afican governments had few resources available to douse the flarnes of di~content. '~~ 
Support at the international fora and the flow of military and economic aid were 
no longer to be taken for granted merely because the affected regime espoused capitalist 
or cornmunist doctrines or served a geo-political purpose. Aid came with conditionalities 
of economic policies or political changes. in the latter case, explicit demands for a higher 
degree of interna1 legitimacy from the aspiring recipients of aid have become the rule. 
This new attitude, christened "La Boulle ~ o c t r i n e , " ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ a r e n t l ~  g v  vent to diverse 
forces within the polity of many Atncan countries and is cause for the ubiquity of 
democractic changes in A k a .  Hence, Doe contrived a democratic election in 1986. 
Similar events took place in Kenya, Benin Republic, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Cote 
d'Ivoire, to mention a iew.2Sg The one-party states yielded to multi-party politics. 
A considerable number of these democratizations were fake and hence activist 
revolts against the old order. in some cases, this took the form of militaristic rebellion 
and warlordism. In this context Liberia presents a paradigm. It is also in the recognition 
of the consequences of the Berlin borders that that the anxiety of Liberia's neighbouring 
states may be appreciated.259 The era of overbeaing illegitimate governments sustained 
by fictional respect for juridical statehood stood in grave danger. Although the challenge 
256 Supra note 223 at 244. 
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was not welcomed by the old ~rder,'~' it was irresistible. On the other hand. the growing 
marginality of Afkica in the emerging d i ~ ~ e n s a t i o n ~ ~ ~ h a d  create  a vacuum which 
stronger states like ~ i ~ e r i a , ~ ~ ~ ~ o u t h  Africa, Zimbabwe ostensibly sought to fil1 in those 
crises which ostensibly threatened regional security. As this template shifl unravelled 
some African c o ~ n t r i e s , ~ ~ ~ i t s  consequences became more pronounced for two reasons. 
The first relates to that continent's chronic political instabilitJM and the second is a 
function of the Berlin partitionhg of Afiica and the complications of cross-border ethno- 
nati~naiisrn.'~~ 
Accordingly, the success of a militaristic challenge to the old order is not limited 
to the particular municipal forum where its success has been recorded but extends to 
neighbouring states sharing sarne ethnic identity. Secondly, it affords a strong precedent 
for similar ideas and sentiments in neighbouring states. As the saying in West Africa 
goes, "when Ghana sneezes, Nigeria catches cold." Hence, President Iawara of Gambia 
larnented ( t h e  months before he was removed by a coup d état), "if Charles Taylor with 
the support of what 1 may cal1 mercenaries fkom other countries of the sub-region were to 
corne into power, one can imzgine the implications it would have for regional 
~ t a b i l i t ~ . " ~ ~ ~  During the B i a h  secession bid in Nigeria, the leaders of the Ewe nation 
(straddling Ghana and Togo) indicated their readhess to declare their statehood if the 
Biafkans succeeded or if the B i a h  were supporteci by the Ghanaian goveniment.267 
Anne Shepherd, "The Economics of Democracy" Afrcan Report, March-April, 1992 at 29. 
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explaining every crisis on this basis. 
264 Copson, supra note 95 at 86. Empirical survcys indicate that given its nuniber of countries, the West 
Afncan sub-region has the highest numbef of coup d 'etats in the world and is also the most politically 
unstable region in the world. 
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Somalia, Botswana and Lesotho approximatc to a nation; with common history of nomadic expansion, 
The combination of these factors in the Liberian crisis became an explosive mix capable 
of d e s t a b i l i ~ i n ~ ~ ~ ~ o t h e r  g vemments in the s ~ b - r e ~ i o n . ~ ~ ~  It is in this context that the 
argument by the West Africans states that the Liberian crisis posed a danger to their 
territorial integrity of West Afncan states rings politically true. 
It is now important to comment on the questionable roles of some West Afncan 
states in encouraging and fbelling the rebellion by Charles Taylor. Inasmuch as the 
Liberian conflict has been depictsd as a Liberian affair, there is some evidence to support 
the opinion that fiom the conception of the rebellion and it's execution, it was more than 
that. For various reasons, the neighbouring states were hardly disinterested observers. 
First. the original batch of 24 NPFL rebels had some sprinkling of Gambian, Ghanaian 
and Sierra Leonean  national^."^ It is remarkable that among them was Foday Sankoh, the 
head of the contemporary rebel movement in Sierra ~eone."' 
The pertinent question is why these people of disparate nationalities should band 
together. While some sit-tight West Afiican leaders as Dauda Jawara of the Gambia and 
Mathew Kerekou of Benin, who have between them spent nearly fifty years in office, 
rr272- were content to dismiss the rebels as "mercenaries, it seems that money was not the 
only factor. Some of them were ideologues d i s g ~ s t e d ~ ~ ~ w i t h  the political decadence in 
West Afiica, as symbolized by the Doe regirne in Liberia. In their view, the Charles 
Taylor led rebellion was a "revolution" against the old order represented by ~ o e . ~ ' ~  
Secondly, it is also probable that given the regime wherein successfÙ1 rebellions has its 
common language and culture and common religion. See Souadia Toural, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge: 
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at 168. 
material and political rewards in Afkica, those dissidents had ample precedents to believe 
that their success would translate into economicaly lucrative political offices. 
However, prior to the invasion, Taylor 275 had travelled within the West African 
sub-region organizing dissidents and exiles from Doe's t y r a n r ~ ~ . ~ ' ~  Taylor's personal 
charisrna and superb abilities as a fundraiser and organizer yielded results. Doe's tyranny 
had created many enemies and previous attempts to unseat him by coup d'etats and 
democratic elections had been ruthlessly fnistrated by him. With the notable exception of 
Nigeria (President Babangida), Doe had become a pariah in regional political circles. 
Liberia's relevance in the Cold War had expired and increased Doe's isolation. Thus, the 
new international order, regional ostracism, Doe's appalling recora and the conviction 
that only an armed invasion could rid Liberia of Doe were decisive factors favouring the 
rebellion. 
Although externalty funded axmed invasions of Afkican states have been recorded, 
Kwesi Aning observes that the "Libenan instance represents an entirely new dimension. 
For the first time neighbouring states advanced patronage to a well-orchestrated act of 
insurrection with strong support among the states of the regi~n."~'~ Sirnilar observations 
have been made by Emeka Nwokedi who notes that the Liberian conflict marked "the 
first ïarge-scale and sustained civilian carnpaign from an extra-territorial base against a 
govemment in West ~ f r i c a - ' " ~ ~  Regarding Ghana, Doe's coup of A p d  1980 and its 
excesses had strained their relations. Repeated Liberian allegations of subversion by 
275 The charge of corruption was dropped as part of the peace process. 
276 Aning Kwesi 'The International Dimensions of Intemal Conflict: The Case of Liberia and West Afnca" 
OnlUie>http:/lwww.c&.dWwp-97-4. Last modifiai on 5 January 1990~creinaftcr. Aning] 
'77 Aning, srrpro at 7. The United States' Statc Department furtber c o ~ e d  Burkina FasoILibyan support 
for the rebels of the NPFL. "The Danger in Liberia" The Inremutional Herald Tribune, 10 November 
1992. 
'73 Cited in Aning. supra note 276. Ghana has always had the rcputation in African politics of being 
virulently opposcd to conservativc tyranny. In the Congo crisis, Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah in denouncing 
Congolese leader Moise Tsombe for inviting Belgium to iatcrvene in the crisis had written: ". . .you have 
assembled in your support the foremost advocates of imperialism and colonialism in Africa and the rnost 
determined opponents of Afncan ficedom. How can you, an African, do this? Sec Ali Mazrui. Towarcis A 
Pax Aficana (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967) a t 3 8 
Ghana led to the mutual occasional recall of arnba~sadon."~ There is no doubt that 
Ghana initially extended some degree of patronage to Charles Taylor when the latter was 
planning the rebellion against ~oe.'" However, it appeared that this romance did not last 
long as Taylor's recruitment of rebels in Ghana became a security concem to Ghanaian 
authorities and he was consequently detained t w i ~ e . ~ ~ '  Taylor had become a problem.'82 
Quoting a Ghanaian intelligence officer, Aning notes that "there were a number of 
Ghanaian dissidents willing to fight alongside Taylor in Liberia. r r283  
It was not only Ghana that inadvertently or otherwise contributeci to the creation 
of the NPFL. Byron Tarr asserts that "in 1987, Taylor approached the embassy of 
Burkina Faso in Accra and requested assistance to overthrow Doe.-.Madame Mamouna 
Quattara, a client of Captain Blaise Compaore [the Burkinabe President] received 
Taylor's written proposal."2w Taylor eventually gained access to the Burkinabes and 
thence to Ghaddafi of Libya who had financed the Thomas SankardCompaore revolution 
in Burkina ~ a s o ?  Stedman is thus emphatic that "...Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and 
Libya provided military assistance to Charles Taylor's forces in Liberia." It is equally 
instructive that the Burkinabe govemment at the 27* Summit of the Organization of 
Afncan Unity convened in Abuja, gave some assurances to the "Intenm Govemment in 
Liberia that Mr. Taylor would no longer enjoy their support. 9-286 
At the start of the rebellion, the goveniment of Burkina Faso despatched 400 of 
,9287 it's troops to Charles Taylor and justified this as "moral support. According to Mark 
' 7 9  Aning, supra at 7. Doe accused Ghana of sponsoring the Quiwonkpa coup attcmpt of November 1985. 
"O Ibid. As already indicated, this is not unusual in Africa. For instance, the Somali governent in Somalia 
sought to justify ifs support for the Somali's of Kenya by arguing that ". . .it is completely impossible for 
the Somali govenunent to abandon the work they have k e n  undertaking, which is that of liberating 
Somalians trapped in Kenya ..." See Copson, supra note 95 at 145. 
zs ' Ibid. 
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Tarr Byron M. "The ECOMOG Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective" 49 Journal of Opinion at 6. 
2ss Ibid. 
Weller, supra note 5 at 15 1. See also, Osisioma Nwolise, " The Iriternationabtion of the Liberian 
Crisis and its Effects on West Africa" in Vogts, cd., supra note 41 at -58 
$87 Candy Shiner, "Peacekeepers Caught up in Renewcd War in Liberia" Christian Science Monitor, 1 2 
Huband, 
[I]n early 199 1, the Nigerians confirmed that Taylor visited the 
Burkina Faso capital of Ougadougou and was developing plans to train 
mercenaries at the Po military base south of the city. The force included 
nationals fkom Liberia, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Guinea and was 
being trained as new weapons were transported across Ivory Coast into 
~iberia .~" 
As for Libya, its meddling in sub8aharan e c a n  affairs is notor io~s . '~~  A 
significant number of the first batch of the NPFL rebels were ~ u r k i n a b e ' ~  and or trained 
in Burkina ~ a s o ~ ~ l a n d  in Libyan military Indeed one of the reasons given by 
Yormie Johnson for splitting with the NPFL to found the INPFL was that there were 
ri293 improprieties in disbursing "Libyan finances. He also alleged excessive Libyan 
influence over the NPFL. Sirnilady in February 1992, the Liberian Interim President, 
Amos Sawyer led a delegation to the Libyan leader, Muammar Ghadafi, in an effort to 
persuade him to stop supporting Taylor's NPFL. According to Amos Sawyer, "Ghadafi 
told me that he made a Mstake in supporting Charles Taylor because he (Charles Taylor) 
was now a tool of French impenalism, to whom he had stopped supplying weapons in 
December 199 1. 9,294 
This welter of evidence is M e r  confhned by Mr. Herman Cohen, the then US 
- - 
October 1991 atl. See aiso, Weller, supra note 5 at 3 12. 
Huband, supra note 74 at 2 1 2. 
189 Ofuatey-Kodjoe W, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of intemal Conflict: The ECOWAS 
Intervention in Liberia" (1 994) hternational Peacekeeping at 272. Similady, ideologicai persuasions are 
known to have motivated support for intra-state rebcllion in Africa. During the Congo crisis, Burundi was a 
transit route of anns supply to the Katangese cebels but with a change of govcrnrncnt, the arms shipment 
dned up. Sudan was also another notorious pipeline for the flow of a m  to the Katangese rebcls. The 
pertinent regimes aided the rebels on ideological groun& as the rebels had professed socialism. See 
Copson, supra note 95 at 160- i 6 1. 
Huband Mark, "The Power Vacuum" (1991) Afica Report [Janwry-Febmary] at 27. 
"' Nwolise, supra note 286 at 57. 
292 Yeebo Zaya, Ghana: The Smggle For Power-Rawlings, Saviour or Demagogue (London: New Beacon 
Books, 1991) at 56. 
293 Aning, supra note 276 at 15. As Prcsidcnt Kcrckou of Benin Republic presciently argued in 1992, 
"today it is Liberia, tomomw it could be any of the corntries represented herc today. Indeed the canker we 
are fighting against is aiready showing itself in Sierra Leone and in othcr parts of the subregion." 
'9.1 Huband, supra note 74 at 2 1 2. Note that French engineen wcre in the NPFL temtory installing a 
powerful trammitter for the NFFL radio. 
Assistant Secretary of State for African A f f h .  in his testimony before the U.S. 
Congress, he asserted that "we do have some evidence that about 50 of those people (the 
W F L )  rebels were trained in Libya and armed by ~ i b ~ a . " ' ~ ~  The BurkinabeKibyadCote 
d'Ivoire support for the NPFL*~% m e r  evidenced by their initial strong refusal to 
contribute forces to ECOMOG. In addition, they persuaded other West Afncan States not 
to support the intervention. During the cnsis, ECOMOG jet-bumbers strafed the supply 
lines linking the rebels to their supply bases in Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire. This 
support had economic, ideological, military, ethnic and personal motives.297 
As CroR and Treacher notes, 
Liberia was the stage for a bitter struggle for dominance within the 
ECOWAS; the organization was fissured dong Anglophone and 
Francophone lines. The Peace process was subsumed by the respective 
regional interests and the personal ambitions of the political leaders. Each 
state had a different agenda for the Liberian crisis. Above all, Nigeria saw 
the war as a test of what it perceived to be its regional hegemony, for it 
was determined that Liberia would not succumb to the NPFL and then join 
the francophone bloc inside ECOWAS.~~' 
Nigerian support for the Doe regime has never been substantially rebutted by that 
country. Nigeria took over the repayment of the %50million Afiican Deveio~ment debt 
owed by Liberia in May 1990, and it was widely alleged that the embattled President Doe 
during his visit to Nigeria requested for 2,000 Nigerian troops to counter the NPFL 
r e b e l l i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  It was common knowledge that the Nigerian government headed by General 
'95~eller ,  supra note 5 at 52. Note also that the U.S in protest recallcd its ambassador to Burkina Faso. 
'% Aning,supm note 276 at 10. 
' 97  Ibid. The late Ivorian Prtsidcnt was also father in-law to Pmsidcnt Compaore of Burkina Faso. 
Sirnilarly, because of the ideological and personal rclationship between Kwamc Nkrumah of Ghana and 
Sekou Toure of Guinca, the latter occasionally thrcatcned to invade Ghana so as to re-install the former 
after he had becn ovmhrown. In 1963, Sawaba ethnic dissidents had a i d d  their kith and kin in Togo to 
launch an assassination attempt on Presidmt Hamani Diori of Niger rcpublic. It is common kuowledge that 
the radical governent of Kwame Nhurnah of Ghana harbourcd dissidents and socialist miaded rebels in 
Africa who were fleeing thcir respective States. On îhis, see immanutl Wallcrstein, A m :  The Politics of 
Unity (New York: Random House, 1965) 101- 108. 
'98 Stuart Crofl& Adrian Treacher, "Aspects of Intmention in the South" in An&ew Domian & Thomas 
Otte, eds., MiIitary Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy tu Humanitarian Intervention (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth Publishing Company; 1995) 147. 
'W Huband, supru 74 at 103- 104. 
Babangida was particularly close to the Doe regime in ~ i b e r i a . ' ~ ~ n i e  Nigerian factor was 
quite crucial and decisive in influencing and resolving the Liberian crisis. in addition, it 
marked the height of the competition for influence between France and ~ i ~ e r i a . " '  
Another international aspect of the Liberian conflict is discemible fiom the 
hostage taking policies of the rebel groups.302This policy was adopted for various 
motives. While the NPFL targeted Nigerians, Guineans and Ghanaians and kidnapped 
and killed them for their goveniment's support for the ECOMOG, Yortnie Johnson's 
INPFL justified its preference for Americans, British, Lebanese and indian civilians in 
order to provoke international intervention in the cri si^.^^^ This strategy worked in 
varying degreesM"and eventually elicited some response fiom the international 
comrnunity. 
It is equally pertinent that the field of conflict was not limited or restncted to 
Liberian temtory. Apart fiom the traditional support which rebel movements usually get 
fiom some neighbouring countries/ethnic groups sympathetic to their struggle for Liberia, 
the field of conflict was not restncted to Liberia a10ne.'~' For instance. the NPFL rebels 
on 23 March 1991 attacked two towns in Sierra Leone killing "two senior military 
300 Clapham, supra note 154 at 238. 
30' Jibrin Ibrahim, 'Towards a Nigerian Perspective on the French Problematic in Africa" in Hama  Jacob 
& Massoud Omar, e&., France and Nigeria: Issues in Comparative Studies (Ibadan: Credu Niger Press.. 
1992) at 67. Note that the recognition of Biafra by France during the civil war in Nigeria ( 1967-70) was 
generally constmed by the Nigerian govemment as  an attempt to b a h i z e  Nigeria and reduce its influence 
in West Africa. See Ferni Otubanjo & Seye Davics, "Nigeria and France: The Stniggle for Regional 
Hegemony" in B. Akhyemi & F. Otubanjo, eds., Nigeria Since Independence (Ife: University of Ife Press.. 
1994) at 73-86. 
1°' Aning, supra note 276 at 16. There were 250,000 Guineans. 200,000 Ghanaians and 5,000 Nigerians in 
Liberia shortly beforc the crisis. The rebcls werc seizing and at times executing forcigners for diverse 
reasom. 
303 Ibid. See also, Nwoiise, supra note 286 at 59. Somc Nigcrian joumalists werc killed by the NPFL in 
cold blood. 
3 0 1  Ibid. Ghana wamed on Iuly 2, 1990 that it would no longer tolerate the violence against its citizens. 
305 Stedrnan on "Conflict and Conciliation" supra note 225 at 252. Thus, even in the absence of state 
support for the rebellion, border-citizcns scparatcd by the Berlin boundaries extend help and support for 
rebels. The help may corne in diverse ways; ranging from the provision of shelter from pursuing 
govenunent troops and serving as a conduit pipe for the flow of a m .  In addition, cross border raids by the 
rebels and government ttoops werc rampant during the Liberian crisis. 
officers and eleven ~ivilians.''~~~~ccordin~ to the Sierra Leonean letîer to the United 
Nations Security Council, "Sierra Leonean military were sent there and afier an intense 
engagement.. .repelled the in va der^."^^' 
This invasion which enab1ed the rebels secure transit for the flow of arms into 
Liberia ultimately led to the downfall of the govemment of ~ o r n o h . ' ~ ~  in addition, one of 
the Sierra Leoneans trained in Libya for the NPFL invasion of Liberia, Corporal Fodeh 
Sankoh founded the Revolutionq United Front (RUF) which has since 1990 been 
waging a htricidal war in Sierra ~eone.' '~ As at July 1999, the RLJF rebellion has killed 
over 50,000 Sierra Leoneans, mutilated over 100,000, pushed over 500,000 into 
neighbouring States as refûgess and intemally displaceci over 2 million Sierra Leoneans 
(half of the population).310 According to the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. 
Sierra Leone faces a tragedy unprecedented in its history and 
horrendous even by the standards of a worid increasingly inured to the 
brutalities of war. The entire population of Sierra Leone, without 
exception, is at the mercy of a murderous rebel war machine which makes 
no distinction between women and children on the one hand and 
combatants on the other. The escalation in the amputation of Iimbs and 
other bestialities, to Say nothing of the almost random mass killings of 
de fenceless civilians, point to a Dark Age threatening to overtake Sierra 
Leone. The vaunted scorched-earth policy launched by the RUF has left 
Sierra Leone's infiastnicture in mins and thousands of homes in Freetown 
and elsewhere in the country burnt and razed to the ground ... in Sierra 
Leone, no less than in Kosovo, the sentience of the world cornmunity 
faces its sternest test." ' 
The impact of the Liberian crisis on Sierra Leone indeed formed the substance of the 
306 Supra note 160 at 133. 
'O7 Ibid. 
308 The coup led by Valentine Strasser was justified on the grounds that the Momoh regime had proved 
incapable of curtailing the NPFL scizure of Sierra Leonean territory and Foday Sankoh's rebellion. See 
Huband supra note 74 at 206-7. 
'O9 /bid. Sec also, "Commander Culpable for Invasion of Freetown, Says Khobe" Odine, 
ngrguardiannews.com/featurts/ft73S9.h~ accessed on IOIOU99.  
''O "Sierra Leone Peacc Deal Agreed" Online, N e w s . B B C . c o . ~  acccssed on 7/7/99. See also 
"Cornrnonwea!th Secretary-General calls for Urgent international Action to Save Sierra Leone" 
Commonwealth News Release 2 February 1999. 
"' Ibtd. 
deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly at its 86" Plenary meeting held on 
the 2 1" of December 1993.)'~ The subsequent Resolution passed by that body made the 
following findings, 
that the spi11 over effect of the Liberian crisis had caused serious destruction and 
devastation of the productive areas of the territory of Sierra Leone and of its economy 
the conflict in Liberia had "devastated lives and properties in the eastern and southern 
provinces of Sierra ~eone ,~ '%aus in~  a 'massive outflows of rehgees and dispiaced 
These factors imposed an astronornical cost to the governent of Sierra Leone which had 
to battle to protect its temtory and people fiom the "spi11 over effect of the conflict in 
9 9 3  16 Liberia. For a country that was included by the General Assembly in its Resolution 
37/133 of December 17 1982 as one of the "least developed countries in the ~o r ld , "~"  
the tragedy was and still remains harrowing. It was not only Sierra Leone that bore the 
brunt of the spreading confîict. Taylor's forces also plundered parts of ~u inea )  l 8  and the 
war equally spilt over into Cote d'~voire."~ 
Scholars are divided on the motives for this internationalization of the Libenan 
conflict, especially with respect to Sierra Leone. According to William Reno, the NPFL 
invaded the diarnond mines of Sierra Leone to finance it's rebel l i~n.~*~ However, apart 
from the econornic interpretation, political cum military meanings have been read into the 
- - - 
"' International Assistance to Sierra Leone, G.A. Res.481196, U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 171, U.N Doc. 
N48149 (1 993). 
313 Paragraph 5 ,  ibid. 
314 Paragraph 6,  ibid. 
"' Ibid. Note also that in addition to other Resolutioar of the General Assembly, Resolution 49 of 1994 
appeakd to the world community to aid the States around Liberia contcnd with the refugce crisis. See G.A. 
Res. 49126.49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) U.N.DocN49149 (1994). 
'16 ibid. 
3'7 Ibid. The Gencral Assembly Resolution contains a ralher pathctic cal1 for international aid and 
assistance to Sierra Leone. 
3'8 Stedman, on "Conflict and Conciliation" , supra note 225 at 252. 
3 19 "Liberia's War is Said to Spill Into Ivory Coast" New York Times, 5 Scptcmbcr 1993. at A2 1. 
''O Stedman on " Conflict and Conciliation*', supra note 225. 
NPFL invasion of Siem Leone, moreso as the NPFL invasion "sparked off another civil 
war in Sierra ~eone ."~~ 'The  civil war in Sierra Leone as provoked and sustained by 
Taylor's NPFL has thus been construed as Taylor's "punishment for Sierra Leone's 
participation in the ECOWAS led intervention in ~ibena.'" Whatever the motives. the 
reality is that since the instigation of rebellion in Sierra Leone by the NPFL rebellion in 
Liberia, that country has become one of the most dangerous places in the world with a 
mounting rehigee crisis threatening to "destabilize the ~ubre~ion."'~' 
Similarly, some of the rebel groups in Liberia such as the United Liberation 
Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) and the Lofa Defence Force (LDF) were 
formed in Sierra Leone and Guinea and it was for the above reasons that the United 
Nations' Security Council unequivocally determined that the deteriorating situation in 
Liberia constituted "a threat to international peace and security, particularly West Africa 
9,324 as a whole. Another aspect which probably lends credence to the destabilizing ability 
of the Liberian crisis was the ease of fiow of arms within the sub-region which has been 
acknowledged as being at the root of the intractable nature of the on-going civil war in 
Sierra Leone. As Stedman noted, 
Afnca's wars have created a boorning cross-border trafic in small 
m s .  This leads to political instability in several ways. The availability of 
arms and the porousness of borders will intensifi civil conflicts in several 
Afncan States where dictators have fanned ethnic hatred in order to stay in 
power. Counûies that are trying to manage democratic transitions find that 
disgruntled groups have access to weapons and can challenge the viability 
of new govemment~'~~ 
in an ostensible attempt to cwtail this ugly trend, the United Nations Security Council in 
32' William Reno. "Reinvention of an Afncan Statc" (1995) 16 Third Worid Quarterly at 1 10. 
'* Stedman, on " Canflict and Conciliation" supra note 225 at 170. 
323 Yearbook of the United Nations f 995 (New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishcn, 1995) at 396. 
324 U.N.Doc. SIResf788 (1992) [hcreinafter, Rcsolution 788 of 19921 On the formation of the U L M 0  and 
LDF in Siena Leone, see Peter Da Costa, "Diversionary Tactics?" West Afiica, April29-May 5. 199 1 at 
650. 
325 Stedrnan, on " Conflict and Conciliation" supra note 225 at 246. 
Resolution 788 of 1992 imposed a complete arms embargo on Liberia and called on al1 
"member states to exercise self-restraint in their relations with al1 parties to the Liberian 
conflict and to refiain fiom taking any action that would be inimical to the peace 
process."3'6 Apparently this exhortation fell on deaf ears. According to the United 
Nations Report for 1995, "factions continued to acquire arms across the bordes" and this 
was attributed to the "the inability of ECOMOG to deploy troops at the major points 
across the borders of Liberia in accordance with the Cotonou Accord- 9-327 
The Securïty Council was thus compelled to note with concem that "in violation 
of Resolution 788 of 1992, arms continue to be imported into Liberia, exacerbating the 
-9328 conflict. In addition to reamnning the embargo on the supply of m s  to the rebels, 
the Security Council took a fûrther step by establishing an amis monitoring cornmittee of 
the Council to "seek from al1 states, and in particular al1 neighbouring states action taken 
by them conceming the effective impiementation of the arms embargo ... And to 
recornmend appropriate mesures in nspowe to violations of the embargo imposed by 
Resolution 788 of 1992. 9,329 
Havir-g examined those intemal contradictions and weaknesses in the Liberia 
polity which rendered it very vulnerable to external factors giving impetus to the 
rebellion, it is now necessary to draw some conclusions. First, the absence of a resilient 
institutional structure in the municipal polity and the subsequent subsumation of the state 
in individuals was an enterprise fiaught with grave risks. Its view of collective security 
and peace as the absence of war was short sighted. Second, illegitimacy of govemance 
Iasted so long principally because the prevailing international order tolerated and in some 
cases supported and sustained it. On the other hand, the redefinition of collective security 
to include concepts hitheno excluded imposed a severe strain on most illegitimate 
j2" Supra note 323. 
327 Supra at 352. 
'" U.N. Doc. S/Res/985 (1995) I)iercinaflcr, Resolution 985 of  19951 
3r9 Ibid. 
regimes. Third, the West AErican states connived at and in some cases collaborated with 
different factions and camps in Liberia and this impacted on the duration and spread of 
the crisis. While the complicity of some West Afncab states in the Liberian cnsis may 
not meet the austere standards set by the Court in the Nicaragua Case regarding state 
responsibiIity for support of rebellions (of which, later), the facts at least show that they 
were not innocent or disinterested by-standers. 
Further, the refugee crisis created by the crisis was a threat to the collective 
security of the sub-region. According to Michael Brown, "at a minimum, refiigees 
impose heavy economic burdens on host states, and they pose political and security 
99330 problems as well. In the Rwandan crisis, 250,000 Rwandans fled into Tanzania in a 
single daymJ3' In the Liberian crisis, over 1.7 million people out of its estimated 
population of 2 million were intemally and extemally d i ~ ~ l a c e d . " ~  The important point 
here is that until recently, intemal confiicts which created high niunbers of intemally 
displaced persons have been largely ignored by the international community and as such, 
were not necessarily construed as threats to international peace. It is in the evaluation of 
the process of this chanze and expansion of the meaning of the concept of collective 
security that chapter three fmds its relevance in this thesis. Chapter three seeks to 
articulate the history and contemporary featwes of the notion of collective security and 
the impact of this trend on the determination by the Security Council that the Liberian 
crisis was a threat to international peace and security. 
330 Michael Brown, supra note 223. 
33 1 Julia Preston, "250,000 Rwandans flec To Tanzania in One Day" Boston Globe, April30 1994, at 1. 
332 Keesing 's 1980, supra note 66. 
CHAPTER THREE 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY: DIALECTICS AND PRACTICE 
1 have made a ceaseless effort not to ridicule, not to bewail human actions, 
but to try and understand them. Benedict de ~ ~ i n o z a . " ~  
3.1 : INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the theory and practice of collective security as applicable 
to the Liberian crisis. In theory and practice, collective security has not k e n  static, rather 
it has reflected the necessities, aspirations, and anxieties of the tirnes. This chapter is 
divided into three sections of which section 3.1 is o d y  introductory. Section 3.2 
examines the origins and practice of collective security in the gobal order and the 
evolution of the noms regulating its practice. This section also evaluates the changing 
content of collective security fiom being merely defined as the absence of war to its 
contemporary comosition of legitimate concems for the security implications of 
economic underdevelopment, environmental degradation, democratization of oppressive 
polities, population explosion and mass migration. The limits of legitimate concem by 
neighbouring states of regrettable events in other states are considered. 
Section 3.3 examines the origins, constitutional structure and juridical nature of 
the ECOWAS. The sub-regional politics and vestiges of colonial influence on ECOWAS 
and its constitutive instrument regarding ollective security in the sub-region are also 
examined. The reasons for the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and the criticisms 
thereto are enumerated for subsequent analysis in chapter four. Chapter three is 
concerned with collective security in the contemporary global order. 
533 E. Luard, ed., The Ilnrernarional Regdation of Civil W w s  (New York: N.Y.Univ. Press, 1972) at 1 88. 
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3.2: THE CLASSICAL NOTION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
Domestic interests are no longer defined as belonging to a sphere separate 
from that o t  international interests; rather, they are seen as existing in 
rzlation to transnational, regional and global spheres. The space of 
international law is becoming increasingly international, as opposed to 
inter-statal, and the state is no Lon er capable of serving as the sole locus 
of international law's l e @ i r n a ~ ~ . ) ~  f 
In spite of the ubiquitous charmer of the notion of collective security and its 
common currency in international law, it is in fact one of the most elusive ideasSs3' 
Consider for instance, the United Nations. It is supposed to be the manifestation and 
realization of the imrnensity of the doctrine of collective security yet nowhere in its 
Charter does the terrn "collective security" appear. It is not only in this type of great 
omission that the concept of collective security betrays it's strange familiarity; teachings 
by publicists and the behaviour of states, as will be demonstrated, have not lent much 
clarity to its precepts. 
This state of affairs is perhaps traceable to its intrinsically fluid and organic nature 
and to the confusion by its earliest proponents who were battling with political realities of 
their times and thus propounded a doctrine heavily dependent on the whims of their 
respective national interests. Where the political wind blew them affected their perception 
and conception of the doctrine. Thus, President Woodrow Wilson, reputed to be the 
father of collective security, was himself steeped in confusion on the issue. From his first 
idea of a "universal government of al1 states" which is central to the concept of collective 
security, he tumbled to the slippery and parochial doctrine of balance of power.336 
However, in faimess to him, at the Peace Conference of 1919 convened shortly afier the 
3 34 Jaye Ellis, "The Regimc as a Locus of  Legitimacy in Intemational Law" (1997) International ?nsights at 
116. 
33s Ibid. 
336 M.V.Naidu, Collective Securïiy and the United Nations-A Defnition of the UNSecurity Sysrem 
(New York: St. Martins Press., 1974) at 4. Bercinafier, Naidu] The doctrine of balance of power had failed 
to aven the First Wortd War. Consequently, the Ltague of Nations was set up. 
First World War, he persuaded the Conference to accept that "collective security requires 
the creation of a global apparatus capable of giving institutional expression to its basic 
princip~es."337 
It was not only President Wilson who engaged in conceptual somersaults on the 
question of collective security. To other politicians, allegiance to the concept of collective 
security was a fùnction of national self-interest. For instance, in 1936 when ltalian troops 
invaded Ethiopia, exposing the impotence of the League of Nations and its dubious 
relevance to global security, the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King disrnissed 
calls for a collective restraint of Italy. In his view, the concept of collective security was 
"a hypothetical argument, bearing no relation to the actualities of the day."338 It was 
probably safe for hirn to Say so since Canada was not facing any direct threat from 
Mussolini's escapades in Ethiopia- Three years later when Mussolini in collaboration 
with the awesome Nazi war machine was mowing down modem civilization and 
knocking on Canadian doors, Prime Minister King ate his words. In a conceptual 
apostasy, he lamented that "if Britain goes d o m ,  if France goes d o m ,  the whole 
business of isolation will prove to have been a rn~th."'~~ 
With the concept of collective security hostage to swinging national interests, it 
took a combination of Adolf Hitler's policies of  a Geman lebensraurn/ final solution, and 
the American explosion of two nuclear devices in Japan, for the world to perceivce of 
collective securty as a global issue.j4' Purporting to have learnt profound lessons fkom the 
337 Otto Pick & J u l i a  Critcidcy, Collective Security (London: Macmillan., 1974) at 15. mereinafter, Otto 
and Cntchley] In spitc of this impressive intention to actualizt collective secwïty in its purity, President 
WiIson could not seIl the idca to the Amcrican Congrcss, especially the Senate. The American Senate 
refused to ratify the Covenant of the Lcaguc of Nations. The United States never joined the League. Thus, 
the ideal yielded to a cruder version of the convenient. Like the Concert of Europe, the tmcation of the 
concept and the half-hearted attempts to enforce it's dilutcd version soundcd its death kncll. From its 
mealy-mouthed response to the Japanesc aggression in Manchuria to a half hcartcd reaction to Mussolini's 
rave pretensions in Ethiopia, it stumbkd and wobblcd to death. '' G m t  Dexter, Canada and the Building ofPeace (Toronto: C-dùn institute of International Affain. 
1934) at 141. 
339 Naidu, supra note 336 at S. 
3'0~upra note 209 at 125. 
disaster of the Second World War, humanity denounced aggression and embraced an 
enhanced concept of collective security."" With this new lease on life, the concept of 
collective security emerged in the post war discourse as the Holy Grail to perpetual 
peace. Statesmen and politicians were literally falling over themselves extolling its 
virtues as the ultimate antidote to global ~uicide.'~' 
The concept of collective security is prernised on the theory that "peace is 
universal and indivi~ible."'~~ This notion, it seems, attains its greatest popularity among 
states after the dissipation of blood and life in expensive warfare. In its classical theory, it 
thrives on the practical supposition that "a world wide combination of a11 states against 
al1 potential aggressors would create a global system of collective s e c ~ r i t ~ . " ~ "  Indeed. 
the history of inter-state relationships confims the abiding notion that states find security 
in combining with other states which on the whole share some of their values and most of 
their interests.)" No state has yet admitted that peace is not a universally shared value. It 
is upon this seemingly trite pnnciple that the whole edifice of global collective security 
encompassing the elaborateness of the United Nations and the ubiquitous nature of its 
agencies is built. 
As a doctrine, collective securuty assumes that any aberrant aggression in the face 
of communal devotion to peace and unanimity of strength would be unprofitable, if not 
suicidai. It affïrms that human societies (here identifieci as states) are not suicide ~lubs.' '~ 
341 Otto & Cntchley, supra note 337 at 27. In spite of Soviet enthusiasm in 1934 to revive the concept of 
collective security md thus contain Hitlerite cxpansionism and aggression, the League woefuily failed and 
Stalin in despair, "continued to promote his country's national interest by his own means." Ibid. Save for 
providing a forum for minimal multi-lateral contacts, the League was a failure as an instrument of 
collective security. 
'42 Supra at 16. 
343 R.A. Akindele, Ihe Organization and Promotion of World Peace -A Smdy of Universal-Regional 
Relationships (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976) at 3. 
344 fbid. Among the Igbo's of Nigeria, this philosophy is Summanzed in the pithy saying that no one cari 
finish a rneal prcpared by the entire comrnunity and that no matter the size of the pot and the dexterity of 
the skili, no single person can gorge the entire commwiity with food for too long 
34 5 Ham Kelsen. Collective Security ut International L m  (Washington: United States Govt-Printing 
Office., 1957) at 3. [HereinaAer, Kelsen on Collective Sec11nn~] 
3 4 6  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press., 196 1 ) at 89. 
As such, no state would in the circumstances, be inclined towards aggression knowing 
that such a course of action will ultimately lead to its defeat and possible destruction. 
~ e l s e n ~ ~ ~ a n a l o ~ i z e d  the rationale for collective security to the individual experiences at 
municipal law. He thus argued that as individual attempts at security in municipal law are 
Futile, so are individual state attempts at international law. In his words, "security can 
only be collective, security is a pleonastic 
Scholars such as Otto and Critchley have asked the question which strikes at the 
very root of the principle of collective security. In their view, if peace is rnanifestly 
desirable, an absolute good and of universal value, why do we need collective 
institutionalization and maximization of the means of coercion to secure it?349 Henry 
Kissinger offers a rather pragmatic answer. In his view, in spite of the touted rationality 
of humanity, the practice of states in the course of history, confims that where peace is 
premised upon mere gentle persuasions of its inherent goodness, humanity has always 
been at the mercy of the most ruthless dictator of the international corn~nuni t~ . '~~ 
While there is rnerit in Otto and Crichley's argument, there is a danger in 
assuming that collective security depends soIely on maximum unifivation of the 
international means of coercion. First, collective security is not about military alliances 
per se. Just as the coercive instrument in the state goes beyond the police and other 
awesorne institutions of force and enforced obedience, the concept of collective security 
goes beyond a global machinery for enforced cornpliance with international Law. 
Collective security includes the knowledge and consciousness that acts of states which 
disturb international peace are prohibited in the conduct of inter-state relations, Save 
where justified at international law. It corifesses the existence of certain universal values 
which states are obliged to obey, not necessarily by compulsion or force but by a 
347 Kelsen on Collective Security, supra note 345 at 8. 
3481bid. 
349 Otto and Critchley, supra note 337 at 16. 
3 5 %enry Kissinger. A World Restored (New Y0rk:Grosset & Dunlap, 1964) at 1 1. Collective s e c u r i ~ ~  
affirms the inhercnt rationality of hwnanity but does not close its eyes to human conduct and history. 
recognition of their legitimacy and rationality. It invokes legality in the behaviour of 
states and rewards it accordingly. Towards this end, collective security includes the spirit 
or notion of international justice and rule of law. It acknowledges that intemal stability of 
states and global insecurity interact c o n t i n ~ o u s l ~ . ~ ~ '  
In practice, collective security has not always been the exampiar of global 
consensus and rationality. The sarne inconsistency is apparent in its post Second World 
War theory. The theoretical dissonance is to be examined first. Some scholars like Hans 
Kelsen argue that the concept of collective security may be compatible with devolution of 
the mechanism of international coercion to regional bodies.352 Others such as ~ a i d u ~ ~ ~ a n d  
Inis ~ 1 a u d e ' ~ ~ a r ~ u e  otherwise. Claude and Naidu prefer the more idealistic and classical 
view of collective security. h their (Claude and Innis) view, universal collectivity is the 
means and security is the end. That is to say, securîty of al1 states, by a11 states and for al1 
states.''' Ln this context, absolute centralization and universalization of global morality 
and means of coercion are the fiindamental characteristics of collective security. Unlike 
Kelsen's compromise, there are no half measures. There is either a universal and 
centralized security system or nothing. In this pure theory of collective security, which 
approximates to a world govemment, there is no "aggression" by states per se as there is 
a world order. Delicts by states will thus rank as illegal use of force necessitating global 
police action. 
The intellechiai ngour and purity posited by Claude and Naidu is a far cry kom 
state practice. in spite of the clamour for the ideal, the practice of states since the end of 
the Second World War until the late eighties shows a bifurcation of the world order along 
the lines of the Soviet and American led race for arms supremacy. In effect, universality 
'" Otto and Critchley, supra notc 337 at 17. 
352 Kelsen, supra note 345 at 25. 
Is3 Naidu, supra notc 336 at 15. 
3 54 ~rofessor-[nis Claude is genccaliy regarded as having undertaken the most defuitive work on the 
subject. Sec his Claude, Swords into Ploughhores 3d ed.(New York: Random Housc, 1964) at 32. 
Hereinafler, Claude] '" This may be said to bc a f o m  of Lincolnian democracy of  collective sccurity. 
lost out-and the concept of collective security became a hostage of the Cold War politics. 
Although the development of security alliances (fashioned along the lines of the Cold 
War conflict) as the active engine room for the maintenance of international peace is 
hardly ~n~recedented,~'~it 's consequences are no less w o ~ y i n ~ . ' ~ ~  Some scholars trace 
the ongin and spread of the practice of regional secwity outfits in the post Second World 
War era to Soviet hegemonic tendencies.)'* As the Soviet Union imposed its will in East 
Europe in apparent preparation for the Marxist prophesied showdown between capitalism 
and socialism, the Western world took note and responded accordingly, 
However, with the proliferation and optimization of the dreadfbl capabilities of 
thermonuclear devices, it probably dawned on a11359that no one, including the most 
comradely cornrnunist and the supposedly rapacious capitalist, would survive a 
thermonuclear holocau~t. '~~ To the con-, the con£iict will wipe away the entire 
humanity several times over. Tempered by this sobering reality but yielding to the 
dubious historical imperatives of securing its problematic eastem flank, Soviet Russia 
proceeded to establish satellite states. in response, the United States encouraged the 
imrnediate re-arming of the Federal Republic of Gemany and the creation of the North 
356 Otto & Critchley, supra note 337 at 2 1. The ancient Greek city-states who combined against aggression 
from Sparta and Athens almost always broke up their alliance no sooner than the cornmon enemy was 
routed. 
357 Nwafor, supra note 209 at 2. Those "marriages of convenience" collapsed as soon as the cornmon 
enemy was defeated Similar tendencies wcrt apparent in medieval Europe. 
358 Otto & Critchley, supra note 337 at 38. This tcndcncy was enhanccd by auspicious circurnstances and 
Russia's obsession witb it's history. The Teutonic invasions of the 13" cenhuy, the PolishiLithuanian 
attack of the 1 7& centmy . the Swedïsh invasion of 1709, the Napoleonic invasion of 1 8 12 and Hitler's 
Operarion Barbarossa had al1 conspircd to persuade the Russians that it's survival depended on the security 
of it's European borders. Witness the contemporary Russian anxiety in the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia. 
The argument here is that Soviet expansionism was at once traditional and ideological. The ideology in 
Marxisrn of the incvitability of a conflict between socialism and capitalism persuadtd the Soviet 
comrnunists to ~flêumize it's military might and size in preparation for the eventual showdown. This 
ideological motive was furîher fiieled by the vacuum crcated by the defeat of Germany in the Second 
World War. Moscow could thus march deep into Europe and install "client states" which could act as plates 
of shield to protect it fiom it's weak Europcan flanks. 
359 Paul Butuex, The Politics of Nuclear Conrultation in NATO Since 1962-1980 (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983) at 34. 
3 6 0  John K. Goilbraith & Stanislav Menshikov, Capitalism, Communism and Coexistence (Boston: 
Houghton Mimin Company, 1988) at 2. Sec also Alastair Buchan, Change Wirhout War (London: Chano 
& Windus. 1974) at 22. 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).'~' In a counter-response, the Soviet Union and it's 
client-states of Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania formed a forma1 regional security arrangement under the 
Treaty of Fnendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed at Warsaw, ~ o l a n d . ~ ~ ~  
With these arrangements, the arms race between both systems/regions began. In this race, 
the obvious loser was the cosmopolitan definition of collective security. Such was the 
complete triumph of the truncated version of collective that for nearIy f iQ years after the 
end of the Second World War, âhe globe was preoccupied with the intrigues, 
machinations and politics of the Cold ~ a r . ' ~ '  Peace and collective security thus became 
negatively defined and circumscribed as the absence of war. 
While this tmcated concept of collective security, evidenced by the rise of 
regional security arrangements and peace of the graveyard may have marked a triurnph 
for politics, Quincy Wright opines that it was a loss to international  la^.'^^ He argues that 
while the trend probably produced a balance of power, it failed to create a legally 
restrained world community. in the harsher judgment of Naidu, the trend was "a diffüsed 
and demented version of the collective security envisaged by the United Nations 
In his view, regionalism runs counter to collective security as it means 
3 6  1 James Golden, et al ed., NATO At Fow- Change, Continuity and Prospecrs (London: Westview Press, 
1989) at 22. 
362 Christopher Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pacr 
(Brooklyn, New York: Praegcr, 198 1) at 6-8. Both rcgional security arrangements, like the ECOWAS 
P M A D  embody the concept that an aggression on one member is aggression on al1 other mcrnbers. 
363 Regional arrangements appear to bc the compromise. Defenders of this watercd down substitute contend 
that it is a partial realization of the grander vision of the pwc concept of collective security; a peculiar state 
of being "dightly prcgnant." This limited vision of collective security and its defence by Lester Pearson, 
arguably cost him the job of United Nations' Secretary Generel, a job which he was otherwise eminently 
quaiified for. Sec Krishna Menon, India and World Politics-Krishna Menon's View of the World (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press 1968) at 107. 
364 Quinc y Wright, International Law and the United Nations (New York: Publishing House., 1960) at 1 5. 
On his part, Claude bemoans the situation and asserts that the "mountainous resolve" by states at the close 
of the Second World War to cstablish a univcrsal collective security shradt to a "mousy commitment. See 
Innis Claude, "The United Nations and the Use of Forcen ( 196 1) International Conciliation at 338. 
365 Naidu, supra note 336 at 3. But see Wolfgang Friedman, " Thc United States Policy and the Crisis of 
International Law" 59 A.J.I.L. 857. He rnakcs the argument that since 1956, there is a prevailing regime of 
"limited use of force" and that states talce particulas interest in justifying their actions bcfore the United 
Nations. In his view, these two factors show that the doctrine of colIective security systcm is alive and well. 
security for some and not for all.'" However, such arrangements represented by the 
NATO and WARSAW treaties and pacts, are distiguishable from the Protocol on Mutual 
Assistance on Defence (PMAD) of the ECOWAS.~~' The difference in both regimes is 
that unlike NATO and similar organizations which are aimed at detemng inter-state 
aggression, the PMAD encompasses intra-state conflicts which threaten regional security. 
Be that as it may, the discussion above shows that the notion of collection security 
was primarily focused on peace and the avoidance of war. In recent times, the concept of 
collective security has assumed a more globalized content. It now includes legitimate 
concems for the security implications of such diverse issues as nuclear 
~ea~ons,~~~environrnental degradation, mass migration, democratization process, sea and 
water pollution, ozone layer depletion, and a myriad of issues hitherto construed as being 
within the exclusisve domain of state sovereignty. It is therefore important at this stage to 
comment on the changing content of collective secwity vis-à-vis state sovereignty. 
The Westphalian notion of state sovereignty acknowledges the boundaries of the 
state as that sphere of a peopled temtory with an effective govemment within which the 
institutions of govemance are not accounatable or answerable to extemal entitie~?~ In 
the relationship of one state with another, the idea of stateh~od,"~the juridical rneans of 
its attainment, and its overall features, a strong preference for pragmatism in ils 
jurisprudence was manifest."' As earlier argued, this regime emerged from the decay and 
-- - - 
'%aidu, ibid. Sec also, Kelsen on Collective Security, supra note 345 at 259. 
ï67 Kelsen, ibid at 29. It scerns that the Charter of the United Nations itscIf coatcmplated the prcsent 
position as Chapter 8 provides for the exercise of certain fict ions which in an effective international 
collective security system, would have been an absolute prerogative of the United Nations itself. This 
aspect of collective security and its impact on the concept of colIective securïty wil1 be cxamined in chapter 
five. 
368 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapom, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 [1996] 
I.C..J.Reports at 226. I)icrcinafter. Nuclear Weapons Case] 
369 Gene Lyons & Michacl Mastanduno, "State Sovercignty and International Intervention" in Gene Lyons 
& M ic hael Mastanduno, eds., Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention 
(Baltimore: Johns Hoplrins Univmity Press., 1995) at 250. 
3 70 Crawford, supra note 238 at 1 1. 
371 Thomas Weiss & larat Chopra, "Sovereignty Under Siegel* in Gcnc Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, eds., 
Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press., 1995) at 87. 
collapse of papal authority in temporal matters and the supphnting of the church in 
political matters by the state. Anxious to blunt the edges of extreme nationaIism, the 
inherent inequality of states and dangers of absolute sovereignty, the nascent states at the 
famous Peace of ~ e s t ~ h a l i a ~ ' ~ ( 1 6 4 8 )  evolved a policy of jundical equality of a11 states 
and qualified state sovereignty in the domestic terrain. It was this emerging order, 
especially the central role of States in the new dispensation that Hugo Grotius ably 
foretold and articulated in his groundbreaking work entitled De Jure Belli ac ~ a c i s . ' ~ ~  
The ernergent Grotian age, as it came to be known, was marked by a system of 
balance of power, settlement of disputes by mediation, growth of diplomacy and 
development of international  la^.'^^ The ~ e s t ~ h a l i a n ' ~ '  and Grotian conceptions of 
sovereignty hinged on equality of states and supremacy of the sovereign in the state. 
Although the sovereign in most States, most often the royalty, had near-absolute 
discretion in fixing the boundaries for the expression of human interests in their domain, 
the state sovereignty has never been absolute but qualified. It is useful to note that the 
Treaty of Onasbmck and similar international agreements provided for the hurnane 
treatment of rninorities within ~ t a t e s . ~ ' ~  
However, the basic unit of international discourse and interaction was the state 
and the regime of collective security and the means for its securement was by restraining 
inter-state aggression. Collective security meant the absence of war and whoever held the 
mantle of power in the state and maintained a peace of the graveyard was the recognized 
head of that country. Apparently, the carnage of the Second World War contributed to 
hrther entrenchment of the view that collective security was the mere absence of war. 
"' fbid. 
373 H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1646) ( Carnegie trans. 1925) at 1 12. 
371 Frederick Kratochwil, "Sovercignty as Dominium** in Gcne Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, eds., 
Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignry and International Intervention (Fhltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press., 1995) at 23-30. 
'" The Peace of Westphalia was among the series of  international agreements reaffimiing the inviolability 
and sovereignty of the emerging states. 
376 Supra note 374. 
However, the UN Charter acknowledged the relationship of respect for human dignity 
and the overall earth space as components of collective security but this was to remain 
covered and obscured by the politics and intrigues of the Cold War. Abuses of human 
rights were routinely dismissed, especially in Aftica, as rnatters within the domestic 
cornpetence of the respective states which other states had no legitirnate right to address. 
It was under this regime that most states with chronic legitimacy deficits3"in the 
municipal forum, relied on the international order fashioned on the relative indifference 
inherent in fixation with juridical statehood to ride rough on their peoples. 
The Courts too were not lefi out in reflecting the values of this regime of near- 
absolute state sovereignty and nmow conception of collective security. Thus, the Privy 
Council in the case of Mitchell and Others v. DPP held that "the issue as to whether de 
j u r e  recognition was to be given to a revolutionary regime was a matter of municipal law 
,3378 in the State, and not international law. This regime continued until late into the 
ei@~ties.)'~ However, the concept of collective security has shown resilience and an 
organic disposition as it now seems to import concems for social justice, ozone Iayer 
depletion and climate change, mass migration, chronic and violent ethno-nationalism, 
water pollution, soi1 and groundwater pollution, nuclear weaponry and arms race, 
dernocratization, and a host of other aspects of collective s e c ~ r i t ~ . ' ~ ~ ~ h e s e  changes which 
appear most manifest since the end of the Cold War have wrought changes on our 
contemporary understanding of the limits of state sovereignty, environmental aspects of 
377 Obiora Okafor, "1s There a Legitimacy Deficit in international Legal Scholarship and Practice? ( 1997) 
Inremarional Imights, at 9 1. 
3 78 Mitchell and Others W. DPP ( Law Reports of the Commonweatth 1986) [Const. and Admin. L.R.] at 
155. On the impact of this trend on municipal law, sce Roderick MacDonald, "Metaphors of Multiplicity: 
Civil Society, Regimes, and Legal Pluralism" (1998) 15 A k  J. Inr 1 L at 74-75. 
3 79 Karsten Nowrot & Emily Schabada "The Use of Force to Restore Dcmocracy: International Implications 
of the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone" (1998) A.J.I.L 1-55. 
Supm note 379 at 55. Sec also. Jost Dulbmck, "Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets: Implication 
for Local Law-A European Perspective ( 1993) 1 Indiana J. of Global Legal Sl~dies 9 at 36. These changes 
have also found expression in several trcaties and conventioas on the clhate, ozone Iayer protection, 
ecological trade and so on. 
global security and cosmopolitan nature of humanitarian law and human rights  la^.^'' By 
the recurrent nature of both international discourse on these issues and number of states 
participating in the conferences which yield these conventions and dedarations, the 
notion of an emeging holistic conception of collective security cannot be denied. 
Needless, to Say, these conventions are binding on the state parties thereto but the crucial 
point to note here is that, they evidence a normative shift in the conception of collective 
security. 
As the Court observed in the Nuclear Weapons Care, even though some of the 
resohtions of the General Assernbly on these issues may not be binding, depending on 
their circumstances, they do also have some normative value.382 In the context of an 
emerging holistic concept of collective secwity, the series of international declarations 
and conferences drawing a direct link between democratization, sustainable use of the 
environment, population control, refbgee problems, et cetera to collective security show 
an evolving global consensus on the point.'83 The expansion of the notion of collective 
security and the celebrated move towards an international s o ~ i e t ~ ~ ~ ~ r n a ~  not so much be 
an affirmation of our common humanity as it is probably a pragmatic recognition that 
some supposedly state problems know no artificial bounda~ ie s .~~~  They simply do not 
respect the boundaries between states. This emerging trend may arguably be moving 
from the North of the globe to the South. Hence, it has been quened whether the 
phenornenon is really a case of genuine globalization3860r in fact, a "globalization" of 
38 1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1 966) 999 U.N.T.S. 171. See also. David Luban, 
"Just War and Human Rights" ( 1990) 9 Philosophy and Public Afain Journal, at 166-8 1 
"' Supra note 368 at 234. 
383 Ibid. On the nature of  ncw customary interntionai law, sec the North Sea Continental Cases (1969) 
1. C.J. Reporis 3 at 44. On the expanding concept of sccurity on sustainable development, see Gregory 
Tzeutschler, "Growing Security: Land Rights and Agricultural Dcvclopmcnt in Northcxn Scncgal" (1999) 
43  Journal of African Law 36. 
Mark Zacker, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple" in James Rosenau ed. Governance 
CYirhout Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) at 58. 
385 Robert Jackson. "international Coaununity Beyond the Cold War" in Gene Lyons & Michael 
Mastanduno, eh., Beyond Westphalia? Stute Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press., 1995) at 59. 
386 Dulbreck, supra note 380 at 10. 
Western concems, anxieties and interests. 
According to Quashigah, the emerging order 'Ys definitely not due to a change in 
moral or humanistic values of the Western states in their relation to the south, it is simply 
change in security interests brought about by the break up of the Soviet s ni on."'^' Be 
that as it may, threats to global collective security posed by issues outside the actual 
existence of warfare and answen thereto are matters which can hardly be pursued fiom a 
statist viewpoint. They are global problems and accordingly, must be resolved by a global 
approach. It is not completely correct to assert that the emerging holistic approach to 
collective security is a pureIy recent phenomenon. To the contrary. it is also seeded in the 
provisions of the United Nations ~ h a r t e r . ' ~ ~  
As the "focal point"3890f state practice at international law, the Charter, inspite of 
its state-centric perception of collective security and its means of securement contains a 
cluster of values of hurnan rights and seeds of an expansive concept of collective 
security . The symbiotic linkage arnong democracy, hurnan rights and peace3wfinds 
anchor in the Charter. Its eloquent prearnble speaks of the determination to "establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and 
other sources of international law can be rnainati~ined."~~' It also reaffirms its faith in 
fundamental human rights and promotion of social progress and better standards of ii fe in 
larger freed~m.'~* Its Article 1 ammis the inter-relationship of enlargeci human freedom 
to global peace and collective security and Article 103 of the Charter makes the pre- 
eminence of the Charter obligations clear. While these auspicious aspects of international 
law were almost subsumed in the Cold War intrigues, recent multi-lateral treaties, 
conventions and declarations re-affirm a holistic conception of collective security and 
387 Quashigah, supra note 239 at at 96. 
jas Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945 -892 [LN. ï .S 1973. ~crcinafter, n i e  UN Charter] 
389 Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of international Law Through the Political Orguns of the United 
Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1963 ) at Z.@ereinafier, Higgins] 
3% Thomas Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (1992) 86 A.J.I.L. at 8 1 .  
39 1 UN Charter, supra note 388. 
392 /bide 
accord it deserved priority. 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at it's 
Conference on The Human Dimension of Security held in Geneva in early 1991, 
unanimously declared that "issues conceming national minorities, as well as compliance 
with international obligations and commitrnents conceming the rights of persons 
belonging to them, are matters of legitimate international concem and consequently do 
not constitute exclusively an intemal affair of the respective state. '93 This confirmation 
of a cosmoplitan nature of collective ~ecur i ty '~ i s  W h e r  buttressed by the Santiago 
Comrnitrnent to Democracy, adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) in Iune 1991 .'9S This Declaration re-echoes the CSCE 
cornrnitment stated above. The CSCE declaration at its conference of Geneva 1991 was 
further elaborated in its Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension of the 
Conference on Security and ~ o o ~ e r a t i o n . ' ~ ~  The import of these developments, as the 
Court noted in the Libya-Malta Continental Sheff Case is that they "have an important 
role to play in recording and defining niles deriving therefkom, or indeed in developing 
tl~ern."'~' 
Although these developments are arguably inspired hom the Western part of the 
globe, their impact have been felt in e c a ,  a continent known for it's rigid insistence on 
the near-absolute pnnciples of state sovereignty and parochial conception of collective 
security. The Secretary General of the OAU, Salim A. Salim in applauding the ECOWAS 
action in Liberia, rejected the claim that the ECOWAS action constituted a violation of 
the OAU Charter prohibition on intervention in the intemal affairs of other countries. In 
his words: 
393 Lon Fisler Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Resrraint: Collective Intervention in Infernal Anairs (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993) at SOZ.[Hminaftcr, Enforcing Restraint] 
394 E.Y .Benneh, "Review of the Law on Non-intervention" (1995) 7 AJ.1. C. L at 155. 
395 Stephen Schnably, "The Santiago Cornmitment as a Cali to Democracy in the United States: Evaluating 
The OAS Role in Haiti, Pem, and Guatemala" (1994) 25 U. ofMiami Int. Law Review at 393. 
396 29 1.L.M 1305 (1990) 
397 Libya-Malta Continental ShelfCase, [1985] ICJ Reports at 29. 
mon-interference should not be taken to mean indifference.. .For 
an Afican Govenunent to have the right to kill it's citizens or let it's 
citizens be killed, 1 believe there is no clause in the Charter that allows 
this.. .To tell the truth, the Charter was created to preserve the humanity, 
dignity, and the rights of the Afiican. You cannot use a clause of the 
Charter to oppress the Afncan and Say that you are irnplernenting the 
OAU Charter. What has happened is that people have interpreted the 
Charter as if to mean that what happens in the next house is not one's 
concern. This does not accord with the reality of the ~ c r l d . ~ ~ ~  
In addition, the Harare ~ e c l a r a t i o n ~ ~ ~ o n  the situation in South Africa elaborates 
and a f h s  tbis notion. in the fifth paragraph to its Preamble, the African States avowed 
that they recognized the reality that permanent peace and stability in Southern Africa can 
only be achieved when the system of apartheid in South AfÎica has been liquidated and 
South Afiica transfonned into a united, democratic and non-racial country. Thus, the 
direct relationship between regional security, respect for human rights and legitimacy of 
govemance, not only in South Afnca but for Southern a c a  was affixmed. The Harare 
Declaration demonstrates that the inequities and iniquities in South Afnca was a threat to 
peace in Southern Africa and not merely in South AGica alone. The Ahican states in 
paragraph 9 of the Declaration affirmed their continued support, politically and rnilitarily 
for a11 those fighting apartheid in South Africa. 
The Liberian conflict, as already noted, caused the death of over 200,000 people 
and exiled over a million to various cowitries in the sub-region. Given the inter-locking 
nature of the ethnic configuration of Liberia with its neighboun and the ethnicization of 
the confiict, the field of conflict rapidly spread to neighbouring states. in view of these 
factors, it cannot be seriously argued that the Liberian conflict, on its face and in the 
398 As reproduced in "Enforcing Remaint, supra note 393 at 193. 
399 Declaration of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committec on Southcrn Afnca on the Question of South Atnca, 
Harare, Zimbabwe, August 2 1, 1989. See Gino Naldi, cd., Documents of the OA U (London: Mansel 
Publishing Co., 1992) at 79. This Declaration was unanimously endoned by the Movement of Non-Aligned 
States at it's Summit Meeting in Belgrade and fomed the basis for the "Declaration on Apartheid and it's 
Destructive Consequcnce in Southern Africa" adopted by the U.N General Asscmbly on December 14, 
I989. 
overall context of the emerging holistic concept of collective security, was not a matter of 
legitimate concern for neighbouring countries. Intra-state ethnic warlordisrn is 
problematic, and when such a conflict occurs in a region like West Africa, where ethnic 
groups traverse the fiontiers of state boundaries, such a conflict is intrinsically 
international in character. 
Further, given the events in Sierra Leone and ~ a i t i , ~ w h e r e  interventions were 
undertaken to remove illegitimate govemments disturbing the tranquility of neighbouring 
states, a change in the concept of state sovereignty and recognition of the relationship 
between illegitimate govemance and collective security can hardly be denied.40' In the 
circumstances, Kampelman's thesis that "there is a shifiing dividing line between interna1 
affairs to be protected against intervention and the responsibility of the international 
community to intervene in order to preserve peace and important huma. 
v a l u e ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ r o b a b 1 ~  holds true, especidly for M c a n  countries. in sum, the question 
whether the Liberian civil war constituted, prima facie, a legitimate subject of concern to 
neighbouring states must be answered in the affinnative. However, that does not mean 
that ipso facto, neighbouring states may join the fkay or iniervene militarily in the 
character of knights errant. To the contrary, the pertinent question ought to be the scope 
of action ECOWAS could lawfully take in arresting the situation in Liberia- This question 
raises issues of the legality of the invitation by President Doe to ECOWAS to intervene, 
the principle of collective self defence, and the legality of the Security Council 
ratification of the measures taken by ECOWAS in respect of the Liberian crisis. Before 
evaluating these issues, the next section will examine the constitutional structure of 
ECOWAS and its juridical status. Attention will also focus on the legal arguments on 
collective security made by ECOWAS and its critics. 
400 Domingo Acevcdo, "The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Rcsponse: A Test of Effectivencss in Protecting 
Dernocracy" in Enforcing Resrraint, supra note note 393 at 1 19. ~crcïnaficr, Acevedo] 
4 0  I Enforcing Resnaint, supra note 393 at ix. 
402 Ibid. 
3.3: ECOWAS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
At the thirteenth ECOWAS Surnmit in Banjul, the Gambia, the (ECOWAS) 
Standing Mediation ~ o m m i t t e e ~ ~ ~ d e c i d e d ~ ~ t o  establish an ECOWAS Cease-tire 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with the mandate to "keep peace, restore law and order 
and ensure that a cease-fire agreed to by the warring factions in Liberia was 
99405 respected. This unprecedented action was anchored inter alia on the ECOWAS' 
findings that 
[Tlhe failure of the waming parties to cease hostilities has led to 
the massive destruction of property and the massacre by al1 the parties of 
thousands of innocent civilians including foreign nationals, women and 
children. some of whom had sought sanctuary in churches, hospitals, 
diplomatic missions and under Red Cross protection, contrary to al1 
civilized behaviour . . .the civil war has also trapped thousands of foreign 
nationals, including ECOWAS citizen5 without any means of escape or 
protection ... the result of ail this is a state of anarchy and the total 
breakdown of law and order in Liberia. Presently, there is a government in 
Liberia which cannot govern and contending factions which are holding 
the entire population as hostage, depriving them of food. health facilities 
and other basic necessities of life.. .these developments have traurnatized 
the Liberian population and greatly shocked the people of the sub-region 
and the rest of the international community. They have also led to 
hundreds of thousands of Liberians being displaced and made refugees in 
neighbourin countries, and the spilling of hostilities into neighbouring 
countries. d 
On this broad mandate, the ECOMOG troops nurnbering 3,000 amved Liberia on 
25 August 1990.~' Prior to this bold initiative, the ECOWAS had adopted a diplomatic 
403 The Standing Mcdiation Cornmittee was set up by the Authoriry (of which. later) and was made up of 
Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Togo. Sec, Extractfiom the Final Communique of the ECOWAS 
Authority ofHead5 of States and Govemment Meeting, Banjul, 30 May 1990. Reproduced in Weller, supra 
note 5 at 39. 
'Ollbid. 
405 Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Lxkria, UN Doc.S/25402, 12 March 1993, para 12. 
'O6 Supra note 403. 
207 Ero Cornfort, "ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekceping in Liberia" (1995) Journal of 
Humanitarian Assistance at 1 .  
approach'08in which representatives of the major rebel group, the NPFL had held 
discussions on a peacefùl settlement of the conflict. These diplornatic efforts failed as 
neither the Doe regime nor the rebels were willing to yield on the question of how and 
when Doe should vacate his office as the President of Liberia. It is important at this stage 
to examine the juridical basis and structure of ECOWAS. 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional 
alliance of sixteen states?09 Geographically, the West African sub-region is 
conventionally delimited as the area bounâed by the Atlantic and lying south of the 
Sahara and West of ~ameroon."~  The ~reat~~"estab1ishi.n~ the organization makes it 
clear that the ECOWAS was originally designed to accelerate regional economic 
development and in~e~rat ion.~" This ambition was not novel. Prior to the appearance on 
the global scene of the West Afncan States with the Berlin-designed boundaries, close 
economic activities (and intemecine rivahies) had existed amongst the various peoples of 
the region. '' 
Although the formation process of the ECOWAS was long and checkered,"'its 
formation has been acknowledged as the most significant West Afncan effort at 
integrating. It is also ironic that the idea of an economic entity in the nature of the 
ECOWAS was fust rnooted by late President Tolbert of ~ i b e n a . ~ "  Sequel to Tolbert's 
'O8 Kufour, supra note 136 at 527. As earlier indicated, tbe rebels rejected the peace proposals. 
409 Douglas Rimmer, The Economies of West Afnca (New York: St Martins Press, 1985) at 2 .pereinafter, 
Rimmer]. At its formation, ECOWAS had fifieen members namcly: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, 
The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone and Togo. Cape Verde, the sixteenth membcr joined in 1977. 
410 Supra at 1. Between 1844 and 1966, the entirc area save for Liberia was subject to French, British, 
Portuguese and Gennan colonial nile. 
I I I  Treaty of the Econornic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 28 May 1975. XIV I.L.M. 
1 200. [Hereinafter, ECOWAS Treaty] 
'"' See the Prearnbles and Article 12 of the ECOWAS treaty. Ibid. at 1200- 12001. 
413 Rimmer, supra note 409 at 3. Sec also, Stephen Wright, "The Changing Context of Afiican Foreign 
Policies" in Stepeh Wright cd., African Foreign Policies (Boulder. Colorado: Westview Press., 1999) at 16. 
The trade was far flung and not merely restricted to the subrcgion. The traditional caps for Igbo chiefs of 
Sigeria are made in Fez, Morocco. 
Iulius Okolo, "Tbc Development and Structure of ECOWAS" in Julius Okolo, cd., West African 
Regional Cooperation and Development (Oxford: Wcstvicw Press., 1 990) at 20. 
4 15 Ralph Onwuka, Developmenr and Integrarion in West Africa: The Case of the Economic Cornmuniry of 
suggestion. a senes of meetings and negotiations led to the launching of the organization 
by Nigeria's General Yakubu Gowon in Lome. Togo on April 1972."~ The ECOWAS 
Treaty was adopted by a ministenal meeting and signed by the original fifteen members 
at Lagos. Nigeria on 28 May 1975.'" The creation of ECOWAS was a diplornatic feat 
for states in a region notonous for inter-state rivaIry, suspicion and mutual hostility. 
According to Julius Okolo, ECOWAS was created out of the teeth of "the perennial 
frontier disputes between Cote d' Ivoire and Ghana and between Benin and Nigeria.. .the 
irredentist movernent among Ghana's Ewes; Togo's suspicions of Ghana since the 
assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio in 1963, the long standing suspicion of 
Nigeria by Cote d'Ivoire.. .the rivalry between Senegal and Mali. A l 8  The recurrent 
suspicion of Nigerian motives in the sub-region is as old as the history of colonialism in 
that region and deserves some consideration. 
Following the colonization of Afnca and its consequent balkanization at the 
Berlin conference of 1844, the British Nigeria was an outstanding possession. First, the 
territory called Nigeria had (and still has) a population larger than al1 other West Afnca 
states combined. Its southem state of Lagos with a population of over 10 million people 
(Nigeria has thirty-six states), is twice that of the Republic of Benin and greater than the 
combined population of the French-speaking Republics of Togo and   en in.^'^ Similarly. 
the population of Nigena's northern city of Kano (bigger than Lagos) is greater than the 
combined population of the French speaking republics of Niger and Chad bordering it on 
the north. Nigeria has half of the entire West Anican econornic market.420 In addition. it 
is the richest country in the sub-region, accounting for a sixth of the entire global supply 
West flrica (ECO WAS) (Ile-He: University of  Ife Press, 1982) at 53. 
.'16 Olatunde Ojo, "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS" (1980) 34 Infernarional Organizafion at 57 1 .  
'"supra note 414 at 22. The fmt  five protocols annexed to the trcaty werc signed at Lome. Togo on 5 
November 1975. 
' 1 8  Supra, at 25. 
419 John Heilbninn, "The Flca on Nigeria's Back: ï h e  Foreign Policy o f  Benin" in Stephen Wright, ed., 
r i p a n  Foreign Policks (Boulder. Colorado: Wcstview Press., 1999) at 43. 
'"O Stephen Wright and Julius Okolo. "Nigeria: Aspirations of a Regional Power". supra note 413 at 43. 
of cmde 0i1.''~' 
Afthough these riches and potential have been largely 
chronic cornipt military rule in that country, the consciousness 
squandered as a result of 
of its wealth and its huge 
and mobile population, combine to imbue its citizenry and governrnent with what some 
1422 cornmentators aptly cal1 a sense of "manifest destiny in the continent of Afica. This is 
the feeling that the country is destined to lead the West Afiican region, if not the entire 
African continent. This attitude raises serious doubts about its real motives whenever it 
dabbles into regional politics. The gross disparity in wealth and size between anglophone 
West Africa led by Nigeria and the relatively less endowed French speaking countries in 
the sub-region has been observed by some publicists as fueling French suspicion of 
Nigeria in West Afnca. It should be noted that France has a long policy of construing its 
freed colonies as cultural heirs of mainland France. Accordingly, France is always 
perceived of as sabotaging British West Afncan dominance of the sub-region by its 
encouragement of divisions and dissent within the E C O W A S . ~ ~ ' D U X ~ ~ ~  talks for the 
formation of the ECOWAS (which dragged on for 15 years), President Georg Pompidou 
of France counseled French West Africa to boycott the "British West Afncan led 
proposal for the ECOWAS and fonn a French West AfÎican economic alliance to isolate 
and weaken rival influence poles as Ghana and Nigeria. rd24  
This division was manifested in the nature of support by ECOWAS countries for 
the various factions in the Libenan conflict and in the overall French attitude to the 
Nigerian 1ed attempt to resolve the crisis. While most of the French West African 
countries supported or at least were indifferent to the rebellion by Taylor, the 
Anglophone countries were vocal and active in their condemnation of Taylor's rebellion 
and support for the ECOMOG effort. 
"' Ibid. 
Clapham on Afican Polif ia  of Survival, supra note 154 at 18. 
'" Daniel Bach "Franco-phone Regional Organizatious and ECOWAS" in Julius Okolo cd., Wesr Afiican 
Regional Cuoperation and Development (Oxford: Westview Press., 1990) at 54. 
'" Ibid.. See also, Clapham on Afican Politics of Survival, supra note 1 54, at 64-89. 
It is perhaps pertinent to address the question of the constitutional structure of 
ECOWAS. The ECOWAS has several organs engaged in the daily ruming of the 
organization. The organs established by the Charter of the organization are the Authority 
of the Heads of States and Governrnent, the Council of Ministers, the Executive 
Secretariat, a Tribunal and several technical and specialized Commissions. The Authority 
of Heads of States and Govement  which is established by Article 5 of the ECOWAS 
Treaty is the "principal governing in~titution'~~'  of the organization. It is made up of the 
various leaders of the member-states. It meets at teast once a year, directs and controls al1 
the executive functions of the ECOWAS and its decisions are "binding on al1 
institutions" of the West AWcan ~ o m m u n i t y . ~ ~ ~  It may delegate its functions to a gmup 
of members chosen fiom its fold. It did this in the Liberian case when it constituted 
arnong itself a Standing Mediation Cornmittee to fashion ways of dealing with the 
Liberian problem. However, the Authonty of Heads of States and Govemments acts on 
the advice of the Council of Ministers of the ECOWAS. However, a carefbl reading of 
the entire treaty leaves no doubt that no organ of the organization, has any powers to 
intervene in matters solely within the dornestic competence of a member  tat te.'^' 
The Council of Ministers consists of two representatives of each member state 
and its responsibility includes the giving of directions to al1 other subordinate institutions 
of the ~ r ~ a n i z a t i o n . ~ ~ ~  In addition. it advises the Authority of Heads of States and 
Governments on matters of policy aimeci at achieving the goals of the organization. Like 
the Authority of the Heads of States and Govement ,  its decisions are binding on the 
other organs of the organization subordinate to it.429 The bureaucratie hub of the 
organization is the Executive Secretariat of the organization, headquartered in Abuja, the 
capital of Nigeria. This organ is charged with the actual implementation of decisions 
'" Article 5 ( 1 )  of ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 41 1 ,  ibid. 
"' Articles 5 (2) and (3). ibid. 
'" Weller, supra note 5 at xx. 
"' Article 6 of ECOWAS Trcaty, supra note 4 1 1. 
Ibid. 
reached by the Authority of Heads of State or the Council of ~inisters.'~"lthou~h 
Article 1 1 of the ECOWAS Treaty provides for a judicial Tribunal which would ensure 
"the observance of law and justice in the interpretation of the provisions of the ECOWAS 
~rea ty , '~"no  such organ has been put in place. In addition to the above mentioned organs 
of the ECOWAS, the Treaty of ECOWAS provides for the creation of specialized 
Commissions to deal with such diverse issues as trade, customs, immigrations, industry, 
transport, telecommunications, et cetera. Indeed, the ECOWAS Treaty ernpowers the 
,432 Authority of Heads of States to establish other Commissions from "time to tirne as the 
need for them arises. 
In recognition of the indispensability of peace and security to the attainment of its 
economic goals, ECOWAS expanded the scope of its cornpetence beyond the confines of 
commerce and economic integration. The extra-economic character of the ECOWAS is 
discernible fkom the organization's Protocol on Non-Aggression concluded on 22 April 
1 9 7 ~ . ' ~ ~ ~ h e  ECOWAS Non-Aggression Pact obliges al1 member states to uphold 
international noms  forbidding the resort to rnilitary settlement of disputes."34 In addition, 
the Non-Aggression Pact imposes a duty on member states to desist from subverting or 
allowing foreign elements to use their territories to subvert the authority of member 
 tat tes.^" This is one fundamental difference between the ECOWAS Non-Aggression 
Pact and other collective security pacts like that 
WARS AW .437 
The ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression 
of the NATO'~~  and the defiuict 
was subsequently supplemented by 
"O Articles 8 and 9, ibid. 
4 3 r  Ibid. 
432 Ibid. 
"j3 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression, 22 Aprii 1978. Rcproduced in Weller, supra note 5 a t  18. 
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434 Articles 1 and 2, supra. 
Articles 3-5, ibid. 
Phi1 Williams, North Aflanric Treaty Organiration (London: Transaction Publishers., 1994) at 4. 
'j7 Neil Fodor, The Warsaw Treaty Orgclnuation-A Political and Organizational Analysis (London: 
~MacMillan., 1990) at 16. 
the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD). This latter Protocol, with a 
contextualized view on collective security, is remarkable for its adaptive response to 
conflicts of peculiarly African ~haracter . '~~ It is arguable that the PMAD was ptirnarily 
aimed at plugging the loopholes existing in the Non-Aggression Pact- Unlike the Non- 
Aggression Pact, the PMAD has provisions to deter and deal with "external aggression 
and extemally supported domestic insurrection and revolt which constitute major threats 
to stability in the co~nrnuni t~ ." '~~ 
In spite of these provisions, the question has been raised whether the ECOWAS is 
a regional body as conternplated by the United Nations chartersa0 Scholars such as Hans 
  el sen^' and ~aidu"*have proposed some tests for determining when a grouping of 
states may for the purposes of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter, be construed as a 
regional body. These tests must be cumulatively answered in the aflinnative. They are as 
follows: (a) that their mernbership includes almost al1 the states within the region, (b) it 
has a permanent and centralized authority and (c) it guarantees the security of one state 
against another?' 
The prearnble of the ECOWAS Treaty and the implicit language of the PMAD 
show that the ECOWAS is a regional body. Its membership encompasses al1 the states in 
the sub-region and as already elaborated, has a permanent and centralized authority. It 
also has assurances of mutual and collecticve security. It is equally significant that 
Resolution 8 13 of 1993 passed by the Security councilW and other Security Council 
resolutions on the Liberian crisis were made pursuant to chapters 7 and 8 of the United 
438 ECOWAS Protocol RelaMg To Mutual Assistance On Defence, 29 May 198 1 .@iereinafter, PMAD] 
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439 Ibid. Article 4. This provision and similar obligations in the PMAD will be examincd in subsequent 
pages when considering the probable applicability of the right of collective self dcfence. 
440 Ofodile, supra note 135 at 357. Set  also chaptcrs 7-8 of the United Nations Charter, of  which later. 
U' Kelsen, Collective Security, supra note 345 at 43. 
442 Naidu, Collective Security, supra note 336 at 63. 
U 3 David Brown, "The Rolc of Regional Organkation in Stopping Civil Wars" (1996-7) 4 1 Airfiorce Law 
Review at 235. 
444 The United Nations itself recognizes and addresses the ECOWAS as a regional body. See S.C.Res. 8 13. 
U.N.SCOR, 48' Sess., 3 1 87& mtg. at 1.  U.N. Doc. S/Res/8 1 3 (1 993). 
Nations C h t e r .  These contain provisions for regdating the relationship behveen 
regional bodies and the Security Council in the maintenance of global peace. Upon the 
foregoing, it follows that ECOWAS is a regional organization. Having examined the 
ongins, structure and juridical statusU50f the ECOWAS, it is necessary to revisit the 
reasons it gave for the intervention in Liberia. This is important because its (ECOWAS) 
altniism in intervention has not only been doubtedu6but the reasons raise some 
controversial points of international Iaw. 
Several rationaies and justifications centred on collective security of the region 
have been advanced by the ECOWAS as justification for its action in Liberia. General 
Ibrahim Babangida, then President of Nigeria justified the ECOWAS action on the 
ground that the Liberian conflict "had a destabilizing effect on the West Afncan sub- 
region.'*' In his words, "if events are such that have the potential to threaten the 
stability, peace and security in this sub-region, Nigeria in collaboration with others in this 
sub-region, was duty bound to react or respond in appropriate manner necessary to either 
avert the disaster or to take adequate measures to ensure peace, tranquility and 
s e c ~ r i t ~ . " ~ ~  As i his argument appeared unconvincing to critics of the intervention, he 
queried, "should Nigeria and other responsible countries in this sub-region stand by and 
watch the whole of Liberia tumed into one mass graveyard?"449 
From New York, the Head of Nigerian Legation at the United Nations, Ibrahim 
Gambari in a lener to the Security Council argued that the ECOWAS stepped in "to 
prevent the situation in Liberia degenerating into a situation likely to constitute a real 
445 Hilaire McCoubrcy & Nigel White, International Organizations and Civil War (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing Co, 1995) at 3 1 .  
446 Robert Jackson, "The Grotian Moment in World Jurisprudence" (1997) Inrernational Insighrs at 42. 
44 7 Kuffour, supra note 136 at 528. 
448 ibrahim Babangida, "The Impcrative Features of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Liberia" at 
su ru note 260, at 105. 449 Supra at 160, ibid. It is iatcresting to observe that sirnilar arguments but of a humanitarian nature were 
made by NATO in its bombing of Yugoslavia. See Bmno Sirnma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: 
Legal Aspects" (1998) 10 E.J.I.L. No. 1 at 1-54. wercinafier, Simrna on "Kosovo Bombings"] To those 
who still remained unconvinced by this humanist argument, hc disrnissed them as engaging in "false 
historical comparisons, intellechial intoxication and phantom analysis"! 
threat to international peace and securïty and that the goals of the cornmunity had 
received endorsement from al1 the leaders of the West Afncan sub-region as well as fiom 
rd50 the OAU. Further, the Secretary General of ECOWAS contended on behalf of 
ECOWAS, that the intervention was in "collective self defence" of the sub-region. 
President Babangida of Nigeria, who at the material time was the Chairman of the 
ECOWAS and the moving spirit behind the intervention, offered yet another legal 
justification. He argued: " we have heard of the iegality of the intervention . . .people who 
raise the issue of legality should promptly look at Article 52 of the Charter of the United 
Nations for the appropriate and expected role of the ECOMOG and other sub-regional 
organizations world- ide."^" In sum, the intervening members of the ECOWAS, 
declared unequivocally that "the reasons for our dynamic but positive action in the 
Liberian crisis are not mysterious ... they are to enswe collective security ... of Our 
peop~es.M452 
The justifications tendereû by ECOWAS have not blunted the edge of the 
criticisms against the intervention. The criticisms have largely dwelt on the contention 
that the intervention flouted n o m s  of international law forbidding intervention in 
domestic conflicts. It is important to summarize the case of the critics before examining 
their ments in international law and as they relate to the issue of collective security in the 
~ u b - r e ~ i o n . ~ ~ ~ ~ n t i c s  of the ECOWAS action invoke the customary international law 
principle of non-inter~ention~~~in the i temal affain of a sovereign state. The rule against 
intervention is so sacrosanct that evm the Charter of the United ~ations"'in Article 2(7) 
"'O UN Doc.S/PV.2974. 22 January 1991, p.8. 
45 1 Supra at 106. 
"" Supra note 448 at 109. 
553 Louis Henkm, How Nations Behave: h w  and Foreign Pofiq 2" cd ,  (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1979) at 155. f'Hereinaftcr,Henkin, How Nationr Behave] 
4 54 The principle of intemational law forbidding the use of force and intervention in inter-state relations is 
well established and c o d m e d  by treaty law at lest since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. See Subhas 
Khare, Use ofForce Under the United Nations Charter (New Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co., 1985) at 132. 
[Hereinafter. Subhas Khare] 
455 Supra note 388. 
forbids -the United Nations itself fiom intervening "in matters that are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any  tat te."^'^ The principle of non-intervention is a 
fundamental principle of customary international Iaw and is also affirmed and reiterated 
in the United Nations Charter, intemationaI conventions and treaties. It is also evidenced 
by state practice and espoused in judicial decisions and various United Nations 
de~larations.'~~These varied manifestations of international law undoubtedly reflect and 
restate its fiindamental character as a basic component of state s o ~ e r e i ~ n t y . " ~ ~  As a 
corollaxy to the prohibition on the use of force by states, which is a rute of ius cogens, its 
radical character is hardly debatable and it is on this formidable pillar that the criticism 
against the ECOWAS action in Liberia partly r e s d s 9  
The case of the c r i t i ~ s ~ ~ ~ i s  also anchored on subsidiary sources of international 
law such as the opinion of writers?' Similarly, decisions of the Court in the Nicaragua 
Cà.se4" and the Co$u Channel CU#' on use of force by states and the doctrine of non- 
intervention have been called in aid. These arguments are apparently well founded. The 
Court in the Nicaragua Case reiterated that the prohibition of military intervention 
without valid invitation is a necessary md constitutive part of every state's right to 
- 
Ibid. It has been argued that no state can insist on this right if the right to non-intervention will cause 
disproportionate injury to the community of nations. See H-Lauterpacht, Tlre Funcfion ofLaw in the 
International Cornmuniry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933) at 286. 
457 For example, Declaration on the Cnadmissibility of Intervention Into the Domestic AHairs ofStates and 
the Protection of neir  independence and Sovereignry, G.A Res 2 13 1, U - N G A O R ~ O ~  Sess..Supp.No. 14.at 
1 1, U.N. Doc.A/6014 (1965) wereinafter, inadmissibility Declaration]; Declaration On Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Arnong Stares in Accordance With The 
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.2625, U.N.GAOR, 25& Sess.,Supp.No, 28, at 12 1, 
U.N.Doc.A/8028 (1970)mercinafter, Dcclaration on Friendly Relations; Definition of Aggression, 
G.A.Res.33 14, U.N. GAOR, 2gm Sess.,Supp.No.31, at 142, U.N. Doc.A.19631 (1974); Charter of the OAU. 
su ru note 220 at 766-775 
"&ra note 136 at 530. But note that the duty not to intcrveac under customuy international law is not 
absolute but appears qualifieci by the concern for international security. Thus, "rigths which have been 
given for the common good of al1 statcs may not be excrciscd by States to menace international secudy." 
See also, A. Roxburgh, "The Sanction of international Law" (1920) 14 A.J.i.L.at 26. 
4 59 Supra notes 135 and 136. 
Supra note 135 at 532. 
461 Ibid. 
a62 Case Concerning Military and ParamiIitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) Nicaragua V. 
United States, Judgment of 2 7 June [1986] I.C. J Reports 1986 at 14. [HereinaAer, Nicaragua Case] 
463 The Co& Channel Case (Merits) I.C.J. Judgnents, Advisos, Opinions And Orders, [1949] at 4. 
sovereignty, temtorial integrity and political independence. Similarly, virtually every 
multiIatera1 treaty of importance on inter-state concourse provides for the right of non- 
intervention. The critics conclude on this point that " the existence in the opinio jrcris of 
states to the existence of the principle of non-intervention is backed by substantial and 
established state practice."'u 
There is hardly any doubt that international law in its primary and subsidiary 
manifestations forbids the intervention by one state or a group of states in the intemal 
affairs of another state rnilitarily or otherwise. For the avoidance of doubt, the "intemal 
affairs" forming the subject of state sovereignty in which other states are debarred Corn 
intervening are those matters which each state is permitted, by the principles of 
sovereignty, to decide !?eely?' However, is this fundamental n o m  of international law 
abso~ute? '~~ Critics of the intervention in Liberia have made the important distinction that 
the ECOWAS action would have been lawful if the effective governrnent of Liberia had 
invited ECOWAS to intervene in the ~onflict.'~' In effect, the critics concede that at 
internationaI law, a state or a group of states may be excepted fiom the prohibition on 
external intervention in domestic affairs of a sovereign state if the effective govemment 
in the troubled state invites the intervention.468 
This is a very interesting point, especially as the critics of the intervention further 
464 Supra note 136 at 532. 
'651mplicit in this observation as made by the Court in the Nicaragua Case is that sovereignty and non- 
intervention are not absolute positions or principles. As already notcd, states may not in their insistence on 
sovereignty menace other states or engage in acts which constitute a direct thrcat to 0th- states even if the 
acts or omissions are perpetrated within the borders of that state asserting the claims to non-intervention. 
Secondly, the doctrine of non-intervention also presumcs the existence of a "state" and that the state 
asserting the right is engaged in acts in which states arc permittcd by international law to "decidc fieely." 
The advances in telecommunications and information have significantly affected these vaiues. As the globe 
shrinks, the "domestic" concems of states especially in human rights issues now assume the toga of 
international subject. 
Gene Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, "Lnternational Intervention, State Sovereignty, and the Future of 
International Society" in Gene Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, eh., Beyond Wesrphalia? State Sovereignty 
and /nfernational Intervention (Baltimore: Johns H o p h  University Press., 1995) at 9. 
467 Supra note 136 at 543. 
'69 Ibid. It is thus argued that the UN interventions in Congo and Cyprus in the 1 960s were at the invitation 
of the respective states. 
opine that the ECOWAS ought to have assembled the various heads of the warring 
factions to obtain their consent before intervening in Liberia. With this golden rod as it 
were, the waters of (i1)legality in external interventions are parted.M9 Thus. in the absence 
of a collective consent by the warlords, the critics argue that the proper intervening body 
is the UN. On this second aspect, the cntics argue that only the United Nations has the 
legal mandate to receive and act upon an invitation for intervention by a troubled 
incumbent governrnent. They have thus likened the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia to 
the unilateral intervention of the United States of Arnenca in the tiny Caribbean republic 
of ~ r e n a d a ~ ~ ~ a n d  Soviet intemention in ~zechos1ovakia~~'which al1 received univenal 
condemnations. These arguments by the critics of the ECOWAS action are finally spiced 
with liberal references to the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the 
Definition of ~ ~ ~ r e s s i o n ~ ' * w h i c h  arguably defines aggression to include the ECOWAS 
intervention in ~iberia ."~ 
For the above reasons, the ECOWAS action, the critics argue, constituted 
"enforcement action" under Chapter 8 of the United Nations and since it was effected 
without pnor authonzation of the Secwity Council, it was unlawful. This thesis will 
shortly examine the merits of these arguments, but before doing so, it is pertinent to 
examine the history of multi-lateral interventions in the pre-Charter era.47'~he discussion 
is to afford a historical background for subsequent analysis of the contemporary regirne 
as it affects the Liberian case on the question of collective security as presently 
469 Supra note 135 at 386. See also supra note 136 at 533. 
4 i0 This intervention was condernned by the General Assembly in a Resolution. See General Assembly 
Resolution 38/7 2" Nov. 1983, 43d Plenary Meeting, reprintcd in WiHiarn Gilmore The Grenada 
Intervention: Analysis and Documentation (London: Mansell Publishin, 1984) 107-108. The purported 
invitation to intervene was largcly dismisscd as the authority to make the invitation was in grave doubt. 
471 This intervention was condemned in a Security Council draft Resolution which failed by the Soviet veto. 
See 1 44Yd Meeting, Security Council Official Records 22" August 1968, p.34. Note also that the 
purported invitation to intcrvene in this case and in the case of Hungary were dismissed as they were 
patently manufactured and or coerced. 
"' Annex to Gentral Assernbly Resolution 33 14 (XXIX) 14" Dccember 1974. 
473 But note that the United Nations Secretary General had obscrved that the ECOWAS did not need the 
UN prior authorization. See Ofodilt, supra note 135 at 4 14. 
'"' Akindele, supra note 343 at 54-84. 
~is tor ica l l~ , '~~the  concept of non-intervention is no stranger to imprecision.J77 
This state of affairs is probably a function of the manifold aspects of intervention in 
domestic affairs of other states. Oppenheim has defined intervention in terms of a 
"dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another state for the purpose of 
maintaining or altering the actual condition of things."'78 This is a classical definition but 
in the context of the subject of this thesis it must be restricted to military 
inter~entions-~~~~lthou~h he doctrine of non-intervention is a well established pnnciple 
of international law, scholars have done well to remind us that "it did not spnng fidl 
b l ~ w n . ' ~ ~ ~  Rather, its contemporary feahires have their roots deeply embedded in the 
practice of states spanning over five centuries.48' To locate the earliest scholarly 
articulation of its noms, historians have referred to the writïngs o f  Wolff and ~ a t t e l ? ~  
These writings probably afforded intellectual clarity for the dissonant practice of states on 
the issue. Reasons for this historical practice range fiom the genuine fear of internai 
conflicts destabilizing an entire region to the reactionary escapades of fatally threatened 
regimes such as the Holy Alliance, of whkh later. 
In 1823, England, France and Russia rnilitarily intervened in Greece on the 
ostensible ground that the Greek civil war threatened the security of ~ u r o ~ e . ' ~ ~  Similarly, 
between 1875 and 1876, Europe was upset by the recunent Turkish outrages which 
threatened European security. It intervened by force of axms.lg4 Further, the revolts in 
"' Henkin, supra note 453 at 160 
476 Ann Thomas & A-Thomas, Non Intervention @allas:Southern Mcthodist University Press, 
1 956) at 3. [Hcreinafter, Thomas] 
477 Richard Little, Intervention: Extemal Involvement In Civil Wars (London: 1975) at 2. 
478 Emest Oppenhcim, International Law, H-Lautcrpacht cd., Vol. 9 (London: Longman, 1992) at 432. 
" 9  Richard Connaughton, Militav Intervention in the 1990s (New York: Routledgt; 1992) at ix. 
480Thornas. supra note 476 at 3. 
4% I Ellery Stowell, Intervention in Intemational Law (Washington, D.C,: John Byme &Co,1921) at 47. 
Vattel has been quoted as positing that "to intenncddle in the domestic affairs of another nation or to 
undenake to rcsuain its counciis is to do it an injury. Sec, Thomas,, supra note 476 at 14. 
483 Dr.F.X. De Lima. Intervention in Internarional Law (Nctherlands: The Hague. 1971) at 126. 
484 Ibid. Further, Russia and Saxony had by their armed intervention in Poland in 1 73 3 -63 placed the Sa-xon 
king on the throne of Poland. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina against Turkish misrule and atrocities persuaded the imperial 
couds in Russia and Austria to adopt the Berlin ~ e r n o r a n d u m . ~ ~ '  These cases show that 
it was not unusual for states to agree to put a tottering neighbouring state in order. 
However, it appears that the intervening states were obliged to show that the problem in 
the troubled state was of such magnitude and character as to endanger the general 
security of the region or of neighbouring states. 
As such, it was not every outrage or conflict in neighbouring states that rose to the 
Ievei of threat to the security of the region and therefore, an acceptable basis for 
collective military action. For instance, although the trouble in Belgrade in 
1903~~~shocked Europe and was wholly condemned, it was not enough to compel the 
European states to intervene. The atrocities had shocked and outraged the entirety of 
Europe and Iefi in its wake very severe diplornatic consequences for the usurpers in 
BeIgrade. However, as Admiral Morin of Italy observed " . . . though this feeling 
dominates al1 other impressions in the presence of this temble tragedy, the govemrnent 
must remember that the events which took place at Belgrade relate to intemal affairs. r d 8 7  
In spite of this restraint and rationalization which was to distinguish collective 
actions for collective security from unilateral interventions, the Holy ~ l l i a n c e ~ ~ ~ e r n e r ~ e d  
"' Ibid. The Berlin Mernorandum was an international instrument which imposed certain obligations on 
Turkey on how she was to administer her tonexhg empire. Needless to Say, this was a clear act of 
"intervention" in a domestic problea Although England did not accede to the Mernorandum, France, ItaIy 
and Russia acceded to it. Whcn the Turks could not control their empire tiom imploding and threatening 
European security, Russia purporting to act in behalf of Europe militarily intcrvcned. 
On the night of 1 0 ~  lune 1903. an anocious military uprising against the royal house in Belgrade e m e d  
the King 40 deep cuts and the Queen 65. Othcr mernbers of the royal house and mling class received 
sirnilar acts of savagery. However, some early writcn insisted that the right to non-intervention yields to 
the duty to intervcne when non-intervention gives rise to disproportionate injury to the neighbouring states, 
See H. Lauterpacht, supra note 456 at 286.1 
'" Lauterpacht, supra, at 141. Similarly. the British condemned the intervention by the Holy Alliance in the 
republican upnsing in Naples which had deposed the monarchy and instituted a popular parliament. The 
British foreign minister argued that such as intervention could only be justified "...if dangers from such 
interna1 affairs constitute clcar, grave, and imminent and actual danger; rnilitary in character to 
neighbouring states. " 
In spite of its grand name, this was a rcactionary group of Monarchists detemincd to crush by force of 
arrns, the nsing wave of republicanism in Europe. It appointcd itself to combine force of arms for the 
restoration to the throne of e x p k d  Moaarchs. See, Hannis Taylor, A Trealire on Public International Law 
(Chicago: Cailaghim and Co., 1901) at 140. 
to stretch the emerging state practice. The European Monarchy, on its way to 
obsolescence hastened by the rising wave of republicanism, did not yield without a 
whimper. The monarchists saw the spreading wave of republicanism, as a raging 
conflagration which must be put out. As the " c ~ n f l a ~ r a t i o n " ~ ~ ~ s w e ~ t  Europe, the Holy 
Alliance felt itself persuaded to intervene and contain the spreading "contagion of 
r e v o ~ u t i o n . ' ~ ~  In addition to the contempt with which most states in Europe held the 
objectives of the Holy Alliance, the contagion doctrine and its variants were destitute of 
respect among pub1icists.'91~itt~e wonder its limited life span as a legal justification for 
extemal intervention in domestic affairs. 
In arguing against the Holy Alliance's intervention in Spain, Britain distinguished 
its earlier intervention in the French polity. According to Lord Castlereagh, British 
intervention in Napoleonic France (unlike the Spanish case) was because France 
"attempted to propagate fint her pnnciples and then her domain (of Europe) by the 
s ~ o r d . ' ~ ~ ~ T h u s ,  contrary to the presumptions of the Holy Alliance, there was an 
The HoIy Alliance under Mettemich attempted to enforce the "contagion theory" by rnilitarily 
suppressing revolutionary movements in the Euopean states which had overthrown their monarchies. It 
was argued by the Monarcbists that the spread of rcpublicanism was Iike a raging conflagration which 
wouId consume and destroy Europe. Thus, in the preliminary Protoc01 of Troppau, the Holy Alliance 
declared that "states which have undergone a change of govemment due to revolution, the result of which 
threatens other states, the Princes bind thernselves by peacefiil means or if nced be bv arms to brinq back 
the guilty state into the bosom of the Great Alliance." The spread of republicanism in Europe which the 
blue blooded princes of the Holy Alliance consmed as a "conflagration" was roundly rebutted by a witty 
French woman. She rcminded the agitated Royalty that "what you believe to be a conflagration is only an 
illumination." See Stowel supra note 449 at 387. 
JW At the Conference of Verona in 1822, British opposition to the preswnptions of the Holy Alliance was 
brushed aside whcn they (the Holy Alliance) authorized hper ia l  France to rnilitarily intervene in Spain to 
restore the dcposed Spanish King Ferdinand VI1 to the throue. Spanish monarchical institutions were 
successfÙlly restored. Great Britain in vain argued that "no proof was produced . . .on the part of Spanish 
government to invade the temtory of France.. .or any project to undermine her political institutions; and so 
long as the troubles and disnubances of Spain should bc c o d i d  within her own temtory, they could not 
be admitted by the British Governmcnt to afford a plea for foreign interference." Stowell, ibid. 
19 1 According to Bowett, "as long as what is going on in your neighbour's house does not dircctly concem 
you, there cannot be that pressing cal1 for self defencc which the plea assume~.~Stowell~upra note 48 1 at 
386. This concept is not as simple as it look. Those making the determination of whethcr the "intemal" 
problem has become international rely on fluid factors of geo-politics to make thtir judgmcnts. 
"" Stowell, supra note 48 1 at 10. 'lhis distinction appearcd to lay the test upon which legality of 
interventions was judged for over one century. Sce Thomas, supra note 476 at 20. Lord Castlereagh 
dismissed the Holy Alliance as "sublime mysticism and nonsense" and Lord Metternich of Austria later 
ridiculed it as " a loud sounding nothing." See Baron De Savigny, Mettemich and His Times(London: 
Longman, 1962) at 129. It is equally rernarkable that the presumptions of the Holy Alliance did not stop the 
emerging opinion arnong states that the rnere existence of a pemicious institution in a 
neighbouring state does not warrant or justifi externai intervention. Here, it seems that 
the cnix of the matter turned on finding the test with which "illuminations" may be 
distinguished from "conflagrations." While "illuminations" were strictly out of bounds 
for foreign states, it was emerging as acceptable and admissible in international law that 
states who had a centralized and objective fiarnework for detemining the existence of 
raging "conflagrations" might act collectively to put out the inferno without breaching the 
n o m  on interventions. The latta action came to be known as "collective a~tion."'~' 
Regarding this regime, it was writers such as Von Martens who distilled from the 
practice of states, coherent principles of legality for multilateral actions.'94 Dunng the 
days of the Holy Alliance and for long thereafter, the determination of the legality or 
otherwise of multilateral military interventions largely depended on third party perception 
of the rno tive of the inter~enors.'~' This chaotic regime4%lacking appreciable scienti fic 
order, was thus largely articulated and clarified by other observers such as ~ericke. '~ '  
Shortly before the emergence of the United Nations Charter, (of which later) the 
following factors and tests marked out collective actions from unilateral interventions. 
According to the findings of the inter-American ~urists.'~*the distinctions include that 
collective actions, uniike unilateral interventions, are usually undertaken by states in a 
spread of the contagion of republicanism which was actively supportcd by immanuel Kant in his 
"Philosophical Essays on Perpetual Peacc (1795). See De Lima, supra note 483 at 14. 
493 Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts., eds., Oppenheim's inmational L w ,  ghed.. (London: Longman, 
1992) at 447.[Hereinafter, Jennings &Watts] 
49' P.H Winîïeld, "The History of Intervention in international Law" (1922-3) B. Y.I.L. 130 at 138. Between 
1820- 1832, there were at l e s t  sevcn multilateral interventions in Europe of varying consequences. 
495 Winfield, supra at 133. 
1% Winfield Iamented that "the non-intervention mie appears to be a patent consequence of independence 
with a host of disordcrly exceptions fastened upon it" 
497 Winfield supra , at 137. He had already exhiïited his despair when he lamentcd that "the subject of 
intervention is one of the vaguest branches of intemational law. We arc told it is a right; that it is a crime; 
that it is the exception; that it is never permissible at all. A reader. aftcr perusing Phillimore's chapter upon 
intervention, might close the book with the impmsion that intervention might bc anything fiorn a speech of 
Lord Paimenton's in the House of Commons to the Partition of Poland." 
498 D~flerences Behveen Intervention and Collective Action, Inter-Amcrican Juridical Cornmittee. OAS 
Offkial RecordOOEA/Scr. 1 M . 2  (Pan American Union, Gencral Secretatriat. OAS, Washington, D-C, 
1996) 
treaty based or clearly defined relationship. Second, while unilateral interventions 
disregard the findamental rights of states, collective action always tend to restore the 
vio1ated right. Third, while unilateral intervention is arbitrary and is for certain interests, 
collective action defends al1 the member states of the organization. Fourth, while 
intervention signifies an attitude that exceeds the cornpetence of a state, collective action 
is exercised within the framework of the multi-lateral b ~ d ~ . ' ~ % i r  Ivor Jennings has 
acknowledged the work of ~ u r d o c h ~ ~ ~ o n  the subject as being decisive?'' It is equally 
interest ing to note that Murdoch's conclusions are similar toSoZthose of the inter- 
Amencan Jurists. However, the pre-Charter regime marked by its reliance on ad-hoc 
c ~ n f e r e n c e s ~ ~ ~ f o r  the maintenance of collective security has been supervened by the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter. 504 
rrSO5 However, the Liberian crisis is probably a "hard case as it questions an 
intervention by a regional organization and the extent to which the provisions of the 
United Nations Charter (primarily designed to regulate inter-state c o n f l i c t ~ ) ~ ~ r n a ~  be 
adapted in justikng the legal problems posed by the crisis and consequent intervention 
by ECOWAS."' The importance of this is further underscored by the increasing number 
of such crises, a phenornenon which Luard, aptly notes as "unique in h i s t ~ r ~ . " ~ ~ ~  If as 
499 Ibid. 
5 0 0  James Oliver Murdoch, "Collective Security Distinguished fiom intervention" (1962) 56 A.J.I.L. at 500. 
5 0  1 Oppenheim's Intemarional Law, supra note 478 at 448. 
'O2  Supra note 500. 
' O 3  F. Kirgis, International Organizations in Their Legal Setring (Minn: West Publishing Co. 1993) at 2. 
5 0 4  Ian Brownlie, Inrernational Law and rhe Use ofForce (Oxford: CIarendon Press, 1963) at 
345. [Hereinaftcr, Brownlie] 
505 Roger Shiner, N o m  and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thoughr (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at 
187. 
5 0 6  Anthony Clark., "The United Nations, Regional Organizations and Military Operations The Past and 
The Present" ( 1996) 7 Duke J.  of Comp. & fnr. Law at 3. ~ercinafter ,  Clark] 
507 Provisions of Chapter 8 of the U.N Chapter refer mainly to inter-state aggrcssion. However, since the 
adoption of the Charter, " a new type of military operation has developed, which has become known as 
peacekeeping." ibid. See also, William Durch., Evolurion of UN. Peacekeping: Case Studies and 
Compararive Analysis (New York: St- Mar& Press, 1993) at the introduction. 
5 0 8  Supra note 333 at 8. Scholars have dubbed confiicts like the Laberian war, "mixed conflicts." These are 
civil wars with substantial but indirect extemal intervention. Set John Norton Moore "Toward an Applied 
Theory for the Regulation of intervention" in John Norton Moore ed., Law and Civil War In The Modern 
CYorld (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.,1974) at 3. 
Luard argues, " the cirafiers of the UN Charter do not seem to have envisaged that the UN 
rrS09- would have any role at al1 to play ln such types of conflict, under what regime of laws 
would the legitimacy of the ECOWAS intervention to be evaluated? In answering this 
question, the issue of the legality of Doe's invitation to ECOWAS and the applicability of 
the principles of collective self defence to the Liberian problem will be explored in the 
next chapter. Thereafier, the legality of the Security Council ratification of the ECOWAS 
intervention will be addressed in Chapter five. 
Luard, supra note 333 at 22. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
INTERVENTION BY INVITATION AMI COLLECTIVE SELF 
DEFENCE 
4.1 : INTRODUCTION 
in examining the legal arguments on collective security made by ECOWAS and 
critics of the intervention, this chapter seeks to ascertain the applicability of the pertinent 
Iegal defences raised by ECOWAS in the Liberian case. The arguments here are 
decidedly nuanced and located within the security peculiarities of the West AErican sub- 
rcgion. This chapter is divided into five sections. While section one is introductory, 
section two examines Doe's authority to invite ECOWAS intervention and the scope of 
activities ECOWAS could lawfully undertake in Liberia on the basis of that invitation by 
Doe. This issue also dwells on the capacity of the ECOWAS to act on such invitation. 
Secondly, even if Doe could not invite extemal intervention, the question still remains 
whether ECOWAS acting under the the principles of its Protocol on Mutual Assistance in 
Defence (PMAD) and the traditional principles of the right of collective self defence was 
entitied to intervene. 
in this context, section three traces the origins, elements and character of the 
doctrine of collective self-defence as a d e  of customary international law. From its early 
appearances in the Perperucil Peace of 1292 between the Swiss Forest Commwiities, the 
right of collective self-defence is traced to its contemporary character. Section four 
examines the impact, if any, of the UN Charter on the customary international right of 
collective self-defence. Attention is also paid to its doctrinal modification and adaptation 
in the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD). The characteristics 
of the PMAD, which in addition to the traditional preoccupation with problems of 
extemal aggression, has provisions relating to mutual assistance on externally supponed 
interna1 rebellion, are exarnined. 
Section five explores such questions as whether the PMAD provisions afford 
legal justification for ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, the impact of PMAD on the 
general notions on collective secwity vis-à-vis the question of what constitutes intemal or 
domestic matter in an increasingly shrinking globe. Further the suitability of such 
agreements as the PMAD for developing states like Liberia caught in the grips of a 
dictatorship is evaluated. Eow would the UN security system cope with the growing 
regional assertiveness in the enforcement of peace? This section and the entirety of 
chapter four teases out these questions and explores the nuances of the issues raised. It 
concludes that the ECOWAS action in Liberia is defensibie both under the authority of 
President Doe to invite ECOWAS and the principles of collective self defence as adapted 
under under the PMAD. 
4.2: INTERVENTION AT THE INVITATION OF THE GOVERNMENT 
In section 3.2, Kuffour and Offodile, the critics of the intervention by ECOWAS 
in Liberia have made the distinction that the ECOWAS action would have been lawful at 
the invitation of the effective government of Libena, they have argued that Doe lacked 
effectiveness and secondly, that the proper intervening body is the UN. On the foregoing 
grounds, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia is likened to the intervention of the United 
States of Americô in the tiny Caribbean republic of Grenada and the Soviet intervention 
in ~ z e c h o s l o v a k i a . ~ ~ ~  The critics also argue that the intervention by ECOWAS 
constituted "enforcement action" under Chapter 8 of the United Nations and without the 
prior authorization of the Security Council, it was unlawtiil. 
~ u f f o d "  and Ofodiles'*have M e r  argued that once a conflict such as the 
Liberian crisis degenerates into a civil war, intervention is illegal without the consent of 
the warring parties. On the first leg, it has been urged that the intervention by the 
ECOWAS without the unanimous consent and invitation of the warring factions in 
Libena, was not only a violaion of the sovereignty of Liberia but an unlawful 
abridgment of the right of Liberian peoples to self determinati~n.''~ Kuffior funher 
argues that the ECOWAS decision to intervene lacks legitimacy because it was "not 
based on a consensus amongst the member states of the ~ o m m u n i t ~ . " ~ ' ~  in effect. it is 
argued that since the ECOWAS treaty adopts the "unanimity r~le"' '~in arriving at it's 
decisions, the decision to intervene, taken in the teeth of opposition by two rnember 
- - 
510 This intervention was condemned in a Security Couacil draft Resolution which failed by the Soviet veto. 
See 1442"~ Meeting, Security Council Oficial Records 22* August 1968, p.34. Note also that the 
purported invitation to intervent in this case and in the case o f  Hungary were dismisscd as patcntly 
manufactured and or coerced. 
S u p n  note 136 at 549. 
'" Supra note 1 35 at 407. 
513 Hea ther Wilson. In  fernational Law und the Use of Force by National Liberation Movemenrs (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988) at 7.[Hcreinaficr, Wilson] 
514 ibid. This is a curious argument. The two couaies  (Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire) which initially 
opposed the intervention, were acknowlcdged to have financed and equipped the rebels. 
" H.G Schermers, Infernational Institurional Law (The Hague: AIphen & Noordorf, 1980) at 39 1 . 
~tates,~'%as fatally defective. The critics therefore query "whether the decision to 
intervene was one by the Community itself or rather, by a nurnber of Member states 
acting under the guise of the Community's a ~ t h o r i t ~ . " ~ "  This section examines the merits 
of these arguments. 
The question of the legal validity of military intervention by invitation of the 
govemments'8is one that may be answered by specific reference to two issues. The first is 
the relevant international noms. The second is the factual scenario on effectiveness of 
the incumbent regime as at the material time an invitation to intervene is made. In the 
context of the Liberian cnsis, the issue may be b m e d  as follows: whether having regard 
to the material circwnstances in Liberia, President Doe had the authonty to invite 
ECOWAS intervention. The second, whether the ECOWAS had the legal capacity to act 
on the invitation by Doe. The third is on the extent of the powers of ECOWAS in 
responding to the invitation. In addressing these issues, this section will attempt to re- 
state the Law on military intervention by invitation of the govemment, examine the factual 
scenario in Liberia at the matenal time of the invitation and by applying the former to the 
latter, argue that the ECOWAS action was lawful. It will also examine the scope of 
lawfùl measures ECOWAS's ECOMOG, as a peacekeeping body, could undertake in 
Liberia in its resolution of the crisis. 
International law recognizes the validity of a state or a group of states sending 
troops to another state upon invitation for certain limited ~ ~ e r a t i o n . ' ' ~  Indeed, Article 3 
of the General Assembly Resolution 33 14 on the Defintion of ~ ~ g r e s s i o n , ~ * ~ a l b e i t  
5 16 Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire. Although the activities of these two States may not meet the austere 
requirements poscd by the Nicaragua Case, of which later, these two countries, for diverse reasons. 
su oned the NPFL. 
l P . ~ P ~ ~  note 136a 539. Note that Builcina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire change* their minds and supponed the 
intervention when they alleged the discovery of "NPFL sponsorcd attempts to destabilizt" their own 
countries. See Ofodilc, supra note 135 at 384. 
5 18 Louise Doswald-Beck "The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by the Invitation of the 
Government" ( 1 985) 56 B. Y./. L. 189.~ereinafter, Doswald-Beck] 
l9 lbid. 
'O Definition of Aggression, G.A.Res.33 14, U.N. GAOR 29& Sers..Supp.No.3 1. at 142, U.N. Doc.A/963 1 
( 1974). See also supra note 457. 
negatively, excepts invited m i l i t q  intervention fiom its definition of what constitutes 
international acts of aggression. Such limited operations have been recognized to include 
use of peacekeeping forces which do not become involved in the internal affair~,~"certain 
rescue missions and quelling of minor intemal dis turban ce^.^^' When a govemment is in 
effective control of most of the state, this principle also affords "a clear alternative to 
Security Council authorization as a b a i s  for justifying extemal inter~ention.""~ Provided 
the consent to extemal intervention is clear, voluntary and fiom the effective authority in 
the state, its legal validity is hardly a matter of c o n t r o v e r ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~  
According to Roberto Ago (then Special Rapporteur), the rationale for this is that 
consent to intervention acts as a f o m  of bilateral agreement between the intervening and 
consenting states and this suspends the normal operation of the legal rules that would 
othewise govem their r e l a t i ~ n s h i ~ . ~ * ~  Moreover, it is an expression of a state's sovereign 
right to choose its mode of bilateral or multi-lateral relations with other states within the 
bounds of international law. Oftentimes, this finds expression in treaties on mutual 
defence but is not limited to that. Although states are absîract entities, international law 
presumes that when a government exercises effective control over the territory and its 
population, the government of that state possesses the exclusive authority to express the 
will of the  tat te.^*^ This is borne out by the consistent practice of states. As Farer 
observes, there is a virtuaI 'iuùforrn practice in international relations of treating any 
group of nationals in effective control of their state as constituting its legitimate 
governrnent."527 This supposition has little reference to how that group of persons in 
"' Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 18, ibid. 
Ibid. in 1964, Britain intemencd in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya to help incumbent govemments 
quel1 internal mutinies, France has intervened more than a dozcn times in Afkican states to help beleaguered 
oveniments regain control in the face o f  attempted miliatry coup d'etats. 
Fi3 David Wippman, "Military Intervention, Regional Organjzations, and Host-State Consent" (1996) 7 
Duke J. ofcornp. & Inr '1 Law 209 at 228. [Hereinafîer, Wippman on Consent] 
'" Rein Mullerson. "Intervention by Invitation" in L-Damrosch & D. Scheffer, eds., Loiu and Force in the 
New International Order (New York: Council on Foreign Relations., 1991) at 128-9. 
'" Eighrh Repon on Srare Resposibility, (1979) 2 Y.B.I.L.Comm h 35-36. [Hereinaftrr, Roberto Ago] 
5 26 Wipman on "Consent", supra note 523 at 2 12. 
5 27 Tom Farer, "Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm" (1990) 84 A.J.I.L.5 10 at 5 13. Sec also, Ian 
effective control of their state acquired the power S2gand is probably derived fkom both 
practical and theoretical cons ide ration^.^'^ 
States thus accept this position as the only viable means of conducting their 
relations and by extension, accord legitimacy to interventions by invitation made by the 
effective regime. However, the legality of the invitation becomes questionable when the 
alleged invitation is tainted with certain vitiating elements such as error, fkaud, violence 
or corruption.530 Similady, the presumption of effectiveness of govemments and the nght 
to invite intervention becomes probtematic when the govenunent is very shaky. The 
question may revolve on who is entitled to express the will of the state in inviting 
extemal interventi~n.'~' This scenario arises when the govemrnent's authont). to 
represent the state is in issue. The global outrage over the Soviet intervention in Hungary 
( 1 %6), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979) are in point.532 Similar 
disapproval greeted United States' intervention in Grenada (1983) and in the Dominican 
Republic (1965)."~ In those cases, what was questioned was not the validity of the 
principle of the legality of intervention by invitation, but the validity of the purported 
invitations. This issue will be revisited anon. 
As an aside, the Cold War created a situation of near absolute state sovereignty 
and this was in tum translated to mean unbridged support for "effective*' govemments 
fighting for their l i~es.~'~Xn the Afncan context, control of the capital city and the 
presidentilal mansion seemed enough to create the right for a president of a state to speak 
for the state and request extemal intervention when necessary. According to Clapham. 
Browlie, supra note 504 at 327. 
See Doswald-Beck, supra note 518 at 193. 
5 29 Wippman, on "Consent", supra note 523 at 212. For non-democratic States, this is fictitious. 
5 30 Robero Ago, supra note 525 at 36. 
531 Quincy Wright, "United States Intervention in the Lebanon" (1959) 53 A.J.I.L.112 at 120. 
"' On Hungary, see U.N.SCOR, 14& Sess., 746& Mtg at 4, U.N.Doc.S/PV (1956). On Czechoslovakia, see 
U.N.Doc. S/PV. 144 1 (1 968). On Afg-tan, sce U.N.Doc. SmV.2 185 (1980). 
533 Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 18 at 228-237. 
534 David Wipprnan, "Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military Interventions in Intemal 
Conflicts" (1996) 27 Colum. Human Rightr Rev. at 435. 
[Slave for occasional and exceptional circumstances,. . .the 
international community tacitly adopted the rule that the government of a 
state consisted of that group of people who controlled the most important 
buildings in the national capital. This may be described as 'letterbox 
sovereignty', in the sense that whoever opened the letten in the 
presidential palace received the invitation to represent the state concemed 
in the United Nations and other international bodies.535 
it goes without saying that such occupant of the presidential mansion in control of the 
capital city, even if he was dictatorial in character and suffered huge deficits of 
Iegitimacy in governance. could lawfully invite extemal aid to assert his a ~ t h o r i t y ~ ) ~  
Conversely, even if the opposing or rebelling forces espoused fieedom and respect for 
human dignity, aid to them was perceived as a violation of the principle of non- 
As the Court held in the Nicaragua Case, the principle of non-intervention 
"would certainly lose its effectiveness ... if intervention were to be justified by a mere 
,438 request for assistance by an opposition group in another state. Accordingly, in that 
case, aid by the U.S. Government to the rebels seeking the overthrow of the effective 
Nicaraguan government was held i ~ l e ~ a l . ' ~ ~  in addition, the Court reaffirmed 
unequivocally that intervention is generally "allowable.. .at the request of the government 
of a State. 0540 
Subsidiary sources of international law such as the writings of publicists5'" 
Clapham on Aman Politics ofSuryiva1, supra note 1 54 at 20. 
5 3 6  Tom Farer, "A Paradigm of Lcgitirnate Intervention" in Enforcing Resfrainr, supra note 393 at 3 16-34 1.  
"' Wippmui on "Consent". supra note 523 at 2 13. 
538 Nicaragua Cme. supra note 462 at 126. 
5'9 fbid. Note that although the U.S intervention in Panama ousted a dictatorial regime, it was widely 
condemned as "a flagrant violation of international iaw." Sec G.A Rcs. 44240, U.N.GAOR, 44" 
Sess.,Supp. No.49.88& plen. Mtg. At 52. (1989). See also, Louis Henkin, "The invasion of Panama Under 
International Law: A Gross Violation" (1991) 29 Colum. J. Transnat '1 L. at 293. 
"O fbid. 
54 1 Article 38 of the Statute of the international Court of Justice. Reproduced in Kindred, i n f i  note 932 
confim the legality of an effective government inviting extemal intervention in the 
domestic polity. According to Henkin, "upon authentic invitation, a state may introduce 
rnilitary forces into the territory of another to assist the government for various purposes, 
including maintaining intemal ~ r d e r . ' ~ ' ' ~  A caveat must be entered here. That is. an 
"effective govenunent may not authorize extemal intervention against a national 
liberation movement opposing racist or colonial d~rnination.""~ This is a direct 
application of the general principle that a state rnay not lawfilly authorize another state to 
take any action which would be illegal under international law if undertaken by the 
authorizing state itself. Since the prohibition on racial discrimination and the right to self 
detemination of peoples have the character of ius c ~ ~ e n s , ~ ~ w h i c h  are non-derogable 
rights Save when altered by a principle of similar character,%is exception seems to 
strengthen the 
The practice of states, especially in M c a ,  confirms that an incumbent 
government, even when it has lost control of a substantial portion of the state, rnay 
lawfûlly invite extemal intervention, provided it retains control over the capital city and 
is not in irnmediate danger of c o ~ l a ~ s e . ~ ~ ~  Similarly, states and international organizations 
are slow to withdraw recognition fiom an incumbent government, even when the 
government has lost control of much of the state."* Premature withdrawal of recognition 
- - - 
(supplement) at 33.See also, The Paquere Habana Case 175 U.S 677. Reproduced in exrenso in Eric Heinz 
& Malgosia Fitzmaurice, eds., Landmark Cares in Internatinal Law (Hague: Kluwer International.. 1998) 
rit 23. 
"' Louis Henkin, "Use of Force: Law and U.S Policy" in Louis He- cd., Right v. Might: Intemutional 
Law and the Use of Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991) at 67. 
'" Wippman on "Consent" supra note 523 at 215. 
'" (1 966) Y.B.I.L.C. at 247-9. 
545 Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Trcatics (1969) 1155 U.N.T.S.33 in force, 1980. 
Western Sahara Cue, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975 (19751 I.C.J.Repom 12. See also, Heather 
Wilson, supra note 5 13 at 9 1. 
547 Supra note 154 at 20. See also, Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 18 at 197-8. 
548 Wipprnan, on "Consent" supra note 523 at 223. The Chadian situation, of which later, is in point. The 
may even be constned as illicit support for the rebel~.~" The disposition to lawfully aid 
the beleaguered goverment is further strengthened when it is obvious that the opposing 
forces are receiving substantial aid and assistance fiom third states. In the circumstsnces, 
aid to the incurnbent may be perceived as counter-intervention,s50if not an exercise of the 
right of collective self-defence. Given the austere conditions required for a valid exercise 
of the nght of collective self-defence as judicially expoused in the Nicaragua Case and 
the sumeptitious and secretive nature of third-state support for insurrections, the latter 
claim of right may be more difficult to sustain. 
However, it is interesthg to note that this regime, especiaily under the Cold War 
era, worked in favour of incumbents who acted "as if they have a virtually unlimited right 
to obtain help nom third states in seeking to suppress intemal rebelli~ns."~~' Save for the 
exceptional cases of ~ u n ~ a r ~ , ' ' ~  the Dominican ~e~ublic, '" ~ f ~ h a n i s t a n , ~ ~ '  and 
~ r e n a d a , ~ ~ '  the legality of a request for extemal intemention by beleaguered regimes has 
been surprisingly consistent at customary international law. 556 The invitation of the UN 
by the beleaguered govemments in Lebanon (in 1958) which had control of a part of the 
capital city and small pieces of the temtory is in point. In addition, invited extemal 
interventions in Oman in 19~7 ,~"  Chad (of which, later), ~ a r n b i a , ~ ~ ~  Lebanon, Ethiopia, 
inviting govemrnent collapsed swn after the invitation was made to the OAU. 
549 Oppenheims International Law. supra note 478 at 74. 
John Perkins, "The Right o f  Counterintervention" (1986) 17 Ga. J.Int;l & Comp. L. at 17 1 .  See afso, 
Henkin, supra note 542 at 64. 
Wippman, supra note 523 at 22 1. 
"' Doswald-Beck supra note 5 18 at 222. 
5 5 3  Supra at 226. 
Supra at 230. 
5 5 5  Supra at 234. 
5  5 6  Security Council Resolution 387 of 1976 reaffmns this principk by acknowlcdging "the inherent and 
lawful right of  every State. in the excrcise of its sovercignty to request assistance fiom any other state or 
~;oup of states." 
' UK Contemporary Practice, ( 1958) 1. C. L.Q. at 99- 102. 
558 (1964) BPIL at 22-3. 
Congo, and other countries at the behest of beleaguered regimes bears out this customary 
international law. 
Notwithstanding the formidable array of opinion in favour of the right of a 
beleaguered govenunent to invite external intervention, some scholars Iike 
~a11,~~~'Thornas,~*and Quincy wrightS6'have forcefully argued to the contrary. In their 
view, the existence of widespread rebellion against a governrnent evidences jts loss of de 
facto control and hence, the right to invite extemal intervention. This aspect of their 
argument needs qualification as the right to invite external intervention as demonstrated 
in the Kuwaiti, Haitian, Sierra Leonean situations may indeed remain extant and subsist 
notwithstanding the contrary pretensions of the usurpers. Hall, Thomas and Quincy 
Wright M e r  argue in the above-mentioned texts that such a state of affairs as 
widespread rebellion against the incurnbent govement  will ultimately abridge the right 
to self-determination if the right to invite extemal intervention in the circumstances were 
extant. This comection of their argument to the right to self detemination is formidable 
since the right is anchored in ius cogens. 
The right to self determination of peoples probably finds its most eloquent 
exposition in the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Conceming Friendly Relations and Cooperation Amongst  tat tes?' 
Paragraph 7 of the elaboration of the Declaration stipulates that "every State has the duty 
to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration 
of the pnncipie on equal rights and self detemination of their right to self determination 
559 Hall, A Treatke on international Law (8' edn., 1924) at 347. 
5 6 0  Supra note 476 at 94. 
56 1 Supra note 53 1 at 1 12. 
567 Supra note , ibid. 
and freedorn and independence."s63 Although Higgins has alluded to the doubt in some 
quarters over which "self the right of self-determination applies 1 0 , ~ ~  the noms of the 
right to self-determination, as surnmarized below do not allow for such doubts in the 
circumstsnces of the Liberian c~n f l i c t .~~~The  Liberian case cannot be regarded as a battle 
for self-determination because international law as evidenced in the Geneva Protocol 1 of 
1977~~~defines stmggles for self-detemination in the context of fights against colonial 
and alien occupation and racist regimes. The Liberian crisis was not such a type of 
conflict. It was not a secessionist war of independence nor a stmggle by the Liberian 
peoples against alien domination. 
Secondly, unlike recognized national liberation movements, fiactious struggles 
for power such as the warring Liberian factions or their Somali counterparts, have no 
legal personality at international law and it would be difficult to argue that third states 
owe them a duty not to intervene against them. Therefore, arguments on the legality or 
otherwise of foreign intervention in the Liberian scenario may be more useful within the 
framework of the law on non-interference as opposd to inapposite references to and 
reliance on the noms of self determination of peoples.567 in this context, the law on 
belligerency may be explored briefly.'68 This is not an easy regime to apply to the 
Liberian case. In the first place, the status of belligerency which obligates third states to 
s63 Ibid. 
sa Rosalyn Higgins, "International Law and Civil Conflict" in Luard cd., The International Regularion of 
Civil Wars (New York: New York University Press, 1 W2), supra note 333 at 186. 
565 Wesrern Sahara. Case, supra note 546 at 3 1-3. 
5 66 Article 1 U.N. Human Rights Covenants 1966; Article 1 (4) of Geneva Protocol 1 1977 Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949.75 U.N.T.S (1950) at 85. in construing the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations and State Copcration, regard should be had to its travaux preparatoires. When this is done. it 
becomes obvious that the principk of self dctermination relates to anti-colonialism, stniggle against alien 
domination and racist regimes and has little rclevance to fractious smggle for powcr in a sovereign state 
already free from colonialisrn, alien domination or racist rule. 
547 Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 18 at 209. 
568 Oppenheims, supra note 478 at 298. 
be neutral in cases of civil wars is not attained merely by the spread of violence in a civil 
~ a r ~ ~ ~ b u t  upon the fblfilrnent of four conditions. The conditions include the existence of 
war and hostilities, occupation and a measure of orderly administation of a substantial 
part of the national territory by the insurgent, observance of the rules of warfare on the 
part of the insurgents and a practical necessity for third states to define their attitude.'" 
While the wamng factions in Liberia may scale the first two hurdles, they will probably 
fail the last two tests. 
In addition to the obligation of neutrality imposed on third states, a jundical value 
in according a rebel organization recognition as  a belligerent force, and as the de facto 
govement over territories held by it, is to bring it within the ambits of the law of 
conflicts. Thus by Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva ~onventions"' and Protocol 2 concluded 
in Geneva in 1 977,572 belligerent forces are obliged to uphold certain humanitarian mles 
of war.") However, before coming to a definitive view on the legality of Doe's invitation 
to ECO WAS and whether the warring factions were recognized as belligerent forces, it is 
useful to recapitulate the factual scenario surrounding the invitation to ECOWAS by Doe 
and the means and methods adopted by the warring factions in their prosecution of the 
rebellion. 
The initial impression created by the Liberian govenunent in international circles 
was that the rebellion was a "thwarted coup d'etats7'which had been brought under 
control. However, within one week of the rebellion, over 10,000 Liberian refùgees had 
- 
569 Jemings & Watts, supra note 493 at 166. 
Ibid. 
"' U.N. T.S 75 at 3 1. 
'" (1977) 16 1.L.M. 1442. 
'" Oswald-Beck, supra note 5 18 at 197. It should be noted that sincc the end of Ancrican Civil War, 
recognition of belligcrency has not k e n  givcn. Therc arc doubts whether it has not fallen into disuse. 
WeIler, supra note 5 at 32. Howevcr, the Liberian govement  recalled it's arnbassador to Cote d'Ivoire 
fled to the neighbouring Cote d' Ivoire and575govemment troops (dominated by Doe's 
ethnic Krahn) sent to Nimba to quel1 the rebellion, were engaged in gen~c ide~ '~of  the 
Gio/Mano of the Nimba County. The atrocities by the govemment troops further 
polarîzed the Liberian polity and pushed the GioMano to support the rebelli0n.~~~.4s 
Doe's control waned, his htile plea to Libenans to "get their cutlasses, single barreled 
guns and get in the bush in pursuit of the rebel~""~fel1 on deaf ears. 
It was ai this point that the ECOWAS, realizing the irnmensity of the problem, set 
up  a Standing Mediation Cornmittee to look into the Liberian crisis. The rampaging 
rebels seized over seventy percent of Liberian territocy. Doe's supporters and cronies 
were deserting him and fleeing the country. Foreign nationals in Libena were also 
leaving in droves. On 6 June 1990, the embattled Doe, wrote the United States President 
asking for assistance "to cmsh the r e b e l ~ . " ~ ' ~  As the rebels advanced on Monrovia, they 
asked for Doe's r e ~ i ~ n a t i o n . ' ~ ~  According to the rebel NPFL's chief negotiator, Tom 
~ o e w i y u ~ ~ ' " ~ o e  is-the source of al1 problems in Liberia.. . We are not calling for the total 
for "consultations" and imposed a dusk to dam curfew on the Nimba County. 
'"ibid. 
Article 1 1 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and huiishment of the Crime of Genocide which 
enterred into force in 1951 defines genocide to mean the intentional destruction in wholc or in part, 
national, racial, ethnic or rcligious groups. See J.G.Starke, Introduction to International Law (london: 
Butterworths; 184) at 60-61. wcreinafier. Starke] 
5 77 WeIler, supra note 5 at 35. ". . .Numerous reports from refigecs in Cote d'Ivoire allege that govemment 
soldiers had massacred many Gio and Mano inhabitan ts..." See also, 101" United States Congres, 2d 
Session, House of Representatives Resolution 345, 7 March 1900. Paragraph 8 thereof notes ba t  ". . .media 
reports and international reports.. .have estimatcd that at least 200 people, primarily members of the Gio 
and Mano ethnic groups have been killed by troops of the govemment of Liberia." Reproduced in Welter. 
ibid.. On the other han4 the rcbels wcrc "killing manbers of Samuel Doe's Krahn tribe." Ibid at 56. 
ibid. 
579 Ibid. 
580 Ibid. ". . .the one thing that is clear is that thcy (the rebels) cannot reach any agreement with the 
Government unless there is a cornmitment for President Doc to rcsign. Thcy are holding fast to this 
negotiating position." 
58 1 Recall chat this same Tom Woewiyu atteniptcd to dcpose Charles Taylor. When this rebellion-within-a - 
rebellion failed, he fomed his own rebel group. 
dissolution of the Liberian govemment but for the resignation of ~ o e . " ' ~ ~  AS the rebels 
negotiated with the Liberian govement,  President Doe declared his readiness to 
"welcome any peacekeeping force from the USA, the OAU, ECOWAS or the 
Meanwhile, Yormie Johnson, alleging excessive Libyan control over the NPFL and 
financial irregularities, broke away from the NPFL and formed his own rebel group with 
the objective of stopping Charles Taylor from taking Monrovia and becoming President 
of ~ i b e r i a . ~ ~ ' '  
The govemment forces were "greatly reduced due to desertion and losses.. .down 
to about 1,000 men to defend ~ o n r o v i a . " ~ ~ ~  In the pithy words of Congressman Burton 
of the United States, "he (Charles Taylor) has got the guy P o e )  by the short hair right 
 no^."^^^ Within the capital city Monrovia, "opposition parties and professionals 
rnobilized civil demands for Doe's immediate r e~ i~na t ion . "~~ '  The situation got more 
d e ~ ~ e r a t e . ' ~ ~  Hence, Wippman's contention that the Doe govemment had not only lost 
control of a substantial porticn of the state but that the "government's international 
(formal) legitimacy was othenvise subject to d o ~ b t . " ~ ~ ~  However, the capital city refbsed 
to yield to the NPFL rebels. This was because the breakaway INPFL and Doe's tmncated 
Armed Forces of Liberia (A.F.L) maintained their vice iike grip on the capital city of 
5 8 2 ~ e l ~ e r ,  supra note 5 at 57. 
Ibid. 
' "~eller ,  ibid. at 61. Having fnistrated Taylor's desired conquest of Monrovia, the embattled Taylor. on a 
radio announcement, pwportedly "dissolved Doe's govtnvnent and declared himself President of Liberia 
under the "National Patnotic Reconstruction Assembly." Further, Taylor "suspendcd" various provisions of 
the Liberian Constitution and "appointed" his "ministem." 
Ibid. 
586 Supra at 53. The refùgec crisis did not fare anp bettcr as over 200,000 Lberians fled to Guinea and Cote 
d'Ivoire. 
587 Ibid. at 57-59. 
588 Weller, ibid at 58. On the legal consequenccs of de facto and de jure recognition of govcmements, see 
Haile Selassie v Cable and Wireless Ltd (No 2 )  [ 19391 Cb. 1 82. 
589 David Wipprnan, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and The Liberïan Crisis" in Enforcing Resrrainr. 
szcpra note 523 at 2 1 0, [Hcreinaftcr Wippman on Liberia] 
Monrovia and the presidential palace. The result was a deadlock. In the words of 
[Allthough most observers assumed the rebel forces would quickly 
vanquish the AFL and drive Doe fiom his fortified mansion, the rebels 
proved unable to do so. The conflict settled into a military stalemate. The 
result was anarchy. Each warring faction exercised a slight measure of "de 
facto executive and judicial power" in it's particular area of control, but 
for the most part, al1 semblance of civilian authority was gone.590 
The atrocities against the Liberian civil populace ~ontinued.'~' It was at this stage that 
Doe extended an invitation to the ECOWAS asking that organization to intervene in 
~ i b e r i a . * ~ ~  According to the beleaguered President, 
. . . [I]t is with profound appreciation that 1 convey to 
your Excellencies compliments and goodwill of the 
Governent  and people of Liberia.. .As you may no doubt 
be aware, since the crisis in o u  country, I have done 
everything possible to resolve the situation and restore 
peace to our motherland.. . I  wish to bring to your attention 
that Our iterative accession to peaceful process has only 
been rewarded by continuing positions of intransigence and 
bellicosity on the part of Mr. Taylor and the NPFL.. .They 
(the NPFL) continue to create more turmoil and tension in 
the people of Liberia. Right now in the suburbs of 
Monrovia thousands have been displaced by the NPFL 
forces, homes have been destroyed, hundreds slaughtered, 
even before their victory is achieved. 1 am therefore 
concerned that the fighting could accelerate in Monrovia 
and thus inflame the suffering of the people of Liberia. 
Consistent with my oath of office to protect and defend the 
Govenunent and people of Liberia, 1 cannot countenance 
Taylor's continu4 mission to destroy Liberia and it's 
inhabitants because of his inordinate greed to become 
President ...any attempt to subvert the process of 
democracy by displacing the Constitution through force of 
arms would lead to an endless succession of anned 
insurrection, bring more deaths and destruction, as well as 
disrupt the socio-political and economic tranquility not 
5 9 0  Supra. 
591 Weller, supra note 5 at 52. 
'9' Letter Addressed by President Samuel Kanyon Doe to The C h a i .  And Members of the MinisteriaI 
Meeting of the ECOWAS Mediation Cornmittee, 14 July 1990. Reproduced in WeIlcr, supra note 5 at 60. 
only of Liberia, but also the sub-region of the ECOWAS as 
a whole.. .to avert the wanton destruction of lives and 
properties.. .It would seem most expedient at this time to 
introduce an ECOWAS Peace-keeping Force into Libena 
to forestall increasing tenor and tension and to assure a 
peacefil transitional environment. While assuring you of 
my fillest CO-operation, 1 remain.. . 
Samuel Kanyon Doe (President of ~iberia) '~) 
ECOWAS, weighing the regional dimensions of the crisiss9' drew the attention of 
the OAU to the crisis and considered imposing a mandatory cease-fire in Libena to stop 
the carnage.s95 The Liberian Representative at the United Nations unsuccessfully nied to 
place the crisis on the agenda of the Security Council a ~ ~ d ' ~ ~ a t  the ECOWAS meeting in 
Banjul, The Gambia, ECOWAS decided to inter~ene.*~' The facts above represent the 
circumstances under which Doe invited ECOWAS and it is within this background that 
its legaiity will be examined. 
In exarnining the legality of Doe's invitation to ECOWAS, it has to be re-affinned 
593 Ibid. [Underlining suppiicd] 
Weller, ibid, at 63. 
595 Weller, ibid. From the moment the idea was mooted, Charles Taylor opposed it arguing that it amounted 
to a breach of Liberian sovereignty and the nght of the Libenan peoples to self determination. He 
threatened that his forces would kiii any interventionist forces. The NPFL rebels made good theu threat as 
they now engaged in private acts of reprisais against citizen5 of ECOWAS countries that supported the 
intervention. 
5% U.N. GAOR 45" ~ess..27' Mtg. At 61, U.N Doc. Al4YPV.27 (1990). The African mernbers of the 
Security Couacil (Ethiopia and Zaire) for their self-serving reasons frustrated the attempts to place the 
crisis on the agenda of the Security Council. 
597 ECO WAS Standing Mediation Cornmittee, Decision AiDEC. 1/8/90, on the Cease- fue and 
Establishment of an ECOWAS Monitoring Group for LI- Banjul, Republic of Gambia, 7 August 1990. 
Reproduced in Weller, supra note 5 at 69. in spite of the opposition of the NPFL to the ECOMOG 
intervention, President Lansana Conte of Guinea speaking for the ECOWAS insisted that ". . .we do not 
need the permission of any party involved in the conflict to implemcnt the decisions reachcd in Banjul. So 
with or without the agreement of any of the parties, ECOWAS trwps will bc in Lihria." See Weller, supra 
at 66. Yonnie Johnson of the W F L  welcomed the intervention saying that he was "rcady to die to make 
the Monrovia port conducive for ECOWAS landing." Initially, President Doe, holed inside the Presidential 
Villa was dilatory as his cnvisaged plan to use the intervention as a shield and rccover his position failed. 
Contrary to Doe's expectation, the ECOWAS decided to set up an Intetim Govcrnment independent of him 
and the rebels. However, he noted his "happiness with the ECOWAS intervention. ..but hoped that it (the 
ECOMOG) would not take sides." See Weller, supra at 88 
that state practice598strongly supports the right of an effective govemment to invite 
extemal intervention in the event of an upnsisng in the state. In the absence of vitiating 
elements including fiaud and coercison, the test of legality of such invitation is a îünction 
of the effectiveness of the government making the i n ~ i t a t i o . ~ ~ ~  The human rights record 
of the effective regime does not affect the legality of the invitation but may influence the 
scope and quality of response such invitations may get. Accordingly, Doe's miserable 
deficiency in legitimacy and good governance are of little consequence in exarnining his 
capacity to invite extemal intervention. The facts of the Liberian case show that the 
government of Doe was the de j u r e  govemment of Liberia and in àppreciable control of 
the capital city and the presidential mansion. Al1 insignia of office were still with him at 
the moment of making the invitation. 
The argument that the Liberians were fighting for self detemination rnistakes a 
fratricidal struggle for power with w a r ~  of national liberation where the leaders of such 
movements may indeed lawfully request help fiom the international comm~ni t~ .~*  The
Libenan crisis was neither a war against a racist regime nor an anti-colonial stmggle or 
war against alien domination which characterizes struggles for self determination."' It 
was simply a brutal and personalized struggle for power inspired by the excesses of a 
decadent polity and permitted by a redefined global securïty order. On the question of 
belligerency, none of the waning factions in Liberia, unlike recognized movements for 
598 Mark Weisburd, Use of Force-The Practice of States Since World War 2 (Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania University h s s ,  1997) at 2 [HercinaAtr, Weisburd on f ie  of Force] 
599 Supra at note 598 at 222-224. 
MK) Malcolm Shaw, "The International Status of National Likration Movements" in Frederick Snyder and 
Surakiart Sathirathai, eds., Third World Attitudes to International iaw-An Inïroducrion (Dordretch: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at 150. 
ta 1 Edward Kwakwa, The International Law of Anned Conflct: Personal and Materiof Fieldr of 
Application (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishen, 1992) at 50-5 1. Sce also, Georges Abi-Saab, 
' Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War" in supra note 600 at 125- 1 28. 
nationel liberation, were seised of legal personality at international law. Therefore. they 
could not be the bearers of legal duties of non-intervention by third States. Second, 
virtually al1 the resolutions passed by the United Nations on the Liberian situation clearly 
identified them as warring factions pursuing the narrow agendas of their respective 
leaders at the expense of the average Liberian. They were thus not accorded recognition 
as belligerent forces. Accordingly, the contention that the rebels' consent was necessary 
for the legality of the ECOWAS intervention is at best, a matter of prudence, not law. 
According to Christine Gray, "the consent of other parties involved in the conflict is 
important as a matter of practical necessity. The peacekeeping force would not 'ue able to 
function without the cooperation of the parties on the g r o ~ n d . " ~ ~ *  As a matter of law. the 
Liberian rebels could not have consented to the ECOWAS action in Liberia. 
Returning to the question of whether the rebels could have attained the status of 
b e ~ l i ~ e r e n c ~ , " ~  it is argueci that they had no respect for established international noms 
on armed conflicts and this weighed against thern. According to Mr. Cohen, the US 
Assistant Secretary of State for Afncan Affairs, ''when we talk of troops (rebels), we are 
talking of young kids, 14 to 17 years of age, who are running around with 
r r 6 0 4  Kalashnikovs. The prevalence of "child soldien" in the Liberian crisis is a notorious 
fact. According to a United Nations report, 
60' Christine Gray, "Host-State Consent and United Nations Peacekccping in Yugoslavia" (1996) 7 Duke J. 
Cornp.& & Int 1 Law at 241. (underlining supplied) Similar consensus was reached in the cases of 
Namibia, Cambodia, and Mozambique. But thesc wars wert of a totally differcnt charmer from the 
Liberian war. See also, Milan Sahovic, "Non-Aligned Counûies and the Cunent Regulation on the Use of 
Force" in Cassese ed., n e  Current Legal Regulation on the Use of Force (Dordretch, The Netherlands: 
Mamnus Nijhoff, 1986) at 479. Bercinafier, Cassesse] But sec, Lori Fislcr Damroch, in Enforcing 
Restrainr, supra note 393 at 10. 
b03 On belligerency and insurgcncy, the Spanish civil war prcsents fertile ground for legal analysis. See 
Crawford, supra note 238 at 268-9. 
* Weller, supra note 5 at 49. See also Jcftiey Goldberg, "A War Without Purpose in a Country Without 
Identity" New York Times Magazine, Jan. 22 1995 at 37. 
[Ojf the apprgximately 1.4 million children now living in Liberia, 
it is believed that 15,000 served as child soldiers in the civil war. The 
rnajority of fighters demobilized at the end of the war were between 
fifteen and twenty-eight years old. Of those aged seventeen and under, the 
majority-69 percent-were fifteen to seventeen years old, and had served an 
average of four years. 27 per cent of the remaining fighters under 17 were 
between the ages of twelve and fourteen years old ... Many of these 
children were forced to become soidiers by combatants desperate for able 
bodies of any age to augment their ranks.. .Some became practiced killers, 
and most were exposed to atrocities on a daily basis ... The youngest 
cornbatants were six years.605 
In the testimony of one of the child soldiers, "1 was given pills that made me crazy. 1 beat 
people and hurt thern until they bled.*& These atrocities were committed by al1 the 
warring factions. in addition, cannibalism was encouraged by the rebel leaders as a 
Acts of genocide canied out by the various factions probably reached i r  height 
with the massacre of over 600 Gio/Manos seeking refbge in a church. According to one 
of the few survivors of that war crime, "...over 600 people were killed. There are still 
blood stains on the altar; they had placed mal1 children there and made them scream, 
'there is no God,' as they (the rebels) cut their t h r o a t ~ . ' ~ ~  An hystencal woman telling of 
how rebels troops at road blocks would take bets on the sex of an unborn children 
lamented that, "they wouid slice the women open to pull out the fetus with a bayonet to 
'O5 Megan Mckenna, "The Reintegration of  Child Soldim in Liberia" >online 
http://www .unicefÙsa.ora/issues98/nov98/Liberia-iump.html, last modified on 1 4 March, 1 999. See also, 
Bianerfer Nowrojee, supra note 86 at 133. 
606 Human Rights Watch interview. >Online h~://www.ora/rcam~ai~:n/c~/voices/hmil last modificd on 13 
March 1999. See also Yacl Daneli., et al e&., International Response ro Traumatic Siras  (New York: 
Bayword Publishing Corporation., 1998) at 334. 
607 Human SkuH, Monrovia, Liberia.Online>http://www.lifewater.ca/shll.htm. last rnodified on 14 March 
1999. According to a child-soldier,ÿou h o w  we ate people during the war; not because wc were hungry, 
but because we were scarcd, and to eat your enemy d e s  you strong. That was what they told us." The 
rebels, particularly the NPFL, tumed their base at the Spriggs-Payne Airport into a convenient cemeteV 
for the bunal of those who were unwiiling to j o b  them in "the Iikration of Lihria-" According to 
independent sources, "there were 20,000 slnills at the end of the m w a y  at Spriggs-Payne aixpott in May 
1992." lbid. 
Ibid. 
r ,609 realize who had won the bet. In the summative language of Lori Damrosch. "the 
r r 6 1 0  savagery of Liberia's civil war is alrnost unimaginable. These are hardly the kind of 
behaviour capable of encouraging third-state recognition of the rebels as belligerent 
forces and impose on third states the obligation of neutrality in the conflict. 
It is equally important to note that even though Doe had the right to invite 
ECOWAS or any other external State or organization to intervene, the ECOWAS 
intervention was not to his advantage. The ECOWAS did not intervene b r  ~ o e . "  ' In 
addition, owing to the interference of several states in the Liberian conflict, ECOWAS 
intervention may also be construed as conter-intervention. Although probative proof of 
external interference in the Liberian conflict may not meet the austere requirements as 
articulated in the Nicaragua ~ a ( e , ~ ' * i t  has been demonstrated in section 5 of chapter two 
that most states in the sub-region had intetests in the conflict. Similarly, the conflict had 
spread beyond the borders of Liberia as some of the warring factions, for diverse reasons 
attacked countries like Sierra Leone, (necessitating Security Council's intervention) 
Guinea and Ivory Coasts. Although these issues have been explored in section five of 
chapter two and their lrgal significance will be examined in subsequent sections of this 
chapter, suffice it to note here that they put the Liberian case beyond the purview of the 
regime on invitation of externaI intervention in intemal conflicts. 
Furthemore, as invitations for external intervention for the restoration of 
democracy6' 3(when the incumbent govemment614has lost effective control of the 
609 Ibid. 
610 Enforcing Restrainr, supra 465 at 19. 
61 1 George Nolte, "Restoring Peace by Regional Action: international Law Aspects of the Liberian 
Conflict." Cited in Wippman on "Consent," supra note 523 at 225. 
6'2 Supra note 462 at 98. 
613 Clarke, supra note 506 at 29. See aiso, W. Michacl Reisman, "Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling 
Democracies" ( 1  995) 18 Fordham Int '1 L.J. at 794. 
governrnent) gains universal s ~ p ~ o r t , ~ ' ~ i t  is dificult to deny that Doe, a de jure  president 
with control of a substantial part of the capital city and the presidential rnansion, could 
not invite extemal intervention. Although this trend may reveal support for the argument 
in section two of this chapter on the increasingly cosmopolitan character of human 
rights6"hd collective security, it equally supports the view that a de jure regime may 
still invite extemal intervention even when it's effectiveness hangs on the baian~e.~" In 
both the Sierra Leonean and Haitian case6" the inviting incurnbents had in fact lost 
e ffectiveness. 
It has also been argued that the scope of actvities and measures undertaken by 
ECOWAS was illegal and ultra vires a peacekeeping body?19 The cornplaint here is that 
ECOMOG went too far in constituting an interim government for Liberia, organizing and 
overseeing elections to various political offices in Liberia and re-organizing the Liberian 
army and police. This is an important accusation which merits consideration here. The 
practice of peacekeeping is a contemporary phenomenon.620 According to Brian 
Urquhart, "the technique of peacekeeping is a distinctive innovation by the United 
Nations. The Charter does not mention it. It was discovered, like penicillin."621 
Peacekeeping originated during United Nations intervention in the Greek civil war in 
"' S.C.Res. 1132. U.N.SCOR 51' Sess., 3822 Mtg. Para. 1, U.N.Doc. S/Res/l132 (1997). Note that 
ECOMOG intervention was not directly authorized by the Security Council. Sec also, See alsoS. C. Res. 
1 1 56, U.S.SCOR, 52" Sess. 386 1 mtg. Para.U.N.Doc. S/Res. 1 156 ( 1998) 
"' McCoubrey & White, supra note 445 at 34. 
6 '6   alv vina Haiberstam, "The Copenhagen Document: Intervention in Support of Democracy" (1993) 34 
Harv. inr 'I .  L. J. at 163. 
6 ' 7  OAS DOC. CPlSN896192 and CP/Doc.2248/92, April 1 1992. (as cited in Acevedo, ibis). The military 
coups d 'etor in Burundi and in Sierra Leone, which had satisfied the test of effectiveness werc mistrated 
by international isolation and delegitimation. 
'18 U.N. SCOR, 49& Sess., 3 4 1 3 ~  Mtg. At 1,  U.N.Doc. S/Res/940 (1994) Note also chat this was the fmt  
time chat the Security Council was authorizing the use of force for the restoration of democracy 
619 Kuffour, supra note 136 at 1 20. Offodile, supra 135 at 340. 
"'O Kirgis, supra note 503 at 7 16. 
02' lbld. 
1947~~~and has usually been employed in rnaintaining cease-fires, assisting in the 
withdrawal of troops and the provision of buffer between opposing forces."" 
Peacekeeping operations are usuaily temporary and not really engaged in the settlement 
of conflicts but to provide auspicious conditions h r  peacefùl resolution of conflicts. 
In effect, peacekeeping operations are not, as the Court held in the Certain 
Expenses of the United Notions ~ a r e , ~ ~ ~ e n f o r c e m e n t  actions. However, in accomplishing 
their missions, peacekeeping forces may have both miliary and civilian components 
necessary for the aforementioned tasks and provision of humanitarian services. Although 
they are charactenzed by the absence of enforcement capabilities, they may use miltary 
force in self defence. Be that as it may, contemporary events have shown the pragmatic 
character of peacekeeping operations. In Namibia, Lebanon, Yugoslavia, Liberia, and 
Cambodia, they have engaged in roles hardly consistent with mere separation of warring 
forces and enhancement of humanitarian services in crisis situations. This is particuIarly 
tme with those operations sanctioned by the Security Council. 
Accordingly, the absence of consent of warring parties in such UN sanctioned 
peacekeeping operations appears to be of little impediment to the despatch of 
peacekeeping forces to troubled spots. Sirnilarly, the scope oftheir operations seem to be 
tailored to the peculiarities of each crisis. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
confimed in his report to the General Assembly entitled, Supplement to the Agenda for 
Peace, 
[Tlhree aspects of recent mandates, in particular, have led 
peacekeeping operations to forfeit the consent of parties, to behave in a 
way that was not perceived of or to use force other than in self defence. 
These were the task of protecting humanitaian operations durine fiehtinq, - 
the protection of civilian   ovulations in safe areas, pressing parties to 
accept national reconciliation at a Dace faster than they were ready to 
a c ~ e ~ t . ~ ~ ~  
As Berdal has pointedly noted. the volatile, complex and dangerous nature of 
intemal conflicts. which O fien i d i c t  senous fatalities6"on peacekeepers, has given nse 
to the contemporary practice whereby host-state consent and traditional peacekeeping 
have yielded to what is now known as "robust p e a ~ e k e e ~ i n ~ . " ~ "  There are other cases 
evidencing a noticeable trend in conternporary international law where traditional 
peacekeeping yields occasionally to peace enforcement or other roles not wholly 
compatible with traditional notions of peacekeeping.628 For instance, in 1989-90 the 
United Nations set up the UN Transition Assistance Croup (UNTAG)~~' to supervise the 
electoral process in Namibia. This task is clearly outside the traditional task of 
monitoring a cease-fire or s u p e ~ s i n g  the withdrawal of belligerent forces. in another 
instance, the United Nations between 1991-2 set up the United Nations Advance Mission 
in Cambodia (UNTAMIC)~~~ and the United Nations Temporary Authority In Carnbodia 
  UN TAC)^^'^^ s u p e ~ s e  govemment h c t i o w  and eventual elections while rebuilding 
625 Supplement to an Agenda For Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occcasion of the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations. U.N. SCOR 50* Sess., paras.34-35, U.N. Doc. Si 199Y 1 ( 1995) 
(underlining supplied) ~crcinafter, Supplemant to Agenda for Peace] 
62%ats Berdal. "The Secuxity Council, Pcacekeeping and interna1 Conflict Aftcr the Cold War" ( 1995-7) 
6-7 Duke J. Comp. & Int 'l L. at 71. He notes that "as of late 1994, there had bcen 130 fatalities in the in the 
U.N. forces in Yugoslavia.. .and as of early 1996, therc had been 4 10 fatalities in U.N peacekeeping 
operations in the former Yugoslavia. 
'" Richard Connoughton, " T h e  to Clear the Doetrine Dilemma" 2 1 Jane's Defence Weekly (1994) at 19. 
'" Margaret Vogts, "The Roblems and Challenges of Peace-Makhg: From Peacc-Keeping to Peace 
Enforcement" in Vogts., cd, supra note 41 at 150. 
6'9 Nico Schrijvens, bLIntrodu~ing Second Generation Peacekecping: The Case of Namibia" (1 994) 6 A. 
J. /. C.L. at 1. Sec also, Sylvester E h d a y o ,  "ECOMOG-A Mode1 For Atncan Peacc-kceping" October 16. 
1998 AfricaNews at 12. According to him, " it should be emphasized that the concept, nature and scope and 
practice of peacekeeping arc changing rapidly with the emergcnce of new types of conflict situations in the 
continent. Both the United Nations and the ECOWAS have recognizcd this, and have had to adapt 
traditional peacekeeping to meet specific iatra-state conflicts suc h as verification of cease- firc agreements, 
securityiprotection for refugees and humanitarian relief workers, demobilization and disaxmament of 
combatak. and observation of demxratic political processes in the form of clectionr, and refercnda." 
''O Ibid. 
Cambodia uid disarming the factions.632 
9 9  633 This "second generation peacekeeping , is closer to conflict management and 
peace enforcement than mere separation of waning parties. The new thinking and 
practice that peacekeeping should move "beyond the Sheri ff' s posse"b3"probably re flects 
pragmatism635and evidence of what the international society considers to be prudent and 
necessary in the contemporary circumstsnces. In view of the fact that the controversial 
measures taken by the ECOMOG peacekeepers were undetaken in active conjuction with 
the UN'S UNOivIlL (of which later) and sanctioned and or ratified by the Security 
Council, the objections by Kuffour and Offodile on the point are rn i sc~nce ived .~~~  
Secondly, the invitation by Doe did not delimit the scope of measures whicti ECOMOG 
could adopt to put the crisis under control. Thirdly, the ECOMOG mandate was not 
limited to merely separating the Libenan warlords. On the issue that the ECOWAS 
decision to intervene was taken without cornpliance with the necessary mles contained in 
the ECOWAS PMAD embodying its pnnciples on collective security, it is now proposed 
to examine in the next sections the applicability of the doctrine of collective self defence 
to the Liberian crisis and the ECOWAS action. 
Vogts, supra notc 628 at 150. 
Schrijvens, supra notc 629 at 3. 
634 Jinmi Adisa, "The Politics of Rcgioaal Military Cwpcration: The Case of ECOMOG" in Vogts, supra 
note 41 at 217. 
635 Walter S h a w  " Protecting The Avatar of Intcmational Peace" (1995) 7 Duke J- Int '2 &Cornp. L. at 102. 
636 In Carnbodia the U N pcacckccpcrs cxtrciscd sovercign authority within the state and in Somalia they 
adopted enforcement rneasurcs to stop the anarchy, starvation and bloodletting . 
4.3: COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE AND THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 
World peace, like war has tended to become indivisible?' 
The ECOWAS argument on collective self-defence has been flayed6380n the 
grounds that the rebellion did not constitute an armed attack on Liberia as envisaged by 
by the doctrine.639 In addition, the applicability or otherwise of the Protocol Relating to 
Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) to the Liberian case has been questioned.610 It 
has been further argued that even if the PMAD is applicable, the necessary procedural 
mechanism for the invocation of the right of collective self-defence was not followed by 
ECOWAS. Therefore, the critics contend, the intervention was unlawfiil at international 
law. Since these arguments turn on very important principles in international law 
regarding the use of force, subsequent sections will examine them in detail. It is perhaps 
pertinent to proceed fiom the historical origins of the p ~ c i p l e  of collective self defence. 
The right of collective self defence, like most legal principles, is distilled From 
practical experience. According to Kelsen, 
Pletween the moment the illegal attack starts and the moment the 
centralized machinery of collective security is put into action, there is even 
in case of perfectly prompt fhctioning, a space of time, an interval which 
may be disastrous to the ~ ic t i rn .~ '  
It is probably in this context that Grotius argued that it is a right rooted in 
nature.M2 However, the scope of the exercise of the right of self-defence is delimited by 
637 Akindele, supra note 343 at 3. 
638 Kufour, supra note 136 at 545. 
639 Supra, at 546. 
610 Supra, at 537. 
Ham Kelsen, "Collective Security and Collective Self Defcnce Un&r the Charter" (1948) 42 A.J.1.L. at 
875.[Hereinafter, Kelsen on Collective Self Dcfcnce] 
Grotius. supra note 373 at 112. 
positive lawbM3 As rhe name suggests, self-defence is the defence of self. It is different 
*,w from necessity as it "arises when a wrong has been done. Secondly, unlike a reprisal it 
is not an enforcement of perceived legal rights, which function is a preserve of the civil 
state. To quote Bowett, it "is not a means of enforcing a perceived legal nght".6J5~hirdly, 
unlike a reprisai, it is invoked at a moment of imminent danger which is of such character 
that waiting on the regular agencies of law enforcement for protection would be fatal to 
the potential victim of the attack. Max Sorensen has argued that the pnnciples governing 
self-defence by States in international law are analogous to and derived fkom the 
municipal laws on self d e f e n ~ e . ~ ~ ~  If this argument is accepted, it follows as McDougal 
and Feliciano affim, that the principles goveming recourse to self defence in a collective 
arrangement in international law are in themselves similara7to those rules applicable in 
the individual context. Self defence is tempered by the conditions of necessity, 
immediacy and proportionality and these elements combine to afford j u s t i f i c a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Contmy to Vattel's argument that self-defence is a "sacred d ~ t ~ ' ~ ~ w h i c h  a state 
must exercise, international law merely recognizes the rightfiil option of recourse to self- 
defence and imposes no duty to exercise it. As Dinstein shrewdly noted, 
[a] prudent state may decline to exercise this nght on the ground that a 
political compromise is preferable to a clash of arms. The indubitable 
military supremacy of the adversary may have a sobering effect on the 
target state, inhibiting it fiom steps that would transmute a theoretical right 
64 3 H. Lauterpacht, "The Grotian Tradition", (1 946) 23 B. Y.I. L at 30-38. 
6 u  Josef Kunz,"Individuai and Collective Self Defense in Article 5 1 of the Charter o f  the United Nations" 
( 1 947) 4 1 A- J .I . L 875. Ifiereinaftcr, Kunz] 
64 5 D. W-Bowett, Self Defence in International Law (Manchester Univ.Press., Manchester, 195 8) at 6 
(Hereinafter, Bowett] 
Mt5 Sorensen Max, Manual of Public International &w (London: Macmillan,, 1968) at 765. 
b(7 Dickinson," The Analogy Between Nanual Persons and Intemational Law in the Law of Nations," 26 
Yale Law Journal at 265. See atso, M y e s  McDougal., International Law of War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994) at 247. 
618 R v. Botrrell(198 1). 60 C.C.C (2d) 2 1 1 ; R. v. Deegan (1979) 49 C.C.C.(Zd) 417; Section 34 ( 1 )  Criminal 
Code. R.S., c.C-34, s.1.; Kunz , supra note 644 at 876. 
649 C.G Fenwick, nie Principles of International iuw (New Haven: Yale University Press.1962) at 125. 
into a practical disaster. The idea that a state must sacrifice realism at the 
altar of conceptualism and risk defeat while prodded on by a "sacred 
duty" is incongrous. 650 
One of the theoretical conundrums surrounding the concept of collective self- 
defence is whether it in fact means the defence of others or a defence of a theoretical 
"comprehensive ~elf.'"~' In addition to these ~orn~lex i t i es ,~~~the  concept of self-defence 
is compounded by the (dis)honesty of its assertion by ~ t a t e s .~ '~  Victirns of aggression 
may therefore dispute assertions of the rÎght by the presumed aggressor. 654~his 
a~nbi~ui$ '~ compounds the tieoretical and practical difficulties in the evaluation of the 
concept. 
In examining the applicability of the principles of collective self defence to the 
ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, regard will be had to the customary international law, 
the practice of States, the ECOWAS PMAD, and subsidiary sources of international law 
such as judicial decisions and the opinion of writers. The analysis will however, be made 
within the context of collective security peculiarities of the West Afiican sub-region. It is 
perhaps usehl to start off with the practice and principles of the doctrine of collecticve 
self defence under customary international ~aw? 
Conhary to the argument of Judge Oda in the celebrated Nicaragua C'use6" that 
the right of coIlective self-defence is of contemporary origin, scholars such as Georg 
650 Yorarn Distein, "International Law as a Primitive Legal System" (1986-7) 19 N. Y.UJJ.L at 12. 
65 1 ~Myres McDougal & Fiorentino Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Order-The Legal Replation of 
/nternatîonal Coercion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961) 246-260. wereinafter, McDougal & 
Feliciano] 
"' tan Browntie. "The Use of Force in Self Defense" (1961) 37 B.Y.1.L 183. 
653 Oscar Schacter, "Self Defense and the Rule of Law" (1989) 83 A.J.1.L at 259. 
654 Myres McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 65 1, ibid 
655 Shaw, M .  N, International Law (Grotius Publications, London, 1991) at 698. 
656 Roger Clark, supra note 3 at 35. 
657 Nicaragua Case, supra note 462. 
~chwarzenber~er~ '~  have traced the practice to the provisions of the Perpaud League 
(1 291) between the Swiss forest communities and the Union of Utrecht (1 579) between 
Great Britain and France, which treaties acknowledged the concept of collective self- 
d e f e n ~ e . ~ ~ ~ ~ h u s ,  before the Civil War in Spain in 1936-1938 (where there was an express 
agreement by States not to aid the parties in the conflict), there existed alliances for 
collective self-defence? Therefore, the doctrine of collective self-defence pre-dates the 
UN Charter provisions of Article 5 1 
It is probable that the right of collective self-defence attained refinement as a rute 
of customary international law during the 19* century and early 20" century. At this 
period, the European continent and the Amencas were the foci of the exercise of the 
right. It literally formed the theoretical basis for the continental and regional 
arrangements for security. it was entrenched in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance concluded on 2 September 1947"~vide Article 3 of that Treaty. During the 
negotiations for the United Nations Charter, the Latin Arnerican countries insisted that 
they would not sacrifice this right at the altar of the nascent United ~ations? 
The right of collective self-defence was M e r  confinned by the United States 
policy of the famous Monroe f oc truie.^ The right of collective self-defence, (furiher 
articulated in the Declaration of Lima) probably influenced the letter of Article 5 1 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, of which, later. It also probably influenced the Court's 
interpretation of the customary law right of collective self defence in the Nicaragua Case 
- -  - -- 
658 Schwarzenberger. G. A Manual ofIntemotiono1 Luw 6& ed.(New Jersey: Professional Books, 1976) at 
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of which, later. It was not only the United States of America that afflmed the existence 
of the nght as state practice and adopted it as a state policy. Other states such as Great 
s ri ta id^' made claims of acting in collective self defence with colonies as far away and 
as diverse as Persia, Egypt and ~ f ~ h a n i s t a n ? ~  Thus, in comection with the 
Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928, Great Britain observed that "there are certain regions of the 
world, the welfare and integrity of which constitute special and vital interest to Our 
peace ... their protection against attack is to the British empire a measure of self 
9,667 defense. It was this liberal construction of the right that publicists have theoretically 
construed as the rotion of a comprehensive self. This concept will be exarnined shortly. 
However, the liberal construction of the right of collective self-defence in the 
guise of a virtudly unlimited notion of comprehensive self was rejected by most 
publicists.668 To Hans Wehberg, the British claim was sheer imperialism which 
9,669 "diminished the significance of the Kellogg Pact to a considerable degree. To Bowett, 
it was sheer greed for terrironal expansion.670 Notwithstanding this quarrel with scholars, 
state practice, which reflected customary international law on the question, permitted a 
Iiberal notion of which states may act collectively to repel aggression against one state. 
Thus the claims by those powerfùl states characterized their conception of what they 
considered to be their spheres of influence. It is therefore safe to Say that at customary 
international law, especially before the wind of anti-colonialism shrank the fiontiers of 
those states, the right of collective self-defence was exercised on the basis of a common 
664 Ibid. 
665 Supra note 646 at 257. 
666 Pearce - Higgins, "lbe Monroe Doctrine ' (1924) 5 B. Y.I.L.at 114 
"' R.I.1.A Documents (1928) Cmd3 109 at 25. 
668 Hans Wehberg, The Otrtlawry of War (Washington: Carnegie Endowmwat for International Ptace., 
1931) at 86. 
"9 Ibid. 
regional security arrangement or where recognizable "vital intere~ts'"~'were threatened 
by state aggression. 
The concept of vital interest and similar linkages of interests or inter-connectivity 
of security, which scholars re-defined as the notion of a comprehensive self was a wide 
umbrella covenng diverse notions including geographic and imperialistic assumptions. 
Often, however, it tended to involve states in a proximate or contigous relati~nshi~.~' ' '  
Dinstein, fiom his analysis of state practice, has argued that the doctrine of self interest or 
vital interest is sufficient to warrant an invocation of the right of collective self- 
de fen~e~ '~a t  customary international law. However, a caveat has been entered here, to 
wit; the security of states acting in collective self defence must be closely interwoven to 
warrant the invocation of that nght. in effect, an attack on one state must by some 
objective cnteria constitute an attack on the other states so as to warrant their intervention 
in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. 
These broad principles have not drowned loud theoretical and practical 
cornplaints about the nature of what constitues a comprehensive self. Nor about whether a 
state whch is contigous to an attacked state but not itself the direct victim of the 
aggression rnay lawfblly invoke the doctrine of collective self-defence under customary 
international Law and about whether a state fa. away fiom the field of original aggression 
but possessing some vital interest there may purport to be acting in collective self- 
defence with the initial victim. McDougal and Feliciano have articulated state practice in 
this regard and their explanation accords with customary international law on the matter. 
6 70 Bowett, supra note 618 at 213. 
"' Supra note 24 at 208-9. 
672 Nicaragua Case, supra note 462 at 220. See particularly Judge Jennings. 
673 Dinstein, supra note 650 at 24. Set also, F.B Schick," The North Atlantic Trcaty And The Problem of 
According to them, 
[A] daim of collective self-defence arises whenever a number of 
traditional bodies-politic asserting certain demands for security as well as 
common expectations that such security can be achieved only by larger 
cooperative efforts, and purporting to define their respective identification 
structures so as to create a common overlap and interlock, confiont an 
opponent, and present themselves to the rest of the general community as 
one uni fied group or collectivity for purposes of security and de fence.'"" 
The above fonnulation therefore encompasses the following eiements as creating a 
cornprehensive self. There must be first, a pnor assertion by the relevant states of mutual 
securities arising from overlapping and interiocking securities and a public assertion and 
recognition of the means of securing that interlocking security by collective rneans. 
In the context of West Afica, the overlapping and interlocking nature of the 
ethnic groups there, their common assertion of collective security and assurance of it 
through collective efforts arnounts to a prima fade case of the existence of a 
comprehensive self in the sub-region. This aspect will be addressed later. However, at 
customary international law, the existence of a comprehensive self only creates a nght of 
collective self-defence and does not impose it as a d ~ t y ~ ' ~  Furthemore, for states in the 
region to assert the nght of coll~ctive self-defence the attack on one must constitute a 
clear and present danger to the inter-locking security of the entire region. Having regard 
to the dangers of abuse and hegemonic tendencies, the threshold bar of secunty must of 
necessity remain high if the right is not to be a cloak for the ulterior interests of the 
"assisting state(s)." 
The exercise of collective self-defence is naturally premised upon a confrontation 
with immediate danger and this raises the issue of who construes or determines what 
danger or aggression is "clear and present" to that comprehensive self to warrant an 
exercise of the right of collective selfde fence? Customary international law allowed for 
-  - - 
Peace" ( 1950) 62 Juridical Review at 26. 
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"auto interp~etation'"'~0f what constituted clear and imminent danger shon of m e d  
attack?' In consequence, the exercise of collective self defense was not only probable in 
the absence of actual armed attack but members of the comprehensive self were at liberty 
to determine by themselves the existence or otherwise of an imminent armed attack. 678 
McDougal & Feliciano insist, "imminence of attack of such high degree as to preclude 
effective resort by the intended victim to non-violent rnodalities of response has always 
been recognized as sufficient justification. 4 7 9  
Oppenheim supports this view and cites some histoncal instances such: (a) the 
British preemptive shelling in 1807 of the Danish fieet at Copenhagen to fnistrate 
Napoleon's (French) secret pact between Denmark ana d rance;^'' (b) The Arnelia Islands 
invasion in 18 17 by the United States to flush out pirates on the Spanish Island; (c) the 
German invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium in 19 14; (d) the sinking of the French fleet 
at Oran in 1940; and (e) the Anglo-Soviet preemptive collective self defensive occupation 
of han in 1941. in the 1928 Kellog-Briand Treaty for the Renunciation of War, France 
and the United States had declareci that a state purporting to be exercising the right, "was 
alone competent to decide whether circunistances require recourse to war in self 
de fen~e . ' *~~  ' 
This principle has drawn considerable disagreement from some pub licists. 
Lauterpacht contends that "such a claim is self contradictory as it purports to be based on 
legal right and at the same time, it dissociates itself fiom regdation and evaluation of the 
r r 6 8 2  law. During the Nuremberg trials, the ~r ibunal~"  reasoned in a similar vein and held 
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that "whether action taken under the daim of self defence was in fact aggressive or 
defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation or adjudication if international law 
is ever to be enf~rced.'"~' in conclusion, it may therefore be said that at customary 
international law, the principle of auto-interpretation685is permitted but the claim is 
justiciable.686 
Another element of the right of collective self-defence is the immediacy of the 
response to the danger or peril constituted by the initial unlawfùl anack. On this question, 
it seerns that regard is had to the means and readîness of articulating a response by the 
comprehensive self to the danger in The difficulty here is that a belated response 
could confuse an exercise of the right with acts in the nature of reprisais. Save for cases 
rr 688 of "continuing aggression , the repulsion of the initial aggression has to be executed 
with relative despatch and under circumstances where such response is the only option 
9489 "to secure a return to lawfùl noms. As American Secretary of State Daniel Webster 
of the United States argued in his correspondence in the Caroline ~ase.~~O for the right to 
avail the United Kingdom, it should, 
[slhow a necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation and the action must 
involve nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the 
necessity of self defence, must be lunited by that necessity and kept 
clearly within it.691 
Webster's test largely remains the classical surnmation of the right individually or in the 
Subhas WC, supra note 454 at 74. 
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collective context under custornary law. Similarly, the response was to be Limited "in 
intensity and magnitude to what was reasonably necessaty promptly to secure the 
permissible objectives of self defence under the conditions of ne~essity."~~' The twin 
essential elements of necessity and proportionality in the exercise of the right of 
collective self defence at customary international law was recently reaff~rmed by the 
Court in the Nucfear Weapons and in the Nicaragua ~ o s e , ~ ~ ' o f  which later. A 
s u m a r y  of the elements of customary international Law on collective self-defence may 
be stated as follows: (a) there must be an unlawfiil armed attack or at least an imminent 
unlawfiil armed attack,(b) the attack or imminence thereof must be of such chaiacter that 
there cannot be a reasonable expectation by the victim of a recourse to pacific settlement, 
(c) Save for "continuing aggression", the response to the attack or the imminent amed  
attack must be of an immediate character regard being had to the nature of  the attack or 
threat and the means of its removal, (d) the response must be reasonable and proportional 
to the threat or the unlawfid aggression, (e) The States acting collectively must have some 
acceptable degree of proximate relationship between them and rnust have given adequate 
notive to the international community of the existence thereof. Before applying these 
principles to the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, the next section will examine the 
impact, of the üN Charter on the customary international law regime on collective self- 
defence. 
69.2 McDougal, supra note 65 1 at 588. In a rather extrcrne case, the United States' army in 19 16, struck deep 
into Mexican territory to pcrmanently incapacitatc some bandits who engagcd in cross border raids fiom 
Mexico to the United States* temtory. Sec G.A. Finch, "Mexico and the United States " ( 1  9 17) 17 A. J .f . L 
at 399-406. 
4.4: COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE AND THE UN CHARTER 
Article 5 1 of the Charter of the United ~ a t i o n s " ~  provides as follows, 
Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self defense if an arrned attack occurs against a 
member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by members in the exercise of this right of self defence shall be 
imediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way 
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present Charter to take any time such action as it deems necessary in order 
to maintain or restore international peace and s e ~ u r i t ~ . ~ %  
The tme meaning of these words in the application of the principles of collective self- 
defence has been pr~blematic.~~'  While some publicists argue that the right the customary 
international law right of collective seif defence has been tempered by and subsumed in 
Article 5 1 ,698 another school of thought maintains that the right exists in its classical state 
untouched by the Charter provisions.699 The former view seems better and has been 
affirmed by the Court in the Nicaragua Case. In the view of the Court, Article 5 1 has not 
9 , 7 0 0  "subsumed and supewened the customary international law right of collective self- 
defence. Hence, it may be said that there are two parallel regimes on the right of 
collective self-defence. 
The salient issue here is that "in considering the extent to which the United 
Nations Charter has limited the scope of the customary international law on collective 
self defence ... one cannot ignore the effectiveness or otherwise of  international machinery 
693 Supra note 368. 
694 Supra note 462. 
695 Supra no te 3 88. (Hereiaaftcr, Article 5 1 of the Charter] 
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General Course on Public International Law, 166 Hague Recueil des Cours, no.2 (1952) at 45 1.  
as a substitute for individual action."70' This is the c m  of the problem. The corollary 
question therefore is the extent, if any, of the influence on customary international law of 
the spirit and letter of Article SI.''* Without preempting the arguments that will appear 
below, it seems that the question whether the practice of states has been qualified by 
Article 5 1 betrays an expectation that Article 5 1 of the Charter ought to curtail the rather 
liberal regime of collective self-defence under customary international iaw.''' The 
question may well be asked, should state practice be read subject to the Charîer? 
Having regard to the prevailing circumstances under which the Charter was 
negotiated, drawn, and agreed to by member states and its raison dezre, there is a 
discernible attitude and disposition against the use of force by states in their dealings with 
one another. Article 2(4) of the Charter expressly reinforces this teleological 
d i ~ ~ o s i t i o n . ' ~  The provisions of Articles 25 and 28 of the Charter M e r  confirm this 
view as they seek to confer a monopoly of the use of force in international law on the 
Security Council. ï h i s  raises the presumption that the recourse to the nght of collective 
self-defence should be a last resort by states and therefore be justiciable under Article 51 
only. For the purposes of assessing the validity of the ECOWAS members that their 
action in Liberia also falls within the rubric of Article 5 1, an evaluation of the opinion of 
scholars and the Court on the various aspects of the issue is prudent. This will of course, 
take into consideration the collective peculiarities of the West Afiican sub-region as 
affirmed and iterated in the PMAD of ECOWAS."' 
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Scho lm like ~ e l s e n , ~ ~ ~ . J e s s u ~ ~ ~ ~ a n d  ~enkid~*have  argued that under Article 5 1, 
the right to colIective self-defence is conditional upon the occurrence of an armed attack. 
In the rather blunt words of Henkin, the argument on anticipatory collective self defence 
under this regime "is unfounded, its reasoning fallacious and, its doctrine pemicious."i09 
On the other hand. another formidable school of thought represented by ~instein"' and 
McDougal and ~e1iciano'"has made a persuasive case for anticipatory self-defence under 
Article 51. Although the Court in the Nicaragua Case did not express a view on this 
issue, because it was decided under the nonnative regime of customary international law, 
the Court did a b  that under customary law, "the exercise of this right is conditional on 
armed atta~k.""~ Be that as it may, when Article 51 is read in the overall context of the 
Charter to avoid and reduce the fiequency and scope of armed conflicts, the better view 
would be that exercise of the right under Article 51 is lirnited to cases of armed attack. 
What then is an arrned attack and who determines when it has occurred? The 
consensus of opinion is that this is a pnvilege of the victim of the m e d  attack. However, 
like under customary international law, this privilege is clearly j~sticiable."~ What is the 
meaning of "mned attack"? It seems that the Court and a majonty of the publicists have 
no disagreement with the definition offered by Article 3, paragraph (g)  of The Definition 
of Aggression annexed to General Assembly Resolution 33 14 XXIX.'" Thus, in addition 
to sending regular forces across an international border, "the sending by or on behalf of a 
706 Kelsen, supra note 641. Howcver, he takes the rather hkral view that the victim of the anack need not 
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state of m e d  bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry out acts of amed 
force against another state of such gravity as  to amount to ... armed attack if carried out by 
regular forces- constitutes armed attack for the purposes of Article 51."'" It is 
rernarkable that the Court adopted a rather restrictive interpretation of this phrase. This 
perhaps affims the teleological intention of the Charter. Although the dissenting view of 
Judge Jennings accords more with the reality of world geo-politics, it opens the door for a 
liberal recouse to fûrther violence. 
The question of who may lawfiilly act in collective self-defence under Article 51 
has not been any less controversial under Article 5 1 than under its customary international 
law counterpart. The Court in the Nicaragua Case indirectly considered the concept of a 
comprehensive self. The facts of the case as found by the Court were that sequel to the 
collapse of the Somoza regime and its replacement by the junta led by Daniel Ortega, the 
Ortega junta reneged on its promises to the United States. It did so by adopting socialist 
policies and also by refùsing to democratize. Further, the juta becarne very fiiendly with 
the communist regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba and with the communist bloc. The United 
States of America then started aiding other neighbouring countries in the hemisphere 
such as Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica to subvert the Ortega regime. The United 
States also h d e d  and assisted a band of Nicaraguan rebels dedicated to the overthrow of 
the Ortega led regime. In addition, the United States also mined Nicaraguan ports. 
In consequence of these activities, the Nicaraguan government filed a daim in the 
Court against the United States. On the question of whether the U.S could maintain a 
714 Supra note 457. 
"' Supra note 462. But sec the contrary opinion of Judge Iemings at page 543 of the Report on the necd 
for a more liberal construction of  the phrase and which argument appears quite realistic in the context of 
contemporary realitics 
daim of collective self with El Salvador for acts of aggression allegedly carrïed out by 
the Ortega govemment some four to five years before the US aided subversion of 
Nicaragua, the Court had cause to address the notion of collectivity of interest and the 
alleged requirement that a victim state must request third-state help before a claim of 
collective self-defence would be admissible. This aspect of the Court's decision is 
difficult to reconcile under customary international law and the Charter. 
First, the condition of fomal request for help is novel and of dubious v a ~ i d i t ~ . ' ' ~  
No such requirernent is evident on the face of Article 51. Second, it seems to 
rnisapprehend the philosophy of the nght of collective self-defence. Collective self- 
defence is not necessarily the defence of another state but the defence of self on the 
principle that an aggression on another state constitutes (for reasons including mutual 
security and interdependence), a direct attack on a comprehensive self. The "assisting" 
State in effect defends itself. It is not a champion of the pnmary victim of the aggression. 
Third, the Court, in adjudicating the Nicaragua Case, was probably unduly influenced by 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of which Article 3(2) makes the 
exercise of the right of collective self defence conditional upon a request by the "primary 
victim."' It is difficult to appreciate why the Court imposed this limitation on the nght of 
collective self defence especially as it purported to be applying "customary international 
law" and not the provisions of the Rio ~eclaration."~ Even if the Court was motivated by 
the understandable need to restrict the scope of the nght to collective self-defence, it still 
does not warrant the interpretation placed on it by the Court. The request for assistance is 
therefore not part of the jurispmdence of c u s t o m q  international law nor of Article 5 1. 
- 
'16 Supra, at 104. 
'" U.N.T.S. 2 1 ,  at 93. 
Regarding the question of parties who may partake in collective self-defence 
under the Charter, Kunz has argued that in the absence of any treaty obligation, collective 
self defence is only a right and not a duty but this hardly answers the question.719 The 
Court in the Nicaragua Case did not specifically address this issue as none of the parties 
made an issue of it.720 However, it appean that there is no strict requirement for the 
existence of a forma1 defence pact between states before recourse can be had by them to 
the right of collective self-defence under Article 51  .72'~instein722 shares this view and in 
the absence of any provision to the contrary on the face of Article 51, it is probabIy 
correct. It may therefore be said that where the security of states are closely interwoven 
and such a circumstance is brought to the knowledge of third states, an attack on one state 
rnay constitute an attack on the other states. Accordingly, the right of collective self- 
defence under Article 5 1 may be invoked. 
However, Bowett has argued that having regard to the travaux preparatoires of 
the Charter and Article 5 1, the exercise of the right to collective self defence is limited to 
states in a defense pa~t723 or in a regional arrangement for mutual s e c ~ r i t ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ h i s  
argument is intriguing as it re-echoes the debate whether the right of collective self- 
de fence originated fiom the Latin American position at the Dumbarton Oaks Con ference 
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States" (1952) 81 Hague Recuil at 445.; Armstrong, " Regional Pacts: Strong Ports or Storm Cellars" 27 
Foreign Aflairs 3 5 1. 
"O Supra note 462 at 108. However, it notcd that then is no general right to intervene on the basis of 
disapproval of another Statc's economic, political, social or foreign policy. In the Court's view, "for such a 
general right to corne into existence would involve a fundamental modification of the customary law of 
non-intervention" Nicaragua Case. supra at 108. 
72' Josef Kunz, "The Bogota Charter of the Organization Of American States" (1948) A.J-1.L. 508. 
7" -Dins tein, supra note 686 at 24. See also, F.B Schick, " The North Atlantic Treaty And Thc Problem of 
Peace" ( I9SO) 62 Juridical Review at 26. 
73 Bowett supra note 645 at 218. 
'" But see Kelsen, "1s The North Atlantic Treaty in Conformity With The Charter of The United Nations?" 
( 1 95 1 ) 1 9 Univ. of Kansas Law Review at 1. 
or whether it ante-dates it. The question has already been resolved in favour of the latter 
view. Whilst the travaux preparatoires might be helpful in elucidating the provisions and 
intention of the Article, it is well to remember that the Latin American experience is not 
necessarily summative of the practice of states as it was at best, a continental peculiarity 
of a universal phenornenon. As such, Bowett's arguments on this issue may not be wholly 
correct. In sum, the right of collective self defence under Article 5 1 is not limited to States 
in a regional pact but the threshold bar of connectivity of collective security must of 
necessity remain high if the right is not to be a cloak for aggression or regional 
hegemony. 
As regards the question of the acceptable time span between the act of aggression 
and the exercise of the right of self-defence, it appears that Article 5 1 maintains the 
customary international law rule that it should be relatively contemporaneous to the 
attack. On the issue of the requirement that states resorting to collective self defence 
should imrnediately report" measures taken in the exercise of the right to the Security 
Council, some publicists like Kelsen have argued that this is mandatory. Who detemines 
whether the measures taken by the Security Council are necessary to restore the peace? 
Kelsen nas argued that this is a responsibility of the Security ~ o ~ n c i l . ' * ~  On the other 
hand, other scholars like Greig have argued that the requirement of reporting to the 
Security Council of measures ostensibly taken in collective self-defece is directory and 
exhortatory and not mandatory. His argument is that doing otherwise does not invalidate 
the exercise of the nght.726 However, the better view, and as f i e r  confirmed by the 
725 Kelsen, supra note 614. 
W.C.Greig, "Collective Self Defcnsc : What Does Article 5 1 Requk?" (1991) 40 1. C. L .Q at 366 
Court in the Nuclear Weapons Case,"' is that the assisting state must report the steps 
taken by it to the Security Council as it substantially reflects on the bona fides of the 
belief in the right. This view is consistent with the attitude of the Charter to restrain the 
use of force by States and also enhances the justiciability of the assertion of the right. 
On the question of the scope of the right of collective self defence when the 
Security Council intervenes, it seems that the obligation to cease acting in collective self 
defence would only arise when the steps taken by the Security Council are by themselves 
capable of rernoving the attack giving rise to the resort to collective self defense. An 
extreme view contends that s t a t~s  exercising the right of collective self defense have the 
right to pursue the right to a logical conclusion by defeating the aggressor and irnposing a 
peace treaty on the vanquished aggressor.72s This view is problematic as it introduces to 
the right alien elements of reprisais, punishment and self-help. It seems that in this 
context, the right is not at large and must be measured on the standard bar of what is 
reasonable and proportional to the initial aggression. 
In summary, the principles governhg the exercise of collective self-defence under 
the Charter may be stated as follows: 
There must be an armed attack and the detennination of its occurrence is the 
responsibility of the victim or comprehensive self but this claim remains justiciable 
and is subject to public scrutiny. 
There must be a strong mutual security relationship or nexus between the victim and 
the assisting state constituting a comprehensive self and the initial aggression must 
constitute a clear and present danger to the security of the comprehensive self. 
727 Supra note 368. 
728 Feinstein, "The Legality of The Use of Force by Isracl in Lebanon-June 1982" (1985) 20 ls.L.R.365. It 
is interesting to note that the Israeli incursion deep into Lebanese temtory in June 1982 which served to 
effectively cripple the prospects of future attacks by militant Palestinians operating from Lebanon has k e n  
justified on this principlc. 
Save for cases of "continuing" aggression, the response by the comprehensive self 
must be immediate, regard being had to the nature of the aggression and the 
reasonable time it would take to assess the manner and the nature of the response to 
be adopted. 
The victim of the anned attack, that is in this case, the cornprehensive self as 
represented by the ECOWAS is obliged to report al1 measures taken in collective self 
defence to the Security Council. 
Parties to the conflict are to hold their peace once the Security Council has effectively 
intervened to restore peace. 
Having examined the principles o f  coIlective self defence under the regimes of the 
Charter and customary international law, it is clear that the Charter regime is narrower 
and better if recourse to use of force is to be reduced. Accordingly, notwithstanding the 
coexistence of both regimes, the parameters of the Charter regime will be used in 
evaluating the legality or othenvise of ECOWAS action in Liberia under the doctrine of 
CO llective self-defence. 
4.5: JUSTIFICATION OF ECOWAS UNDER COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE 
The threshold point for the invocation of the right of collective self-defence is the 
~ 7 2 9  occurrence of an "armed attack. The question now is whether the NPFL invasion of 
Liberia and or its support by some third states rose to the level of an armed attack as 
contemplated by Article 5 1 .730 The Definition of ~ ~ ~ r e s s i o n ' ~ '  contained in the General 
Assembiy Resolution 33 14 of Decernber 1974 contains binding normative definitions of 
what constitutes anned attack. This has hrther been articulated and reiterated by the 
Court in both the Nicaragua Case and the Nuclear Weupons Case. However, some 
publicists like B r n o  Simma are pessimistic in this regard. In his view, "despite the 
exertion of considerable effort a generally recognized definition of 'anned attack' has not 
been f o ~ n d . " ~ ~ ~  
Be that as it may, Article 3, paragraph (g) of The Definition of Aggression 
annexed to General Assembly Resolution 3314 XXIX733~hi~h  defines armed attack as 
including the sending of regular forces across an international border; the sending by or 
on behalf of a state of anned bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which cany out 
acts of armed force against another state of sucn gravity as to amount to ... armed attack 
would suffice for the purposes of this analy$s. Being a declaration of the United Nations 
adopted with substantial support by states, it is evidence of international law on the 
 natter.^^^ The issue to be resolved is whether the facts of the rebellion and the ostensible 
third state support for it constitutes armed attack for the purposes of Article 51  and 
customary international law on collective self defence. 
The alleged support given to the rebels by various states within and around the 
- -- - 
x9 Bruno Simma et ol eds., The Charter ofthe United Nations- A Commentary (London:Oxford University 
Press, 1994) at 662-678. wereinafier, Sirruna] 
7 3 0  Simma supra note 729 at 668. 
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j3' Simma, supra notc 729 at 669. 
733 Supra note 457, ibid. 
7 4  Higgins, supra notc 387. ibid. But see the con- opinion of Judge Jennings at page 543 of the Report 
on the need for a more liberal construction of the phrase, which argument appears quite realistic in the 
context of contemporary weapons of warfarc and military inmgues. 
West African sub-region has already been documented in the preceding chapters. While a 
repetition of those allegations is hardly helpful, for the purposes of the elucidation of the 
arguments here, some of the more pertinent instances will be revisited and their legal 
implications addressed. The training of the NPFL rebels in Libya has already been 
detailed in chapter two. The Libyan motive is raîher controversial. Some commentators 
such as Mark Huband who interviewed some of the ex-NPFL rebels contend that 
Ghadaffi wanted a beachhead in West Africa and control of the sophisticated Amencan 
Omega Relay satellite in ~iberia.'~' Other reasons include his alleged desire to use the 
NPFL rebels to seize the relatively large number of Amencans in ~ i b e n a . ' ~ ~  Be that as it 
may, the crucial question here is whether the alleged support of the various factions by 
diverse states is sufficiently attributable to those states and whether it constitutes armed 
attack. 
It is not in doubt that the NPFL rebels iaunched the rebellion fiom Cote d'Ivoire 
and allegedly received extensive support fiom both the Ivoirean government and the 
government of Burkina   as o.'^^ These are not without legal consequences. The critical 
test here is whether the government of Cote d'Ivoire and Btrkina Faso merely neglected 
to safeguard their temtories fiom being used by the rebels or whether they (the two 
governments) voluntarîly placed their territories at the disposal of the rebels. in the 
former case, it would be a delict at international law. While these speculations may have 
their relative elements of truth, they afford little probative utility to the international 
lawyer. As the Court pertinently noted in the Co* Channel Case, 
(I]t cannot be concluded fiom the mere fact of the control 
exercised by a State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily 
knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, 
nor yet that it necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors. This 
fact, by itself and apart from other circumstances, neither involves prima 
''' Huband, supra note 74 at 65. 
'16 fbid. 
737 Supra at 76. 
facie responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof. 99738 
Moreover, the use of a state's temtory by a rebel group does not amount to armed attack 
but rnay constitute subversion of the victim state. In addition, the support of the w h n g  
factions by some States does not necessarily make them the agents of their benefactors. 
As the Court held in the Nicaragua Case, it must be shown that the waning factions were 
not only created by those states financing their carnpaign but that they were under their 
~ontrol."~ Offenng logistic support and finances to the rebel group is not enough. The 
element of control is critical. In the absence of probative proof that Cote d'Ivoire, 
Burkina Faso and Libya created and controlled the warring factions, the question of the 
existence or not of an armed attack under this heading does not But this is not the 
end of the matter as the sending of 400 Burkina Faso troops by the Burkinabe 
govemment to Liberia to fight alongside the NPFL rebels is a different kettle of fish. 
As already indicated in sections four and five of chapter two, the govemment of 
Burkina Faso acknowledged sending over 400 of its state army to the NPFL rebets which 
it justified as "moral ~ u p ~ o r t " ~ ~ ' f o r  the rebels. The legal significance of this fact is quite 
radical. The decision of the Court in the Nicaraguu ~ase~~~leaves little doubt that the 
Burkinabe action took the matter out of the rubric of indirect aggression7e3to one of actual 
direct aggression constituting armed attack. According to the Court, 
[I]n particular, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed 
attack must be understood as including, not merely action by regular 
armed forces across an international border, but also the sending by or on 
738 Supra note 463 at 18. 
739 Supra note 462 at 100- 120. 
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Online>http://www.cdr.dWwp97-4, supra note 276.; D. Elwood Dun& "The Civil War in Liberia" in 
Taisier M.Ali & Robert Manhews, eds., Civil Wars in Afica-Roou and Resolution (Montreal-Kingston, 
McGill-Queeen's University Press., 1999) 89 at 90. 
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7'3 P ierluig t Lamberti Zanardi, "Indircc t Military Aggression'* in Cassese, cd., The Current Legal 
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behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which 
carry out acts of anned force against another state of such gravity as to 
amount to inter alia to an armed attack conducted by regular forces, or its 
substantial involvement therein. 7a(emphasis added) 
Although these remarks were made in respect of the customary law regime, they 
apply with equal force to the Charter regime"'on collective self-defence. Accordingly, 
the sending of 400 Burkinabe troops to Liberia by the govemment of Burkina Faso to 
fight alongside the NPFL rebels is nothing short of an armed attack against Liberia. Even 
if the despatch of Burkinabe troops to Liberia was at the request of the rebel NPFL in 
Liberia, it still constitutes armed attack against Liberia since the existence of a civil war 
does not necessarily mean the disappearance of Liberian sovereignty. As the Court held 
in the Nicaragua Case, state sovereignty and the doctrine of non-intervention "would 
certainly lose its effectiveness . . .if intervention were to be justified by a mere request for 
r.746 assistance by an opposition group in another state. Accordingly, the unlawhil 
despatch of Burkina Faso troops across its borders to Liberia to help in the rebellion 
against Doe violated intenational law and constituted anned attack against Liberia. 
Having crossed the threshold point on collective self defence, the second test is 
whether ECOWAS and its constitutive States is a comprehensive self warranting its 
intervention. In answenng this question, the crucial test ought to be the substantiality of 
the new comprehensive self created by public assertions of an inter-connectedness of 
securities by the affected States. Ln the Liberian case, its collective security arrangement 
in the ECOWAS PMAD is sufficient to create and assert its comprehesivity of self. The 
preamble to the ECOWAS PMAD and its substantive Articles leave no doubt about the 
existence of a comprehensive self. The preamble does not only "recognize that Member 
States belong to the same geographical ~ e a * * , ~ ~ ~ i t  aflirms the consciousness of ECOWAS 
that regional security can best be achieved by pooling together their resources within a 
744 Nicaragua Case, supra notc 462 at 630, para 195. 
'" Simma, supra notc 769 at 687. 
746 Supra note 462 at 126. 
747 Supra note at 438.  
cornrnon agency.748 Thus, in addition to the shared economic interests of the ECOWAS 
mernber states, there exists an undentanding and public affirmation in the sub-region of 
the interlocking and inter-dependent nature of their mutual securities. This undertstanding 
finds ample expression in the substantive provisions of the PMAD and the ECOWAS 
Non-Aggression Pact. Some of the pertinent provisions of the ECOWAS Protocoi on 
Non-Aggression and the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) are 
as follows: 
Article 2 of the Non-Aggression Pact, 
Each member shall renain fiom committing, encouraging or condoning 
acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of the other mernber ~tates.'~' 
The provisions of Articles 3 and 4 impose a positive duty on member states to ensure that 
their territories are not used for acts of regional and inter-state subversion. 
Article 3 of PMAD: 
[Elach member state shall undertake to prevent foreigners on its territory 
fiom committing the acts referred to in Article 2 above against the 
sovereignty and temtorial integrity of other member ~tates.~" 
Article 4 of PMAD: 
Each member state shall undertake to prevent non-resident foreigners from 
using its tenitory as a base for committing the acts referred to in Article 2 
above against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states."' 
In addition, the PMAD articulates ECOWAS explicit approbation of the doctrine of 
collective self defence within the region as Article 2 of the PMAD provides that, 
'" Ibid. 
749 Reproduced in WeUer, supra note 5 at 18. 
Ibid. 
'' ' ibid. 
[Mlember States declare and accept that any armed attack or aggression 
directed against any Member state shall constitute a threat or aggression 
against the entire ~ o m m u n i t ~ . ' ~ ~  
Members of the ECOWAS are by virtue of Article 3 of the PMAD obliged to give mutual 
aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression.7s3 This objective is 
to be achieved through the instrumentality of an Allied Armed Force of the Cornrnunity 
to be composed of nationals Erom existing m e d  forces of the Community earmarked for 
that purpose and placed at the disposa1 of the Cornrnunity in cases of any "armed 
inter~ention."'~~ The phrase "anned intervention" seems to have a contexnialized 
meaning regard being to the provisions of Article 15 (1). That Article provides that 
"intervention by AAFC (the Comrnunity's Allied Force) shall in al1 cases be justified by 
the legitimate defence of the community." However, the ECOWAS Cornmunity shall not 
employ this provision to intervene "if the confiict remains purely internai. 99755 
It is very pertinent to note that by virtue of Article 18 of the PMAD, a conflict is 
not internai if, as in the Liberian case it is "actively maintained and sustained fiom the 
,9756 outside. Nor would it still be constnied as an intemal matter when it actually spilt 
over into Sierra Leone with catastmphic consequences. The impact of  the Liberian crisis 
on Sierra Leone fomed the substance of the deliberations of the United Nations General 
Assembly at its 86" Plenary meeting held on the 21R of December 1993.'~' The 
subsequent Resolution passed by that body made the following findings, 
that the spi11 over effect of the Liberian crisis had caused serious destruction and 
devastation of the productive areas of the temtory of Sierra Leone and of its economy 
as a  hol le,'^^ 
752  lbid. 
753 Ibid. 
"' Article 13 o f  PMAD. 
755 Article 18 o f  PMAD. 
756 Ibià. 
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The. conflict in Liberia had "devastated lives and properties in the eastem and 
southem provinces of Sierra ~ e o n e , ~ ' ~  causing a "massive outflows of rehigees and 
displaced persons. 9,760 
On the foregoing grounds grounds, it is argued that in addition to the treaty obligations 
imposed on rnember states by the ECOWAS Non-Aggression Pact and the PMAD, their 
clearly exists the collectivity of interest and a comprehensive self justifjmg the assertion 
of a right in collective self-defence by ECOWAS. 
It has been argued by cntics of the intervention that the decision to iniervene via 
the h e w o r k  of the PMAD was flawed and invalid for alleged non-cornpliance with the 
provisions of the PMAD and the ECOWAS ~reaty.'~' This argument is apparently 
formidable. In support of the argument, Article 6 of the PMAD has been invoked. The 
Article provides that 
The ~ u t h o r i t y ~ ~ ~ s h a l l  decide on the expediency of military action and 
entrust its execution to the Force Commander of the Allied Forces of the 
Community (AAFC)'~) 
Since the decision to intervene militarily was taken by the Standing Mediation 
Cornmittee, a delegate of the ECOWAS ~ u t h o r i t y ~ ~ o f  Heads of States and Govemment 
as provided above, the decision to intervene, it has been argued, was invalid. It has to be 
recalled that the ECOWAS Authonty of Heads of State and Govemment, met on 30 May 
1990 in Gambia established a Community Standing Mediation ~ornmit tee .~~ '  This body, 
made up of four members of the ECOWAS Authority itself was appointed by that organ 
lS9 Paragraph 6, ibid. 
Ibid. Note also that in addition to other Resolutions of the General Asscmbly, Resolution 49 of 1994 
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and chaired by the chairman of ECOWAS. Its mandate is tu suggest and explore 
amicable ways of settling disputes in the sub-region and report to the full ~ u t h o r i t y . ' ~ ~  It 
was the Standing Mediation Cornittee that recommended despatch of peacekeeping 
troops to Liberia. The argument that the decision to intervene taken by the Standing 
Mediation Cornmittee, instead of the hl1 body of the Authority of Heads of States, was 
illegal is erroneous and ignores subsequent developments on the issue. 
At the extra-ordinary Summit of the Authority convened at Bamako, Mali 
between November 27-28,1990, "the Authority expressed its appreciation to the members 
of the Mediation Cornmittee for the initiatives taken in finding a peacefbl resoiution to 
the cnsis in Liberia*' and moreover, "ratified the ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia as 
embodied in the Banjul Communique and Decisions of the Standing Mediation 
Cornrniittee adopted on 7 August 1990." '" Although this clear ratification of the 
decision to intervene taken by the Standing Mediation Comrnittee was ex  post facto, 
arguments on the purported incornpetence of the decision to intervene are not well 
founded. 
The other conditionality for justification under collective self-defence is whether 
the response by the West Afncan states was both necessary, timely and proportional to 
the threat posed by the conflict. in evaluating this aspect of the right to collective self- 
defence, regard should be had to the complexities of  the civil war in Liberia, its impact on 
the countries in the sub-region, the relative difficuities in raising the necessary military 
response and finally, the most reasonable solution to the problem. The impact of the 
Liberian conflict on L ibe r i a ,  the region and the international community at large have 
been explored in chapter two. It has already been noted that six weeks after the rebellion, 
the neighbouring countries were aiready feeling the pangs and pain of the conflict as the 
lbid. 
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rate of the infiow of refugees was a already stretching the capacity and security of those 
states? Meanwhile, both the OAU and the UN, beyond platitudes and homilies on 
peaceful coexistence and amicable settlement of conflicts, ignored the spreading disaster. 
Meanwhile, the crisis had recorded numerous atrocities and was becoming increasingly 
ethnicized, a phenornenon which, given the problems of the Berlin partitioning of Afiica, 
was bound to draw the conflct, as it did, beyond the fiontiers of Liberia. It is therefore 
argued that in view of the factors listed above, ECOWAS response was necessary. 
On the question of timeliness of response and reporting to the Security Council of 
rneasures taken under Article 51 of the Charter, it is important to recall that Doe's 
letter769 inviting the ECOWAS to intervene in the anarchy in Libena was addressed to 
that body on the 14" July 1990. Three weeks thereafier, precisely on 71h August 1990, the 
ECOWAS Standing Mediation Cornmittee, acting on behalf of the ECOWAS Authority 
of Heads of States took the following de ci si on^^^' on Libena: 
Established an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOIMOG), 
Ordered a Cease-£ire in Liberia, 
Ordered al1 combatants in the conflict to sunender al1 arms to the ECOMOG 
Ordered al1 parties to the conflict to refrain fiom the importation of arms and 
ammunition into Liberia, 
Proposed the establishment of a democratically elected government in Liberia, 
Proposed the establishment of an intenm Govemment for ~ibena."' 
That these far reaching decisions were taken just shortly after Doe's intimation to 
ECOWAS about the crisis in Liberia, can hardly be said to have been belated; moreover, 
the crisis was in the nature of a continuing aggression. It is thus clear that the response by 
the ECOWAS was very timely especially in the context of the efforts necessary to 
-- 
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convene sixteen different states to agree on a comrnon agenda. 
However, some commentators have argued that the ECOWAS response which 
ultimately led to the resolution of the crisis and the installation of a dernocratically 
elected govemment in Liberia was not proportiona1772to the threat posed by the Liberian 
crisis. This argument, attractive as it seems on the surface, makes a profound rnistake. As 
Loius Henkin noted, any inquiry into the role of law "must take into account the state of 
'the system9-the character of international society and of the law at a given tirne."773 This 
is not to mean that scholars or international lawyers are at liberty to torture legal rules to 
yield particularly pliable and amenable interpretations and justifications. Far fiom that; 
the issue here is that to the extent that argument on this aspect of the question fails to take 
into consideration the prevailing conditions and the intrinsic nature of the issues at hand, 
the objection remains suspect. 
It is well to recall the earlier arguments on the emergence of a pragmatic, instead of a 
doctrinaire approach to peacekeeping or collective self-defence as the case may be. As 
already noted, a study of multi-lateral responses to civil strife with international 
repercussions shows that peacekeeping measures are more or less a necessary demand of 
the nature of the crisis. Peacekeeping bodies intervening in intra-state conflicts 
increasingly insist on universally obsewed elections in resolving those conflicts. In a 
situation like Liberia's where the rebellion threatening the region was rooted in the 
poverty of govemmental legitirnacy,'"it stands to reason that democratic elections should 
be part of the recommended remedy by those states acting in collective self-defence. it is 
therefore argued that to the extent that the ECOWAS created and sustained an 
environment whereby the warring factions were disarmed and a genuine democracy 
instituted to enable the Liberian people to rebuild their country, the ECOWAS response 
was proportional to the threat posed by the civil war. Moreover, the measures taken 
772 Kufour, supra note 136 at 535. 
773 Henkin, How Nations Behave, supra note 453 at xii. 
774 Luard, supra note 333. 
enabled most of the neighbouring member-states to reclaim their threatened sovereignty 
and did not go beyond the ECOMOG mandate, nor was it limited by Doe's original 
invitation. 
The next criteria for justification in collective self defence under the Charter is 
that parties acting in collective self-defence should speedily report to the Security 
Council, the steps taken by them in pursuance of Article 51 of the Charter. Here the 
ECOWAS action may well be the paragon of scnrpulous compliance. Although the 
ECOWAS decision to act inter dia in collective selfkiefence was taken on the 7'h of 
August 1990, it is significant to note that the Security Council was informed of those 
decisions within 48 hours. Indeed by a letter'" dated 9 August 1990 and addressed to the 
Security Council, the Security Council was informed of the steps taken by the ECOWAS. 
The pertinent aspects of the Ietter read thus, 
1 consider it necessary to invite you to this brief session on the 
tragic situation in Republic of Liberia and on the efforts at the regional 
level to restore peace to that country.. .the Authority held its first Summit 
in Banjul fÏom the 6-7 August 1990 and came up with effective steps for 
ending the Liberkm tragedy. Conscious of its responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace and security in the sub-region, the Cornmittee on 
behalf of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of States and Goverment, 
decided as follows: 
There shall be an irnmediate cease-fire. Ai1 parties to the conflict shall 
cease al1 activities of a military and paramilitary nature as well as al1 
acts of violence. 
Under the authority of Chairman of ECOWAS, a cease-fire 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), was set up; it comprises military 
contingents fiom member states of the of the ECOWAS Standing 
Mediation Committee, as well as Guinea and Sierra Leone, Liberia's 
neighbours. 
ECOMOG shall assist the Committee in supervising the 
implementation and ensuring strict compliance of the cease-fire by al1 
the parties to the conflict. 
That a broad-based hterim National Govemment shall be set up in the 
Republic of Liberia to administer that country and organise fiee and 
fair elections, leading to a democratically elected govement. The 
- composition of the Interim Governrnent shaIl be determined by al1 
parties to the conflict, including political parties and other interest 
groups. 
None of the leaders of the warring parties shall head the Intenm 
Govemment. 
For the purposes of carrying out a peacekeeping role and monitoring 
the peace process in Liberia, a special emergency fund was 
established. There shali be voluntary contribution by the member 
states of ECOWAS, the OAU and other fnendly countries to the 
special fiind. A budget of about USSO million is projected for 
financing the military operations, and for the immediate humanitarian 
needs of the Liberian people.'76 
The letter concludes with a statement that the ECOMOG action was not designed to take 
sides in the conflicts and urging the international community to support the ECOWAS in 
its initiative. The letter dispels any doubt as to whether the ECOWAS satisfied this leg of 
the conditions for a valid invocation of the rights of collective self defence as provided by 
Article 5 1 of the Charter. 
The last condition is that the states a c ~ g  in collective self defence should cease 
hxther actions in that regard once the Security Council takes effective steps to resolve the 
conflict. With particular reference to the case of the ECOWAS action in Liberia, it is 
remarkable that the Security Council not only approved of the actions taken by the 
ECOWAS but within 18 months after the initial ECOWAS intervention, engaged in an 
unprecedented alliance with that body. n i e  alliance, in the form of the creation of the 
United Nations Observer Monitoring Group in Liberia (UNOMIL) lasted fiom 1992 to 
Zn view of the various implications of this novel arrangement and its impact on 
collective security and the provisions of the United Nations Charter relating to regional 
arrangements, attention will shifi in this thesis to the continuing expansion of the 
meaning of the phrase, "threat to international peace," and its role as the eigger 
mechanism for the provisions of chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The next chapter will argue 
U.N Doc. SQ48 1 1 of Novcmber 16, 1992 (Anncx) 
that recent state practice shows an untidy and incoherent cornpliance with the relevant 
Charter provisions on regional ebforcement actions. In most cases like that of Liberia, the 
relationship between regional bodies and the Security Council in the application of 
chapter 7 of the UN Charter is accidental and leaves much to be desired. This seems to 
present the Security Council with the need to ratify whatever presurnptous or 
unathourized measures adopted by muhi-lateral security organizations without the prior 
authorization of the Council. The cases of Liberia and Kosovo are in point. One of the 
grave dangers in this evolving practice is that regional organizations may now proceed to 
engage in ilIicit military interventions in the knowledge that presented with a fait 
accompli, the Security Council would "ratiw' such brazea usurpation of responsibility. 
With respect to this chapter, it is argued that the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia is not 
only legaly justifiable under the principles of invitation by an officila and recognized 
g o v e m e t  (though threatened) but also under the principtes guiding resort to the 
doctrine of collective self-defence under Article 5 1 of the UN Charter. 
CHAPTER 8 OF THE UN CaARTER AND RATIFICATION OF THE ECOWAS 
ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
The principal task of the student of international organization is not to 
waste more time debating over regionalism versus universalism but to 
study the ways in which, in concrete cases, the two principles can be 
utilized in combination and the standards to be applied in deterrnining the 
dosage of each to be a d ~ ~ t e d . ' ~ '  
S. 1: INTRODUCTION 
It is now common knowledge that the increasing rate of intemal conflicts of international 
character imposes a huge strain on the United ~at ions ."~ This trend has probably resulted 
in the apparent readiness of the United Nations to welcome regional initiatives or 
collaboration in the maintenance of international security or in some cases, to merely 
spectate when such efforts are taken by regional organizations. Witness the cases of the 
OAS intervention in Haiti, the lslamic Conference and Arab League initiatives in the 
Somali Crisis, the Association of South East Asia Nations efforts in the Cambodian crisis 
and the OSCE initiatives regarding the new states in the defunt Soviet Union and 779 the 
1999 European Uniod NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. 
On the Liberia crisis, the Report of the United Nations on the Observer Mission 
in Liberia, (UNOMIL) acknowledges that "the United Nations, h m  the beginning of the 
conflict, supported the efforts of the ECOWAS mernber ~ta tes ." '~~ This sense of support 
for the ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ' ~ r a d u a l l ~  and evennÿilly yielded to a diminished CM role in Liberia. 
This subordination of the UN was justified by Secretary-General of the United Nations as 
"reaffirming . . .cornmitment to a systematic cooperation ktween the United Nations and 
m Pimian Potter, cited in Akindele, supra note 343 at forcword. 
778 According to Boutros Bouuos Ghali, in 1994 there were 70.000 U.N Peacekeepers in 17 operations 
around the world at a cost of 53.3 billion per year. See Binaefer Nowrojee supra note 86 at 129. 
779 Binaefer Nowrojee, supra note 86 at 129. 
'O Assessrnent of the Special Representative of the SG, Report SG üN Doc. SE5402 of March 12, i 993. 
' Ibid. 
a regio-1 organization, as envisaged in Chapter Vm of the ~harter ."~ The UN contented 
itself with giving ECOWAS assistance on politicai reconciliation, humanitarian 
assistance and electoral assistance. 
It is remarkable that this Report and subsequent proceedings and events Ieading to 
the unprecedented close cooperation between a regional organization and the United 
Nations h ~ s  escaped the relative close scrutiny of scholars. in this chapter an attempt will 
be made to examine the legality of the ECOWAS action in Liberia in the context of this 
trend and as it impacts on the Charter of the United Nations on enforcement actions. 
Towards this objective, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section one is 
introductory. 
Section 5.2 is a doctrinal exercise on the pertinent aspects of the Charter on the 
maintenance of global peace. The essence is to highlight the general consensus of writers 
and commentators that it is the Security Council that has the responsibility of maintaining 
peace globally. The critical question here is whether having regard to the provisions of 
the Charter, a regional body c m  proceed to undertake enforcement actions without the 
prior approvai and authorization of the Security Council. It also explores the continuing 
expanded meaning of the phrase, 'Weat to international peace" in its role as the trigger 
mechanism for the provisions of chapter 7 of the UN Charter. 
Section 5.3 examines the juridical nature of the UN Security Council resolutions 
and traces the process of ratification of  the ECOWAS action in Liberia. However, this 
section contends that recent state practice on chapter 8 of the Charter is untidy and 
incoherent and also examines the process by which the aberrant action of the ECOWAS 
in Liberia gained apparent legitimacy by ratification. It is remarkable that the United 
Nations Security Council passed 16 unanimous resolutions approving and appreciating 
the ECOWAS enforcernent action in Liberia. Similarly, the General Assembly passed 6 
resolutions cornmending and justifjing the ECOWAS action in Liberia. The corollary 
78Z Ibid. 
issue is. whether a post facto ratification of any such enforcement actions is possible 
within the fiarnework of the United Nations. That is to Say, is there a place for ratification 
and retroactive validation of regional enforcement actions at international law? Could 
those resoIutions have legitirnated the ECOWAS initiative in Liberia? Regard is also had 
to the probable reasons why the ECOWAS action in Liberia enabled it to gain the 
approval by the Security Council and the General Assembly? This is achieved by a short 
cornparison with OAU intervention in Chad and OAS intervention in Haiti. 
As the dangers inherent in such ex p s t  facto ratification are apparent, this section 
sets the tone for discussion on how the emerging trend may be remedied. Section three 
and indeed the whole of chapter five conclude with the observation that in view of the 
Security Council's ratification, the ECOWAS action, notwithstanding some of its obvious 
defects, was lawfûl at international law. 
5.2: REGIONAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND THE UN CHARTER 
As a way of providing ECOMOG with sufficient rneans to ensure the 
implementation of the Agreement, and with the support of the Security 
Counc il, the Secretary-General established a trust fùnd, under the auspices 
of the United Nations, that can be utilized to enable Afncan countries to 
send reinforcements to ECOMOG, to provide assistance to countries 
already participating in ECOMOG, and for humanitarian assistance, 
elections and demobili~ation.'~~ 
In the final quarter of the twentieth century the character and significance 
of international law, 1 believe, will be importantly influenced by the Third 
~ o r l d . ' ~ '  
The unified response of the Security Council to the Gulf conflict raised the prospect of a 
"new world order" of global commitment to the maintenance of international law and 
removal of threats to international peace.785 As subsequent events indicate, the euphona 
died a sudden death as it was apparently motivated by concems other than the vindication 
of international law or a sincere concern for collective security. The fond expectation of a 
world govemed by law and of the willingness of the great powers to lend their might in 
defence of nght, justice and international law has since the end of the Second World War 
been hstrated by their self serving, provincial andl or ideological agendas. The end of 
that war had given rise to a resounding determination and resolve by States to "save 
succeeding generations fiom the scourge of ~ a r . " ~ ~ ~  The United Nations was set up with 
a fundamental purpose of maintainhg "international peace and ~ecurity."'~~ This was to 
be achieved primarily by taking "effective collective measures for the mevention and 
removal of threats to the ~eace."'*~ 
Although the phrase "threat to international peace" is not defined in the Charter, 
the body capable of making that determination was provided for in Chapter five of the 
783 BOUUOS Boums Ghali, .Report of the U.N Secrctary Gencral, United Nations Observer Mission in 
Lnberia, Online> hppt-Jlwwwlun.org/Depts/DPKOMision/unomiV-b-htm, accessed on 1911 1/98. 
784 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behuve supra note 38 1 at xiii- 
785 McCoubrey & White, supra note 453 at vii. 
786 The Charter of the United Nations, supra note 388. 
787 Article 1, ibid. 
788 Ibid. Underlining suppiied. 
Charrer. This chapter makes clear provision for the mechanism by which such crucial 
functions may be exercised. m i l e  Article 7 of the Charter establishes the Secunty 
Council, Articles 23 and 24 state the responsibility of the Security ~ouncil.'" Article 24 
provides that the Members of the United Nations, 
[Clonfer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
m a i n t e G e  of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying 
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their 
behalf.790 
However, the power to maintain international peace is not to be exercised at the 
whims and caprices of the Security Council. Articie 24 (2) delimits and circurnscnbes the 
scope of this responsibility. Thus it clearly provides that 'Tn discharging these duties the 
Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
~ations."'~' To reinforce the supremacy of the Security Council in the maintenance of 
international peace, the determination of what constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security is the sole responsibility of the Secuity Council. Hence Article 39 of the 
Charter provides that 
[Tlhe Secunty Council shall detemine the existence of anv threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recornmendations or decide what measues shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
secu~ity. '~~ 
This regime of supreme and primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace appears to be tempered by a desue in the Charter to strike a balance behueen 
regional imperatives and the need for international collective security. In effect, some of 
the responsibilities relating to the maintenance of international security need not be 
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~t~encies ."~ Thus, Article 52 provides that 
[Nlothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for 
regionai action. 794 
This compromise is quickly qualified by the provisions of the Charter which Iimits this 
margin of regional initiatives to measures not necessitating what it refers to as 
,9795 "enforcement actions. Thus, while the regional bodies may be used for enforcement 
actions by the Security Council, they cannot Iawfblly seize such initiatives on their own 
volition. In the express words of Article 53 the Charter, 
[Tl he Security Council shail, where appropriate, utilize such regional 
agencies or arrangements for enforcement action under its authoritv. But 
no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by 
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security ~ o u n c i l . ' ~ ~  
The rules above purport that if any enforcement action is to be undertaken by any 
regional agency, it must be with the prior authorization of the Security Council first 
sought and obtained. For the assessment of the lawfulness of the ECOWAS action in 
Liberia under the prevailing Charter regime, three issues arise here. The first is the 
meaning of threat to international peace. The second is the meaning of "enforcement 
action". The third is if an enforcement action is undertaken to remove a threat to 
international peace but without the prior authorization of the Security Council, may such 
an action be accorded ex posr facto ratification. It is upon these three sets of issues that 
the legality of the ECOWAS action in Liberia and consequent UN response will be 
evaluated. 
However, it must be remembered that the Charter provisions on regional 
793 H.A.Amankwah, "International Law, Dispute Settlcmeat and Regional Organizations in the African 
Setting" in Snydcr and Sathirathai, th., supra note 600 at 197-206. 
794 Article 53 of the Charter, supra note 388. 
795 Ibid. 
7% Article 53 (Underlining supplied). 
arrangements and initiatives like other provisions of the Charter are ostensibly designed 
for inter-state confli~ts.'~' Thus, Article 2 (4) containing the ban on the use of force and 
Articles 39, 51, 52 and 53 which contain the exceptions thereto apply basically to 
rnember states in their relations with each ~ t h e r . ' ~ ~  Be that as it may, the emergence of 
the contemporary rash of civil wars has probably resulted in the Security Council 
engaging in an ingenious and relatively liberal con~tniction~~~and interpretation of Article 
39 of the Charter. This awesome provision confers on the Security Council the powers to 
act, and if need be, ovemide the limitations posed by the principles of non-intervention. 
It is upon making this detennination, that it may take rneasures necessary for its 
kemovai. This duty overrides the prohibition on the Council and states from interferhg in 
9,800 matters which are purely "internai to a state, when the cnsis in issue constitutes a clear 
and present threat to international peace and security. The detexmination of the existence 
of a threat to international peace and security is the gateway to enforcement actions and 
military delimitation of state sovereignty. Therefore, it is important that the phrase "threat 
to international peace and security" be properly scrutinized and its boundaries delimited 
with as much precision as possible. 
Recent state practice reflecting the gradua1 evolution of a holistic and global 
conception of collective security (which has been discussed in chapter 3)80'points to the 
emergence of a rather liberal regime on the detennination of what constitutes threat to 
international peace and security. This trend has been most noticeable in the increasing 
cases of outbreak of civil wars. It is interesting to note that the Somali deba~ le ,~ '~  the 
Yugoslavian c n ~ i s , ~ ~ ~ t h e  Sierra Leonean crisis and several other cases of civil wars have 
797 McCoubrey & W t e ,  supra note 445 at 4. 
798 Supra, at S. 
799 Simma et ai, eds.. s u p  notc 729 at 565-61 1. 
'00 Article 2 (7) UN Charter, supra note 388. 
8 0  1 Michael Reisman, "Coercion and Self Determination: Construing Cbartcr Article 2(4)" (1984) 78 
A.J.I.L. 642. 
'O2 Wippman on Consent, supra notc 523 at 234. 
'O3 But see Mark Weisburd, " Thc Emptincss of the Concept offus Cogen, as Illustrated by the War in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina" (1995-6) 17 Michigan J.1 of /nt % Law at 1. 
al1 been determined by the Security Council as constituting threats to international peace 
and security. The coilapse of a governent  in a civil war, genocide, and refùgee crises 
have been construed in contemporary times as threats to international peace and security 
and thus beyond the domestic jurisdiction of the affected stategM In other words, 
intemally generated crises which physically impact on neighbounng states are being 
increasingly perceived of as threats to international peace warranting the intervention of 
the Security Council in the prmary source zone of crisis. 
As states have pursuant to Aiticle 25 of the Charter undertaken to "accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter" it is 
beyond doubt that where such deteminations have been made, member states are obliged 
to collectively enforce such de ci si on^.^^^ While widespread human rights a b ~ s e s . ~ ~ ~ t h e  
denial of the nght to self-detemination, extreme violence,"'civil wars, genocide and 
overthrow of democratic regimes by force may now be construed as threats to 
international peace where they impact on neighbouring states, the tme test may probably 
be political rather than legal, even though the issue rnay be presented o t h e r ~ i s e . ~ ~ ~  As the 
gatt-way to the use of force by the Security Council, and by delegation, regionai 
bodiesTso9the need for clarity and objectivity as to the elements of and a priori contents of 
what constitutes a threat to international peace c m  hardly be overstated. 
The malleability of the concept of threat to international peace appears to be 
804 The process of making customary international law is informal, haphazard and is not usualIy deliberate. 
See Heniun, How Nations Behave, supra note 453 at 32-34. 
'OS McCoubrey & White, Supra note 445 at 32. Sec also, Reparation Case [1949] I.C.J. Rep. at 178-9. 
'Ob Simrna, supra note 729 at 6 12. 
807 Jochen Frowein, "Action With Respect to Threau to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, Acts of 
Aggression" in Simrna cds., supra note 729 at 61 1. ~crcinafler ,  Frowein] 
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not appear possible." Frowein, supra, at 623. But sce N.D White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations 
and the Maintenance of lntemational Peuce and Secun@ 2.6 cd.. (Manchester: Manchester University 
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309 Kelsen, supra note 64 1 at 727-8. 
substantially reduced or avoided on the rare occasions where the Security Council has 
made such decisions by unanimous votes.810 However, the practice of the Security 
Council seems to indicate an appreciable latitude in its determination of what constites a 
threat to international peace.8'1 Needless to Say, for the Security Council to make the 
determination that a particular crisis is a threat to international peace, it needs the relevant 
information fkom those states who are directly confronted with the threat. This is 
probably the aspect where the margin of appreciation possessed by regional bodies 
becomes very ~ s e f Ù l . ~ ' ~ ~ h i s  aspect will be M e r  exploreci in the last chapter. 
Be that as it may, the elasticity of the concept of threat to international peace as 
McCoubrey and White argue, is apparent in the extensive and varied use made of it8I3 
between 1965 and 1968."~ Similarly, it is reflected in the ~ontemporary8'~resur~ence of 
civil conflicts. One may refer to the examples of Iraq,816Yugoslavia,s'7Soma~ia,818~aiti, 
of which later, to buttress this point. Why should the crisis in Yugoslavia be construed as 
a threat to international peace when the chronic civil war in Sudan has remained 
relatively ignored inspite of the endless bloodshed and genocide there and the 
destabilizing impact on neighbouring states? Why Iraq and not Turkey? Are the Kurds in 
Iraq better deserving of protection that their Turkish kins? 
In the Liberia case, it suffices to note that the Security Council by Resolution 788 
of 1992 made a determination that the violence in that country was a threat to 
international peace.819 Having crossed that thresh01d;~Othe next issue is what is an 
8 10 Frowein, supra note 807 at 6 10. 
8 1 1  Frowein, supra at 613. 
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"enforcement action"? Article 53 of the Charter and other provisions of the Charter are 
not helpful, as  they do not offer any definition of this ail-important phrase.82' The editors 
of the European Comrnenta?y on the Charter of the United Nations are of the considered 
view that by virtue of the travaux preparatoires of the Charter, al1 measures under 
chapter 8 of the Charter, without exception, are enforcement r n e a ~ u r e s . ~ ~ ~  On the other 
hand, a section of North and South American scholars are agreed that it refers to use of 
military force and mandatory sanctions excluding purely defensive a~tions.''~ The better 
view seems to be that it relates to those actions (excluding defensive acts) which 
ultimately require military coercion or force for their effect. This much was the finding of 
the Security Council in the Dominicun case, 
In the Dominican Case, the collective measures taken by the OAS against the 
Dominican Republic which fell short of armed force was impliedly held by the Security 
Council not to be an enforcement action as contemplated by chapters 7 and 8 of the 
Charter. The Security Council's three power resolution merely urged the Council to "take 
note"824 of the OAS action. In effect, the economic sanctions by the OAS against the 
Dominican Republic as  a regional action not requiring the use of arrned force for its 
execution was constnied as not being an enforcement action for the purposes of Article 
~ 3 . ~ ~ '  This interpretation by the Security Council is however incompatible with its 
subsequent reaction to the Cuban Quarantine of 1962 . '~~  Here the Security Council by 
necessary implication decided that the naval blockade imposed on Cuba by the USIOAS 
''O Ofodile, supra note 135 at 41 1. 
I. Wolf, "Regionai Arrangements and the UN Charter" (1983) 6 E.P./.L at 289-95. 
'" Sirnma, eds., supra note 729 at 732. 
823 McCoubrey & White, supra note 445 at 46; Sec also, Michel Akehursf "Enforcement Action by 
Reg ional Agencies With Spccial Rcfercnce to the Organization of American States" ( 1 967) 7 B. Y. 1. L. at 
175-227 
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President Betancourt of Venezuela. The member states of the OAS acting undcr Articles 6and 8 of the Rio 
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At the Security Council, the Soviet Delcgatc argucd that the OAS action amounted to an enforcement 
action requiring the prior authorization of the Security Council. UN.Doc.s14491 (1960) 
825 AkindeIe, supra note 343 at 110. 
U.S. Dept of state, (1962) Bulletin xlvii at 15. 
and which obviously required military manoeuvres for its effectiveness was not an 
enforcenment action requiring the Council's prior auti~orization.~~' It may well be that in 
this case, the heavy hand of superpower politics in the Security Council was tnumphant. 
Be that as it rnay, the hallowed grounds of enforcement action can hardly be 
9,828 defiled by cosmetic use of the terni "peacekeeping. As the leamed editors of the 
European Commentary on the Charter have noted, 
[I]t is problematic to state categorically that peacekeeping is not 
enforcement action because peacekeeping activities cari be performed in 
various guises. It is apparent that some observation missions fiuiction as 
means for peaceful settlement of disputes. But it is difficult to draw a line 
which will ensure in every particular casc, that peacekeeping forces do not 
resort to coercive measures; especially when the forces are on the 
initiative of a regionai arrangement.82g 
The short point here is that the ECOWAS action in Liberia, being a clear use of rnilitary 
force, albeit for the ostensible good of the region and Liberia, was an enforcement action 
requinng the pnor authorization of the Security Council first sought and obtained. 
However, scholars such as Binaefer Nowrojee have argued that regional enforcement 
actions may be validly undertaken without the prior authorization of the Security Council 
provided that the enforcernent action "is consistent with the Principles and Purposes of 
the United ~ a t i o n s . ~ ~ ~  This argument, attractive as it may appear, is hardly compatible 
and consistent with the clear letter of the Charter as already stated. Having made that 
determination, the next issue is whether in spite of the absence of a prior authorization of 
the enforcement action taken by the ECOMOG, the Security Council was competent to 
ratiSf such enforcement action by ECOWAS. 
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5.3: THE PROCESS AND CHARACTER OF RATIFICATION 
The United Nations is legislator as well as judge and executive and its 
judgrnents are political not j~ridical.~' ' 
In examining the nature of the powers of the Secunty Council to ratify 
enforcement actions undertaken by regional bodies without its pnor authorization, the 
attitude of the Security Council in the Dorninicnn Case is perhaps h e ~ ~ f u l . ~ ' ~  In that 
instance, the Soviet Union surnmoned the Security Council in September 1960 "to 
approve the decision of the OAS, so as to give it legal effect and render it more 
effective."833 Another member of the Security Council, Poland, joined the Soviet Union 
in arguing that the "Security Council is entitled to annul or revise as well as complete 
3,834 regional measures. It is remarkable that no member of the Council doubted the 
powers of the Security Council to annul, revise or complete enforcement actions 
undertaken by a regional body. However, the crucial deteminant here was whether the 
sanctions imposed on Venezuala arnounted to "enforcement actions" as contemplated by 
Article 5 3 of the Charter. 
The position of the Security Council is consistent with its paramount role as the 
ultimate guardian of peace and security in the world. In principle, the primacy of the 
Security Council in the maintenance of peace is not necessarily impaired merely because 
a regional organization jumped into a confict before the Security Council did. The 
Security Council may rat@ or reverse the measure taken by the regional bodies if 
undertaken without its permission first sought and obtained, or even where authorization 
was given but exceeded by the regional organization. Where then does this power corne 
From and what is the juridical nature and character of UN Security Council resolutions. 
Louis Henkin, supra note 453 at 168. 
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Malintoppi has argued that being the apex body of a universal organization 
committed to certain values and aspirations, its resolutions represent the manifestation of 
what its members believe to be their general feeling.'" Given the unrepresentative 
character of that body, and glaring inconsistencies in the resolution o f  international crises, 
one cannot be very enthusiastic about Malintoppi's articulation of the issue. Another 
difficulty with his conception of the matter is that in the absence of that quality of 
repetition which evidences a nonnative prescription or obligation at international law, it 
is difficult to believe that a resolution adopted by the five concurring permanent members 
plus five other selected members of the council is a tme reflection of general feeling on 
an issue. At best, the resolution may well pre-empt an embryonic n o m  oï actually be the 
product of hard and shrewd behind-the-scene negotiation between the permanent 
members of the Council as opposed to a true attestation of consensus on the question.836 
If the juridical character of a resolution of the Security Council is to have meaning, it is 
argued that such resolutions should substsntially scale the above-mentioned hurdles. 
Although ~chwebe1'~'and ~ r r a n ~ i o - ~ u i z ~ ~ ~ h a v e  their doubts about the normative 
content and character of resolutions (especially these of the General Assembly), most 
scholars are agreed that the Resolutions passed by the Security Council, depending upon 
their content and context have a normative e f f e ~ t . * ~ ~  HigginsW0and the editors of 
OppenheirnsJ' (to mention a few) are of the view that the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions passed in the discharge of its responsiblities under chapter 7 are 
835 J-Castenada, Legal Efleca of United Nations Resolutions (New York: CoIurnbia University Press., 1969) 
at 170-1. 
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binding-on al1 states. In addition to an analogy to treaty obligations at international law 
which could be made in respect of Charter obligations, the Security Council being the 
apex organ of the UN body, is deemed to portray in many instances, the practice of states 
as to what they consider to be obligatory. Accordingly, apart fiom its resoiution passed 
pursuant to chapter 7 of the Charter, its other resolutions rnay, depending on the 
circumstances, generate new noms  and also serve as a revelation of the subjective 
element of international law i.e opinio juri.~.~~' This rnay well be a function of the fact 
that the permanent members of the Security Council largely represent the configuration 
of the balance of military and economic might, veritable tools in the enforcernent of 
"law". 
On the other hand, the United Nations, in a manner of speaking acts as a peculiar 
form of legislative body for the globe. This it does by the process of the adoption of 
Resolutions. According to Sir Robert Jenning and Arthur Watts, "resolutions adopted 
unanimously, being a matter of consensual agreement, are sometimes regarded as 
equivalent to treaties concluded in simplified f ~ r r n . " * ~ ~  With specific reference to 
Resolutions passed pursuant to Chapters 7and 8 of the Charter which is the raison d 'efre 
of the United Nations, there is hardly any doubt that they are more than 
recomrnendations. Membership of the UN or any other body imports obligation to 
comply with the rules of that organization. Article 25 of the Charter makes clear the 
normative nature of decisions on international peace taken by the Security Council as 
members are obliged to comply with the measures adopted. Where an obligation created 
by treaties of a regional body conflict with the Charter obligations of a member of the 
United Nations, there is no doubt that the Charter provisions will preva.l.8" Similarly, it 
cannot be questioned that the Security CounciI has the legal authonty to remove threats to 
'" But see Anthony D* Amato who dismisses the concept of opinio juris as "otiose.," D ' Amato, "Custorn 
and Treaty: a Response to Professor Weisburâ" (1988) 21 Vanderbilr J. of Transn '1 law 459 at 47 1. 
'" Oppenheimrn S fnxernartional law, supra note 478 at 48. 
844 Article 103, of  the UN Charter, supra note 388. 
international peace. If it decides to achieve this by authorizing a state or a regional body 
to use force on its behalf, such use of force is for al1 practical purposes, an exercise of the 
will of the Security Council on behalf of the United ~ations. '~ '  
What is required is a clear indication by the Secunty Council of the "extent and 
nature"846 of the armed force to be used by the agent state or regional organizations. Of 
course, any such use of force whether by the Security Council directly or any of its 
appointees must be geared towards the validation of the pnnciples and purposes of the 
United Nations. Thus, if states exercising this function on behalf of the Security Council 
wish to use less or  more force, they must first seek and obtain a mandate or change 
thereof fkom the Security ~ouncil."' This is usually done at the Securïty Council by the 
adoption of relevant resolutions. Reference may be made to the instances presented by 
the cases of Southem ~hodesia,~~'and Yugoslavia, of which, later. However, there is 
hardly any reason at international law why an enforcement action undertaken by a reginal 
organization without prior authorization of the Security Council may not be subsequently 
ratified by the Security Council if circumstances warrant. In the overall context of the 
Liberian tragedy, it stands to reason that the Security Council resolutions on the crisis 
have a normative quality. An examination of the ratification process by the Security 
Council of the ECOWAS enforcement action is necessary. 
The ratification process of the ECOWAS action in Liberia started in 1992. In 
effect, while the Liberian civil war had blossomed into a h l 1  humanitarian and regional 
cnsis in six months of its explosion, the world feigned ignorance of the unfolding 
tragedy. It is equally ironic that it was the other Afiican states of Zaire and Ethiopia who 
McCoubrey & White. supra note 445 at 238. 
846 Ibid It should however be noted that authority should not bc delegated without adequate safeguards to 
revent nationai interests fiom outstripping collective security interests. &, Ibid. Some scholars have rightly argued that even if the actions of the ECOMOG was an enforcernent 
process, they were justifieci, regard king had to the fact that it was the rebels who attacked the ECOMOG 
troops. Thus, the ECOMOG was entitled to act in self defence even if it may be cousmed as constituting 
enforcement actions. See Weller, supra note 5 at 24 1. 
8.18 McDougat & Reisman, "Rhodcsia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern" 
(1968) 62 A.J.I.L. at 1-19. 
at the material times were non-permanent memben of the Security Council, that blocked 
the attempts by the Liberian Permanent Representative at the United Nations to table the 
cnsis before that body."9 In addition, France trying to "protect its business interests in 
the war tom c o ~ n t r ~ , " ~ ~ ~ w a s  not very enthusiastic about bringing the crisis to the agenda 
of the Security Council. 
These issues raise doubts about the propnety of having as members of the 
Security Council, states which have little semblance of legitimacy and order at home. 
How couid Zaire and Ethiopia, war tom and ravaged as a result of decades of intemal 
misrule and corruption, sit on the Security Council? 11 is equally significant in this 
context to recall that at the start of the Rwandan genocide, Rwanda was presiding at the 
Security Council! It will be argued in the last chapter that instead of having only states as 
memben of the Security Council, regional organktions should have seats in the Security 
Council especially when matters of security involving their regions are under 
consideration. If this arrangement was in place, the similar machinations of France (a 
permanent member of the Security Council) to &strate UN intervention would have 
been nipped in the bud. This arrangement would also ensure that other conflicts totally 
ignored by the Security Council, but no less deadly and destructive would at least be 
tabled on the Council's agenda. 
As an aside, the case of the people of Southern Sudan is directly in point. In the 
harrowing words of a church leader in that war-ravaged part of the counq,  "1 have told 
my people: let us die silently now'. ..the world has forgotten The "political 
domination and brutal oppression dictated by ~hartou.m'~~~'of the people of Southem 
lu9 Raymond Hopkins, " Anornie, System Reform, and Challenges to the UN System" in Miltom Esman 
and Shibley Teihami, eh . ,  International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict (Ithaca, New York: Corne11 
University Press, 1995) at 95. Both couutries apparcntly did not want to set the prccedcnt whereby their 
similarly circumstanced civil wan would eventually becorne the subject of Sccurity Council intervention. 
"O Binaefer Nowrojec. supro note 86 at 142. 
"' Julie Flint, "The Unwinnable War" (1 993) Nov-Dec. Afii-can Report at 46-49. 
Angela Lloyd, "The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case for Secession" (1994-5) 32 Columbia J. of 
Transn 'I Law 4 19 at 420. 
Sudan has largely gone unnoticed notwithstanding its chronic ~haracter .~ '~ Sudan 
epitomizes the inequities and instabilities bom by the imposition of arti ficial boundaries 
drawn in accord with colonial preferences rather than national inter est^.^'^ Its neglect by 
the Security Council, however, is one out of many instances casting serious doubts on the 
presumption that members of the Security have a global, rather than a parochial agenda in 
maintenance of world peace. The corollary point here is that unless an honest and serious 
effort has been made to bring a crisis to the attention of the Security and that body fails 
and/ or refuses to act accordingly, it will be difficult to justie any regionai initiative 
ostensibly designed to address that situation, even if the Security Council thereafter 
purports to raftify such unilateral actions. The Charter process ought to be exhausted 
before any such mutti-lateral actions could be taken. 
Be that as it may, Resolution 788 of 1992~" is the starting point in the ratification 
of the ECOWAS action in Liberia by the Security Council. That resolution: 
Determined that the situation in Liberia was a threat to "international 
peace, particularly in West Afnca as a whole, 
Welcomed and comrnended ECOWAS actions in Liberia, 
Condemned al1 attacks on the ECOMOG troops and recognized the 
ECOWAS action in Liberia as a peacekeeping exercise, 
hposed a complete arms embargo on Liberia except for arrns destined 
for the ECOWAS in Liberia, 
Requested al1 member states to respect the measures established by 
ECOWAS to bnng about a peacefiil solution to the conflict in Liberia, 
- 
853 Supra. The conflict bas raged on skcc 1956. 
Supra at 42 1 .  See also, Adila Abusharaf, "The Lcgal Rclationship Bttwccn Multinational Oit 
Corpoations and the Sudan: Problcm and Prospets" (1991) 43 Journal of Afncan Law 18. 
8s5 Supra note 324. 
Decided to remain seized of the matter.856 
Similarly, Resolution 8 13 of 1993 made on the 26 of March 19938S7reaffirmed the above 
mentioned aspects of  Resolution 788 of 1992. In addition, it demanded that all parties 
cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with ECOWAS to ensure 
the full and prompt implementation of the Yamoussoukro Accord, and: 
Declared its readiness to consider any appropnate measures in support of ECOWAS 
if any party is unwilling to cooperate in implementation of the Yamoussoukro 
Accords, in particular the encampment and dismament provisions, 
Requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with ECOWAS to consider the 
possibility of convening a meeting of the President of the Interim Government of 
National Unity and the warring factions, aAer thorough and detailed groundwork, to 
restat e their cornmitment to the implementation of the Yamoussoukro Accord within 
an agreeable timetable.8s8 
This unprecedented and growing cooperation between a regional body and the United 
Nations in peace enforcement and peacekeeping was M e r  cemented by the provisions 
of Resolution 856 of  1993 passed on the 10lh of August 1993 at its 3263* meeting.859 
This resolution, the third in the series, welcomed the decision of the Secretary-General to 
send a technical tearn to the United Nations to gather and evaluate information relevant to 
the proposed establishment of a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia 
(UNOMIL).~* 
An advance team of  thirty military observers were despatched to Liberia to monitor, 
investigate and report on cease-fire ~ io la t ions .~~ '  in addition, the Secretary-General of the 
Ibid, paragraph 14. 
857 Supra note 444. 
Ibid. 
"' S/Res/856 ( 1993) 
1160 Ibid. The creation of  the UNOMIL was effectcd pursuant to Resolution 866 of the Security Council 
adopted on the 22* of Septernber of 1993 (of which, latcr). 
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United Nations was requested to draw up a h e w o r k  which would "ensure coordination 
between the UNOMIL and the peacekeeping forces of ECOWAS and their respective 
roles and respon~ibilities.~" Resolution 856 of 1993, like the earlier resolutions, 
"commends (ed) ECOWAS for its efforts" to restore peace in Liberia. This remarkable 
cooperation between the United Nations and the ECOWAS in Liberia did not end with 
Resolution 856 of 1993. 
Resolution 866863 of 1993 passed on the ~2~ of September 1993 went m e r  than the 
three previous Resolutions and is arguably one of the most radical resolutions 
substantiating the notion that the United Nations apparently ''fianchiseci" its primary 
responsibility for peace enforcement to the ECOWAS. The preamble to this resolution 
"emphasized that the Peace Agreements assigns ECOMOG the primarv resoonsibili~ of 
supervising the implementation of the military provisions of the Agreement and 
envisages that the United Nations role shall be to rnonitor and verifv this process."864 
The express letters of this aspect of Resolution 866 clearly relegates the United Nations 
to the background role of monitoring the more aggressive and dominant ECOWAS in the 
Libenan conflict. 
In fact, Resolution 866 itself attests "that this would be the first - ~eace-keeping 
mission undertaken with a ~eacekeming mission alreadv set up bv another oraanization, 
in this case ECOWAS."'~~ This admission clearly dispels any notion or illusion that the 
United Nations was not fùlly aware of the nature and character of the relationship created 
by it with the ECOWAS in the Libenan conflict. The Resolution M e r  noted that this 
unparalleled arrangement "would contribute significantly to the effective implementation 
of the Peace ~ g e e r n e n t . " ~ ~ ~  
To give teeth to this arrangement, a Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Cornmittee (JCMC) 
Ibid. 
S/Res/866 ( 1993) 
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composed of three Liberian waming parties, ECOMOG and the United Nations was 
established. In addition, the UNOMIL as contemplated by Resolution 856 was finally 
established. The UNOMIL was to be compnsed of military observers as weli as medical, 
engineering, communications, transportation and electoral components together with the 
minimal staff necessary to support it. A critical review of the mandate o f  the UNOMIL 
leaves the clear impression that the ECOMOG was the enforcement a m  of the United 
Nations while the UNOMIL took care of the more specialized aspects of peacekeeping. 
This is understandable having regard to the relative inexpenence of the ECOMOG 
in the more refined and intricate aspects of conternporary peacekeeping operations. This 
"division of labour" and symbiotic cooperation between the two institutions immanent in 
the mandate of the UNOMlL as contained in Resolution 866 may be listed as follows: 
To receive and investigate al1 alleged incidents of breach of the Cease-fire 
Agreement, 
To monitor cornpliance with the embargo on arms supply to the rebels, especially at 
the Sierra Leonean and other borders, 
To observe and veriQ the election process, 
To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance, 
To develop a plan and assess financial requirements for the demobilization of 
combatants, 
To report on any major violations of international humanitarian law to the Secretary 
General, 
To train ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance and in cooperation with ECOMOG, 
coordinate the identification of mines and assist in the clearance of mines and 
unexploded b0rnbs,8~' 
Without participation in enforcement ~ ~ e r a t i o n s , ~ ~ ~  to coordinate with ECOMOG in 
lbid. 
868 Ibid. Here the United Nations clearly acknowledged that the ECOWAS action in Liberia was indeed a 
peace enforcement action. 
the discharge of ECOMOG's separate responsibilities both formally and infonnally. 
It is perhaps pertinent at this stage to comment on the constitution of the UNOMIL. 
The UNOMIL consisted of several contributions of personnel and materials by several 
member states of the United Nations. At its height, it consisted of at least 400 military 
observers drawn fiom such states as Austria, Bangladesh, Belgiurn, Brazil, China, Congo, 
Czech Republic, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Sweden and 
Its military cornmand was held sequnitially by Maj. General Sihandar Shami 
of Pakistan, Col. David Magonone of Kenya, Maj. General Mahmoud Falka of Egypt and 
Maj . General Ismael Opande of ~ e n ~ a . ~ "  
Voluntary contributions for its budget came fiom many countries especially 
Denmark, France, Japan , the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, Canada and the 
United States of ~menca.*" In addition, the General Assembly adopted a general 
Resolution assessing the contributions to be made towards the financing of the 
UNOMIL.*'~ It is also pertinent to note that the expenses of the UNOMIL were clearly 
declared by the General Assembly to be "expenses of the Organization to be borne by 
Member states in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United 
~at ions ."~ '~  in effect, that the ECOMOGRMOMIL action in Liberia was technically 
speaking, a United Nations operation with al1 its legal implications. In addition to 
establishing the UNOMIL, Resolution 866 of 1993 encouraged al1 member states of the 
OAU to send additional troops the ECOMOG and also estabiished a Trust Fund to offset 
869 UNOMIL Facts and Figures as of 30 June 1997. Online > 
h m  :i~~\~\u..un.ore.De~ts.IDPKOhi i s s i o n l u n o  -!hm1 accessed on 30' March 1999. 
''O /bid. 
'" Ihid. 
Financing of the United Obsewer Mission in Liberia, G.A.RES.49/232,49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.49) 
at 28 1 ,  U.N.Doc. A/49/49/ (1994) 
873 /&id. Paragraph 4. On the implication of  this, sce The Cemin fipenses Case, supra note 6 17. 
some of the costs of the ECOWAS action of ~iberia."~ The assessed contributions were 
augmented by voluntari 1 y contributions fiom several States. 
The aflied and combined activities of the UNOMILiECOMOG formed an aspect of 
the subsequent Resolution of the Security Council in 1994. Thus in ~ e s o l u t i o n ~ ~ *  9 1 1 of 
1994 adopted at the 3366" of the Security Council, the Council "welcomed the close 
cooperation between UNOMIL and ECOMOG and stressed "the importance of 
continued full cooperation and coordination between them in the implementation of their 
respective t a~ks .** '~~  Further, it imploreci al1 parties to the confiict to cooperate with the 
ECOMOG in its efforts to resolve the   ri sis.^^^ It should be remembered that the 
Resolution once again affinns the detennination of the Security Council to remain 
actively seized of the   natter.^'' 
The Security Council at its 3442nd meeting held on the 2 1 of October 1994, reviewed 
the events in Liberia and for the h t  time acknowledged as per Resolution 950 of 2994 
that the Liberian crisis in addition to being a "threat to international peace" had 
,9879 degenerated into "ethnic warfare. As already noted, this exarcerbated "the widespread 
killings of civilians and other violations of international humanitarian law by the factions 
in Liberia, and the detention and the maltreatment of UNOMIL observers, ECOMOG 
soldiers and other international personnel. 9,880 
Hence, the Security Council condemned those atrocities and as per paragrapgh 8 of 
Resolution 91 1 of 1994 demanded al1 factions in the dispute to respect the "status of 
ECOMOG and WNOMIL personnel.'"81 Resolution 950 of 1994 reminded al1 pesons of 
the Security Council's decision to remain actively seized of the matter.882 With the 
Ibid. 








situation in Liberia M e r  deteriorating and sorne of the neighbounng states pouring 
arms into Liberia, the Security Council at its 3489h meeting convened on the 13 '~  of 
January 1995. In the Resolution adopted at the end of that meeting, the Council noting 
"with concem that there has been a continuing inflow of arms into Liberia in violation of 
the existing amis embargo'*883urged the ECOWAS to convene a meeting for the purposes 
of "tightening the application of the anns embargo. 99884 
To m e r  attest to the desire of the Security Council to have ECOMOG directly 
resolve the crisis in Liberia, it is perhaps pertinent to note when the patience of Nigeria 
and Ghana (the two leading contributors to the ECOMOG) wore thin and a pull-out of the 
ECOMOG fkom Liberia was seriously contemplated, the Securïty Council became 
aiarmed and reiterated "the need for the ECOWAS States to maintain their troops in 
vr885 ECOMOG. These concems were reflected and reiterated in the subsequent Resolution 
985 of 1 995886 which was passed at the 3517' meeting of the Security Council. 
In fact, Resolution 985 of 1995 was one of the most far reaching effoxts by the 
Security Council to curtail the infiow of arms into Liberia as it constituted the full 
Security Council into a Cornmittee to monitor the flow of arms into ~ i b e n a . ~ ~ '  Be that as  
it may, the fkactious nature of the Liberian crisis and the impact of external parties on the 
crisis extended the agony of Liberians in the conflict. 
Further, the proceeds fkom the United Nations Trust Fund for Liberia could hardly be 
utilized effectively to relieve the hardship imposed on Liberians caught up in the conflict. 
In this season of despair, the Security Council vide Resolution 1001 of 1 9 9 5 , ~ ~ ~  
"reaffirmed the continued necessity for ECOMOG and UNOMIL to cooperate in 
fulfilling their respective mandates and to this end urge [ed] the ECOMOG to enhance its 
- - 
8g5 Ibid. 
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cooperation with UNOMn at al1 levels to enable the mission to discharge its mandate." 
889 In addition, it urged the ECOMOG to take "necessary action to provide security for 
UNOMIL observers and civilian staff. >,wo 
The Abuja ~ ~ r e e m e n t ~ ~ ' s i ~ n e d  on 19 August 1995 is probably the most significant 
step towards the resolution of the Liberian cnsis as the subsequent disarming of the rebels 
and the return to democratic governance in Liberia are based on it. It supplemented the 
Cotonou ~ ~ r e e r n e n t , ~ ~ ~ t h e  Akosombo ~ g r e e r n e d ~ ~ a n d  the Accra Its 
importance is equally reflected in the decisions of the Sccurity Council at its 3577'h 
meeting and embodied in Resolution 1014 of 1995."' 
This ResoIution does not only continue with the numerous statements of support by 
the Security Council for the ECOWAS initiative but made a case for "additional 
resources in ternis of troops, equipment and logistics for ECOMOG in ~ i b e n a " ~ ~ ~  to 
oversee the implementation of the various aspects of the agreement, in particular "the 
disarmament and demobilization process.'T897 Owing to the importance of some of its 
features, to bener appreciate the subsequent discussion on this aspect of the Liberian 
crisis, some of its very pertinent aspects are summarized below. They include the : 
Adoption of measures to enhance the relationship between UNOMIL and ECOWAS; 
Provision of financial, logistical, and other assistance in support of the ECOMOG to 
enable it to carry out its mandate,898 
Encouragement of Member States, in particular Afncan counhies to consider 
providing troops to the expanded ECOMOG, 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 








Demand that al1 factions in the conflict respect the status of the ECOMOG and the 
UNOMIL, 
Encouragement of the OAU to continue its pst-conflict peace-building collaboration 
with ECO WAS in promoting the cause of peace in ~iberia.''~ 
After the adoption of Resolution 1014, the ECOMOG proceeded on a programme of 
deployrnent of its troops throughout the areas hitherto occupied by the rebels. However, 
this process suffered another setback as one of the rebels led by Generai Roosevelt 
Johnson attacked ECOMOG in Tubmanburg on 28 December t 995 and Hled several of 
thernem 
Following the Tubmanburg incident, the United Nations, acting in concert with the 
OAU despatched mediators to the affécted areas to negotiate a return to relative 
normalcy. This event and similar incidents of violations of the cease-fire agreements and 
breach of fundamental noms of war necessitateci the strengthening of the ECOMOG. 
Consequent on these factors some Afiican States such as Tanzania sent troops to the 
ECOMOG, which was duly "appreciated"pO by the Security Comcil in Resolution 1020 
of 1 995 adopted at its 3 ~ 9 2 " ~  meeting held on 10 November 1995. 
Resolution 1020 of 1995 "adjusted the mandate of the U N O M I L " ~ ' ~ ~  the following 
manner; 
To exercise its good offices to support the efforts of ECOWAS and the Liberian 
National Transitional Govement (LNTG) to implement the peace agreements and to 
cooperate with them for this purpose, 
To investigate allegations of cease-fire violations, 
To monitor cornpliance with the other military provisions of the peace agreements 
including disengagement of forces, disarmament and observance of the arms embargo 
/bid. 
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and to verify their impartial application, 
To assist in the maintenance of assembly sites agreed upon by ECOMOG, the LNTG 
and the factions in the implementation of a programme for demobilization of 
combatants, 
To observe and veriQ the election in consultation with the OAU and the 
ECO WAS .'O3 
In addition, Resolution 1020 of 1996 urged al1 member States to continue their 
matenal and logistic support for ECOMOG and reiterated that the presence of the 
UNOMIL was wholly predicated upon the security provided by the ECOMOG.~'~ In 
other words, the UNOMIL would not be in Liberia but for the ECOMOG which had 
substantially created the conducive environment for the complimentary role played by it. 
In this context, Resolution 1020 of 1996, like previous Resolutions stressed the need "for 
close contacts and enhanced coordination between UNOMIL and ECOMOG in their 
operational activities at al1 levels. 9905 
To further reinforce that the UNOMIUECOMOG activities in Liberia were directly 
under the control and guiding auspices of the United Nations Security Council, 
Resolution 1020 of 1996 affirmed the decision of the Council to remain 'directly seized 
of the rnat~er."~'~ These activities by the Unitcd Nations Security Council did not 
necessarily bring about an irnmediate end to the cnsis. There were repeated attacks on the 
ECOMOG and unanned civilians by the rebels and thus the Security Council at its 3624'h 
meeting held on the 2gh of January 1996 considered and adopted Resolution 1041 of 
1996.907 Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Resolution did not only condemn the attacks but also 
comrniserated with the victims of the unlawfûl attacks?' It addition, it reiterated the 
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status of the ECOMOG and UNOMIL as peacekeepen and demanded that that status be 
accorded its traditional respect.909 
The peace process in Liberia suffered serious setbacks again as the w h n g  factions 
escalated the regime of violence in Libena. The escalating violence warranted the 
ECOWAS to resoIve not to recognize any governrnent in Libena that emerged by sheer 
force of a r ~ n s . ~ ' ~  On the other hand, the West Afiican states of Nigeria and Ghana, who 
were the backbone of the ECOMOG, were compelled to threaten their immediate 
withdrawal fiom the peacekeepng exer~ise.~" At the debates of the Security Council in 
May 1996, these developmmt necessitated the Council to adopt Resolution 1059 of 1996 
condemning the ceasefire violations and "encouraging the ECOWAS to consider ways 
and means to strengthen ECOMOG and persuade the faction leaders to resume the peace 
process."912 The Secunty Council also expressed its support for the ECOWAS stance not 
to recognize any illegitimate but forcefully effective govenunent in ~ ibe r i a .~ '~~no the r  
significant aspect of Resolution 1059 of 1996 is that it reiterates the ultimate dependence 
of the UNOMIL on ECOMOG. Thus, according to paragraph 8 of its preamble, the 
Secuity Council stressed that "the presence of WNOMIL in Liberia is predicated on the 
presence of ECOMOG and its cornmitment to ensure the safety of UNOMIL military 
 observer^."^'^ This m e r  evidences the symbiotic relationship between the ECOMOG 
and the UNOMIL. 
As the peace process now gained greater momentun, the Security Council at its 
366gth meeting held on the 30* August 1996 adopted another Resolution affinning once 
again, the need for closer cooperation and coordination between the UNOMIL and 
909 /bid. 
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ECOMOG.~'~ in addition, this resolution acknowledges another ugly aspect of the 
Liberian crisis-the use of children by the rebels as combatants. Paragraph 9 of the 
Resolution thus unequivocally condemned "the practice of some factions recruiting, 
9,916 training and deploying children for combat. As this aspect has already been 
addressed, fiuther ink will not be spent on it here. Moreover, Resolution 1083 of 1996 
adopted at the 371 7h meeting of the Security Council on November 27& 1996 reiterated 
the Council's continued condernnation of that international d e l i ~ t ? ~  
However, the disamament process of the warring factions had started in 
e a r n e ~ t . ~ ' ~  This development is M e r  evidenced by Security Council Resolution 1 100 of 
1 9 9 7 . ~ ' ~  The last of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the Liberian 
crisis is Resolution 11 16 of 1997 which was adopted at the 3793d meeting of the Security 
Council. This Resolution not only extended the mandate of the UNOMIL to its terminal 
date of 27" July 1997 but also expressed the gratitude of the Security Council to al1 the 
members of the international community which had supported the ECOMOG in its action 
in ~ i b e r i a . ~ ~ '  It is abundantly evident that the effect of the resolutions of the Security 
Council on the Liberian cnsis has the clear legal effect of ratifymg the ECOMOG 
initiative as lawful and legitimate.921~he West Afncan action in Liberia was 
consummated with the installation of a democratically eiected governent for Liberia 
and the restructuring of the Liberian Axmy by the ECOMOG.'~~ 
It was not only the Security Council that took an active part in approving the 
ECOWAS action in Liberia. At the 85th Plenary meeting of the General Assembly, that 
" U.N. Doc/S/Res/lO7 1 ( 1  996) Wereinafter, Resolution 1 O7 1 of lW6] 
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body by an unanimous Resolution affirmed its "appreciation to the international 
community for its support of the peace plan for Liberia of the ECOWAS, . . .and hopes(d) 
that the continuing efforts made at the sub-regional and international levels aimed at a 
peaceful resolution of the Liberian will, within the shortest possible time, lead to national 
reconciliation, reconstruction and d e ~ e l o ~ r n e n t ~ ~ '  This universal validation of the 
ECOWAS action in Liberia was not a mere solitary approval. 
At the 8gh Plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on the 16Ih of 
December 1 992 another unanimous Resolution was adopted expressing universal 
"appreciation for the continuing mediatory efforts of the ECOWAS to find a peaceful 
,1924 solution to the Liberian crisis. This second global acclamation was immediately 
followed by another ananimous Resolution adopted at the 92"d Plenary meeting of the 
General Assembly held on the 18<" of December 1992.~~' This Resolution equally restates 
global vaIidation of the ECOWAS action in Liberia and calleci upon the international 
community to quickly contribute humanitanan relief materials to embattled 
~ i b e r i a . ~ ~ ~ T h e  spate of universal approval and cornmendation of the ECOWAS action in 
Liberia is also apparent in another unanimous Resolution adopted by the Generai 
Assernbly at its 8 5 ~  Plenary meeting held on the 2 0 ~  of Decernber 1993.~~ '  Here the 
General Assembly for the fifth time in a row expressed its "appreciation" the efforts of 
,1929 Liberia in the c r i s i ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ h e  approbation of this "regional effort in conflict management 
and resolution was completed by another General Assembly Resolution adopted at the 
9'3 G-A res.47/74,47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 3 1 ,  U.N.Doc. Al47149 (1 992). 
''' Assistance to Refugees and Displaced Persons in Africa, G.A. Res. 47/107,47 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 
49) at 188, U.N.Doc. Al47149 (1992). O n l i n 6  
http::;w-n-w 1 .urnn.edu~umanrts/resolutions!47~107GA 1992.html accessed on 05/01/99, 
Assistance for the Rehabilitation of Liberia, G.A. RES. 471154.47 U.N GAOR Supp. (No. 49) al 114, 
U.N. Doc. A/47/49 ( f 992) 
926 Ibid. - - 
927 G.A.Res.481118.48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) U.N.Doc. A/48/49 (1993). 
9'a Ibid - - 
929 Assistance to Refugees, Retumees and Displaced Ppersons in Africa, ~ . ~ . ~ e s . 4 9 / 1 7 4 ;  49 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 49) at 191, U.N Doc. Af49149 ( 1994). 
94" Plenary meeting held on the 23d December 1994.~~'  
Despite the near-universal acclamation of the ECOWAS action in Liberia, some 
disturbing issues are raised by it. The first is an examination of why it was so popularly 
received within the United Nations. The second is the impact of the precedent on the 
Charter regime regarding the use of force by regional bodies. This will be valuated in the 
context of the recent NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Thirdly, how can the lapses in the 
ECOWAS action in Liberia be usefully evaluated so as to enhance a cordinated 
frarnework for regionaVuniversa1 cooperation for the maintenance of international 
security under the United Nations fiarnework? The third question will be addressed in 
chapter six. 
With respect to the first question, the ECOWAS action in Liberia was not the first 
regional initiative ostensibly advertised as an attempt to secure regional security and 
peace. Previous cases exist at international law where multilateral actions supposedly 
premised on concerns for regional security have been undertaken but condernned by the 
international community. In some of those cases, the fear of hegemonism masking as 
regional concem for peace was quite real.93'~though unilateral actions are forbidden by 
the regional organizations have under certain circumstances employed 
themselves in the maintenance of peace. The cases of the OAU in Chad and the OAS in 
Haiti readily come to mind. A short comparison may be usefûl here. 
In 198 1, members of the OAU sent a peacekeeping force to separate the waning 
factions in Goukhoni Weddeye and Hissene Habre in ~ h a d . ~ ' )  This measure was greeted 
930 ibid. 
93' Ibid. Wimess the case of Czechoslovakia. Seventeen days after the Warsaw Pact which bound the 
members to cooperate on the basis of "the pnnciples o f  equality, respect for sovereignty and national 
independence, those sarne members invaded the country on the pretext that there was an interna1 problem in 
Czechoslovakia which threatened the sub-region. Similar abuses occwrcd in Hungary. See Richard Falk, 
ed., The Internarional Law of Civil War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 197 1 )  at 419. 
''' Hugh Kindred, et al e h . ,  International Law-Chie& as lnterpreted and Applied in Caneda 5' cd. 
(Canada: Emond Publications, 1993) at 850-85 1. [Hereinafter, Kindred] 
933 Amadu Sesay, "The Limits of Peace-Keeping by a Regional Organization: The OAU in Chad" (199 1) 
vol. X 1 Conflicr Quanerly (Winter) at 7 .  
with acclaim across Afnca and touted as the beginning of Afncan solutions to Afncan 
problems. Chad is the fi& largest country in Africa and one of the poorest with ninety 
per cent of its temtory generally referred to as b6useless."934 From its independence from 
France in 1960, its govemance has been marked with incornpetence, ethnic nvairy and 
corruption. 935These faction gave rise to intemal rebellions which like the Liberian case, 
found its bloom with the end of the Cold War. These rebellions have been generally 
acknowledged as largely sponsored by Ghadafi of Libya with the ostensible a h  of 
having the upper-hand in Chad/Libya7s perennial dispute over the Uranium rich Aouzou 
stnp bordering both c o ~ n t r i e s . ~ ~ ~  
The OAU decision to intervene has been rationalized on the grounds of Atncan 
States7 suspicion of foreign intervention in m c a n  cnsis, especially, since the Congolese 
crisis of the sixties which is generally perceived to have sabotaged the c'progressive" 
govemment of Patrice ~umumba."' Similady, the orchestrated plan by the embattled 
President Weddeye of Chad to enter Chad into a political union with Libya had distwbed 
security concems in that region warranting the quickness with which the decision to 
intervene was made.938 With the promise of logistic support from France and the United 
States, the OAU intervened to stop the conflict and pre-empt Ghadafi's plan of a "greater 
,9939 Islamic State. Accordingly, troops from Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire were despatched 
under the auspices of the OAU to Chad. The agreement between the OAU and Weddeye 
for the despatch of the peacekeeping troops to Chad was signed in Nairobi, Kenya on the 
28 Noveber 198 1 .940 Soon after the arriva1 of the OAU peacekeepers, the beleaguered 
934 Supra. 
935 Orobola Fasehun & Amadu Sesay, "The OAU and Conflict Control" Mimeogragh. Deparment of 
International Relations, University of Ife, 1980, at 12. 
93b Supra note 933 a; 8. 
937 Supra note 933. 
938 fbid. 
939  David Yost, "French Policy in Chad and the Libyan Challenge" (1983) Orbis (Winter) a t  965-997. 
'O Olusola Ojo & Amadu Saay. '* The OAU Peacekecping Force in Chad: Policy Implemcntation and 
Failure" in C.A.B.Olowu & Victor Ayeni, A Nigenan Reader in the Policy Process (Ife:-University of Ife 
Press, 1991) at 1-1 8. 
government of Weddeye which had invited OAU's intervention was upstaged by forces 
loyal to Hissene ~abre."' The intervention by OAU faltered and collapsed. 
Although the OAU intervention in Chad, hampered by lack of resources and 
absence of sincerity on the part of President Weddeye and the opposing political force of 
Hissene Habre was a complete failure, its legality has not been questioned. However, like 
the Liberian case, its domination by ~ i ~ e r i a ~ ~ a n d  lack of ~ r e d i b i l i t ~ ~ ~ ~ r a i s e s  similar 
questions regarding the limitations of peacekeeping operations by regional bodies. Be 
that as it may, it is arguable that if Nigeria, as in the Liberian case, had been ready and 
willing to spend as much as it did in Liberia and succeeded in its overall objective, the 
OAU peacekeeping in Chad would have succeeded and would have been favourably 
perceived. In addition to Weddeye's undoudted nght to invite OAU, which he did 
(although, like Doe he was beleaguered and was finally ousted after four months of 
inviting the OAU), the extant issue is whether the test of legality in the circumstances 
depends on the "success" of the enforcement action by a regional organization? Does the 
end justiw the means of intervention? This question dovetails into the second issue of the 
precedential impact of the Security Council ratification of the ECOWAS action on the 
Charter regime. Before examining this issue, a quick reference to the Haiti case may be 
In the Haiti case,914 President JeamBertrand Aristide who won an intemationally 
supervised election as the president of Haiti was overthrown in a miliatry coup on 
September 30, 1991. The Organization of Arnencan States quickly reacted with a 
package of diplornatic and economic sanctions against the Raul Cedras led jur~ta.~~'  In 
addition, the OAS resolved not to recognize the illegitimate junta. Upon the invitation of 
94 1 Arnate, supra note 30 at 187. 
9" Nigeria was the main financier and spent over 50 million USD in the effort. 
943 Certain States contributing troops to the OAU force were accused of bias by some of the warring 
factions. 
Acevedo, supm note 400. 
9'5 Supra at 132. 
the deposed President &istideW6that the OAS establish a civilian mission to pave way for 
his return to power, the necessary mechanism was put in place. On May 17, 1992 the 
OAS ad hoc Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers passed a resolution urging 
member states to adopt whatever measures were necessary to restore democracy in 
~ a i t i . ~ ~ '  
Thereafter, the UN Secretary-General started working in consultation with the 
OAS on the restoration of democracy in Haiti. The argument by the Security Council that 
the Haitian crisis was an intemal problem of ~aiti"'in which it could not lawfully 
intervene soon yielded to a detemination by the Council under chapter 7 of the Charter 
that the crisis was a threat to international peace.949 Accordingly, it authorized members 
of the OAS "to use al1 necessary means to facilitate the d e p m e  from Haiti of the 
military leadership and the restoration of the legitimate authonties of the government of 
~ a i t i . " ~ ~ ~ ~ o n s e ~ u e n t l ~ ,  the OAS Multinationai Force entered Haiti to pave way for the 
United Nations Mission in ~aiti~' 'which organized the r e m  of Aristide and maintained 
peace in the interim. 
Unlike the OAU in Chad where there was no UN collaboration with a regional 
organization in the enforcement of peace, the ECOWAS/UNOMIL cooperation and the 
OASAjNMH collaboration in Haiti raise certain issues and lessons. The first point is that 
the legitimacy of both cases is largely dependent upon the recognition of the requirement 
that the Security Council must assume some measure of control, directly or indirectly, in 
the enforcement a ~ t i o n . ~ ~ ~ ~ e c o n d ? ~ ' f o r  such egional enforcement actions to be 
916 Request from the President of the Republic of Haiti to the Secretary General of the OAS , 
doc.MiWdoc.3J9 1 ,  October 7, 199 1. Cited in Acevedo, ibid. 
91 7 Restoration of Democracy in Haiti, Resolution MRBRes.3/92, May 17, 1992. Cited in Acevedo, ibid. 
918 SCf3011 mtg, 46 UN SCOR (1991) 
919 U.N.Doc. S/Res/940/( 1994) 
"' Ibid. Note that this was the fmt tirne that the Security Council was authorizing the use offorce for the 
restoration of democracv. 
Report of the ~u l t inkonal  Force in Haiti, U.N.Doc. 8/1994/1107. 
9s2 lbid. 
953 Tom Farer, supra note 49 1 at 3 16. 
legitimate, they rnust be premised on a recognized institutional, procedural and 
substantive fiamework. Although this condition is ostensibly designed to screen out 
hegemonial tendencies fiorn the considmtion of a regional or multi-lateral decision to 
intervene in a crisi~,~'~evidence indicates otherwise. The ECOMOG was literally an 
extension of the Nigerian amy, ditto for the OAU intervention in Chad. Third, the crisis 
forming the subject for the intervention must be such, which clearly rises to the level of a 
threat to international peace. The determination of this circumstance is a prerogative of 
the Security Council and cannot be delegated. However, regional organizations, by their 
proximity to the crisis may have a margin of appreciation of the danger, which they 
should bring to the attention of the Council. This is not the same as their making the 
determination by themselves that a particular state of affairs constitutes a threat to 
international peace. It is not every crisis in a state, real or imaginary which affords a 
gateway to Article 53 or which ipso facto constitutes an exception to Article 2 (7) of the 
On the second issue of the precedential impact of the Security Council ratifiaction 
of the ECOWAS action in Liberia on the Charter regime of chapter 8, an eloquent 
expression of the fears of abuse is in the controversy over the NATO bombing of 
Yugoslavia in April-May 1999. The human casuaities in that unilateral action have been 
estimated at 2,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of refbgees have been decried by 
most cornrnentator~.~~~but its legal implications deserve some attention here.957 inasmuch 
as editorial opinions and news reports seem to support the right of forceful humanitarian 
intervention, the existence of that right in the post-Charter era has been very difficult to 
"' /bid. 
9s5 Ibid. 
9 5 6  Noam Chosky, "nie Demolition of World Order*' (1999) Harper S Magazine (June) at 15 17. 
LHereinafier, Chomsky] 
5 7 Antonio Cassese, "Er inuriu ius oritur: Are wc Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Cornmunity" ( 1999) vol 10 E.J.I.L. at 1 -7. See also. Simma, 
supra note 449. 
estabiish and indeed, is very contro~ers ia l .~~~ While this issue is outside the scope of this 
thesis, it will suffice to note that the prevalent view is that the nght of humanitarian 
intervention, if it existed, did not survive the 
Be that as it may, the pertinent question here is whether the ratification of the 
ECOWAS action in Liberia by the Security Council did not set a dangerous precedent 
whereby powerfûl States would be engaging in illicit enforcement actions on the real or 
even vague hope that the Security Council would ratiQ such acts. A related issue, 
especially in respect of the bombing of Kosovo, is the validity of the peace agreements 
between Yugoslavia and NATO in respect of cessation of the bombing and the resolution 
of the Kosovo crisis. For the avoidance of doubt, Article 52 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties voids any treaty concluded upon the use or threat of 
use of force contrary to principles of international law as embodied in the The 
question then is, if the use of force by NATO in Yugoslavia is contrary to principles of 
international law as embodied in the Charter, of what Iegal validity is the peace 
agreement between NATO and Yugoslavia purportedly endorsed and ratified by the 
Security Council? Can we place something on nothing? This is not the central issue in 
this thesis, but only shows the quagmire into which the rash of "ratifications' by the 
Security Council of unathourized regional enforcement actions has thrown international 
law. 
Although an appreciation of Article 53 of the Charter in good faith "leaves room 
for the possibility of ex post facto authonzat i~n"~~'b~ the Security Council of regional 
enforcement actions, the probability of abuse as already indicated is high. In further 
reference to the Kosovo crisis it is remarkable that "When France called for a UN 
958 Nicaragua Case. supra note 462 at 14. 
959 Michael Akehurst, "Humanitarian Intervention" in HedIey Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relation., 1984) at 285. See the Dedaration on Friendly Relations. supra 
note 457; Artcle 2 (4) of the Charter, supra note 388. 
9* Supra note 545. 
9 6 1  Simma, supra note 449, at 3. 
Security Council resolution to authorize the deployment of NATO peacekeepers, the US 
State Department flatly refbsed, insisting that "NATO should be able to act 
independently of the United ~ a t i o n s . " ~ ~  Appamtly, the US knew that its unilateral 
actions in Yugoslavia would in the fuiness of time be "ratified" by the Security Council. 
It is possible that it had not forgotten the lessons fiom Liberia. This instance is not 
isolated as the continous bombing of Iraq by US and its allies e~idence.%~ In the Iraq 
case, the US and its allies, by a torturd redehition of the content and meaning of 
resolution 678 of 1 9 9 0 ~ ~ ~  which authowized the initial allied repulsion of Iraqi aggression 
against Kuwait, have bypassed the Security Council and continously engaged in 
unilateral enforcement actions. 
Returning to the Kosovo crisis, it is instructive to note that President Clinton of 
the United States had once noted that "unless human tragedy is caused by natural 
disaster, there is no such thing as a purely significant humanitarian enterprise."965 The 
siginificance of this is explored below. Thus, although the determination by the Security 
Council that the situation in Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace was 
made by resolution 1 199 of 1998, Yugoslavia was requested to take urgent steps to arrest 
the detenorating humanitarian ~ondition.'~ For the avoidance of doubts, the Security 
Council expressly reserved for itself the prerogative of deciding whether Yugoslavia had 
remedied the situation and if not, to "consider hrther action and additional mesures to 
maintain or restore peace and stability in the region."967 
Despite this and President Clinton's earlier disavowal of altniism in interventions 
ostensibly geared to avert humanitarian tragedies, NATO subsequently proceeded to 
96' Chomsky, supra note 965 at 16. vnderlining supplied] 
9 6 3  Jules Lobel & Michael Ramer, "Bypassing the Sccurity Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use 
Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime" (1999) AJ.2.L. at 1. 
Reprinted in 29 I.L.M.1565 (1990) 
%S A TV remark, June 1994. Cited in Elwood Dunn, supra note 741 at 1 15. See also, Rakiya Omaar & 
AIex de Waal, "The Lessons of  Humanitarian Irnpenalism in Somali" (1993) War Report (Feb-March) at 
12. 
966 U.N.Doc. SC/Res/l199/1998. 
967 Ibid. 
engage in enforcement actions on ~ u ~ o s l a v i a ~ ~ w i t h o u t  reference to the Secunty 
Council. This hi&-handed defiance and isolation of the Security Councii by NATO may 
mark the beginning of a cornpetitive relationship between both bodies, which can hardIy 
be masked by the subsequent "ratification" of the NATO conduct by the Security 
Council. The impact of this is a gradual, if not rapid destruction of the framework of the 
Charter on the regime on the use of force?' As Cassese nghtly warns, ". . .one cannot 
confine oneself to hoping that this ciramatic departure from the UN standards will rernain 
an exception. Once a p u p  of powerfiil states has realized that it can fieely escape the 
stnctures of the UN Charter and resort to force without any censure, except for that of 
'9970 public opinion, a Pandora's box may be opened. Sadly enough, the Security Council 
as in the Liberian case, was made to bbbaptise" the NATO actions in Yugoslavia when it 
purported to adopt a resolution in terms of NATO objectives. 
Having examined these issues, the next chapter, concludes this discourse in three 
parts. The first part posits preventative and curative measures the causative agents of 
instability and violence in juridical states. The second part examines the adequacy or 
otherwise of regional collective security machineries. The third and final part evaluates 
deferred question of the impact of the growing cases of regional enforcement actions on 
the Charter regime and how best regional organizations may be hamessed for coliective 
security purposes. The cornmon theme is that individual liberty, state stability, regional 
security and systemic coherence are inter-linked. These are some of the lessons immanent 
in the Liberian crisis. 
96g Sirnma. supra note 449, at 8. 
%9 Cassesc, supra note 957 at 2. 
9î0 Ibid. 
CHAPTER SIX 
LEGITIMACY OF GOVERNANCE, STATE STABILITY AM) GLOBAL 
SYSTEMIC COHERENCE: THE TRINITY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
It is the absence of legitimacy, of an established political order 
comrnanding general consent, which is ofleu the uhimate cause of civil 
wars. 97 1 
6.1 : INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapters have examined the origins of the rebellion in Liberia and 
its impact on neighbouring States and international law. It is desirable to draw some 
lessons fiom that tragic experïence. The first lesson is that fiom the three different levels 
of analysis fiarne-work already adopted; the national, regional and global, events at the 
first level enabled the regional and global factors to impact heavily on Liberia. At the 
national level, the obvious issue is the question of bad govemance and abuse of human 
rights in Liberia which pushed the people to despair. With the interna1 decay and 
auspicious regional and global circumstances, recourse waç had by them to violence. 
A considerable welter of opinion agrees that the intensification of contempt for 
bad governments and rejection of the constitutionality of the state cause most civil 
~ a r s . ~ ' '  In Greece, Lebanon, Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, the issue was about 
elections alleged to have been rigged.973 In the CongoKatangese war, one of the main 
issues was the power of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister. The NigeridBiafia 
war was substantially about the type of federal structure in that country which would give 
vent to its d i v e r ~ i t ~ . ~ ' ~  In Liberia, the war was about power and revenge for Doe's 
tyanny. In Somalia, the corrupt and debauched regime of Siad Barre exploded, pitting 
the Hom of AMca in a bizzare conflict. In Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko's e~~ i r a t i on~ '~has  
left in its wake a civil war, which is eliciting an uncertain response fiom the Southem 
- - 
47 1 Luard. supra note 333. 
9 72 Farer. supra note 527. 
"j Ibid. 
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975 Schism in SA DC Over Congo Wa. r Ordine> hnr>:ll~w.6&v.co.za198/08/08ZO/newsl. htm visited on 
25/ 1 1 /W. 
Afiican Development ~ o r n r n u n i t ~ . ~ ' ~  
This chapter attempts to suggest solutions to the spate of civil wars with 
international dimensions now raging across several Afncan states. It argues that regional 
agencies have a role to play within the framework of the UN Charter towards managing 
and resolving conflict but must do so within the confines of international law. It further 
suggests ways which such regional organizations may best be employed in achieving 
international peace and security. In expounding these arguments, this chapter is divided 
into four sections of which section one is introductory. Section 6.2 bnefly examines the 
concept and practice of legitimacy of govemance and how it could be applied, especially 
in the juridical states with notorious inclinations for political violence which threatens the 
stability of other states. It argues that the quest for legitirnacy of govemance is both a 
municipal and international concem and suggests a role for states and multi-lateral 
organizations. Section 6.3 suggests ways in which the relationship between regional 
bodies and the Security Council may be enhanced, coordinated and strenghtened for 
fniitfbl collaboration for the maintenance of global peace. Section 6.4 is a sumrnary of 
the entire discussion in the thesis. 
976 The rebellion led by Laurent Kabila portended to be an end to the intemecine conflicts in that 
country. Events have proved the expectations wrong. Shortly afier the emergence of the Kabila 
regime in Zaire (Iater renarned Congo), the Foreign Minister of the rcgime Bizima Kazare and a 
coalition of Banyamulenge (ethnic Tutsis of East Congo) rcbelled against the rule of Kabila alleging 
that he was no better than the latc Mobutu. Accusing bun of comption, txîbalism, and dishonesty of 
intention in claiming to return the country to democratic rule. 'lhe leading figures in the armed 
rebellion against Kabila include Mr.Jean Piemc Ondekame a former commander of Kabila's a m y  
which overthrew the regime of Mobum; Zahiti Ngorna, an international lawyer fomerly with the 
UNESCO. It has becn alleged that the rebels who now occupy a significant portion of Congo are 
backed by the governments of neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda and on this notion, the Congolese 
governent  has refiised to negotiate with the rebels describcd as the "pawns of Rwanda and uganda." 
Consequent upon this state of affairs, the Southcm African Developmcnt Cornmunity (SADC) 
reviewed the situation an3 noting "the escalating conflict's potential for upsetting the region's 
precarious balance," decided to intcrvcne. The fmt meanire taken was to impose an economic 
blockade a g a k t  the rebels. At the present moment, the SADC has intervencd militanly. See 
Http://www. souùimovement.alphalink.comau./southne~~d-pana-mini~htm. Visited on 
08/08/99. In July 1999, the government of Zaire instituted an action at the International Court of 
Justice against the governments of Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda for their allegcd suppon of the 
rebels and aggression against Zaire. 
6.2: RECONCEIVING THE PARAMETERS OF GOVEWANCE 
The doctrine of legitimism, which originally meant dynastic or 
monarchical legitimism, has now divorced itself of its rather unfortunate 
ancestry and has corne to be centred on the concept of popular 
iegitimism.977 
With the recent spate of interna1 confiicts, the concept of legitimacy of 
governance978assumed greater significance. Illegitimacy of govemance may be 
manifested in injustice in the distribution of state resources, denial of effective 
participation in govemance and absence of transparency and accountability in the 
political process.979~hese factors disable the pemetration of popular desires into the 
instruments and character of governance. From the discussion in previous chapters, it 
seems that the prevalence of bad govemrnents in Africa peaked during the Cold War. 
The preoccupation with the intrigues of the Cold War enabled such governrnents 
to keep the lid shut on the irrepressible human quest for fieedom and justice. However, 
with the relative and contemporary redefinition of global security, the hitherto empty 
shell of govemance is ostensibly and gradually being filled up with other criteria of 
legitimacy. Values such as democratic representation and liberal economics are assuming 
international ascendancy and currency. Hence, those govemments unwilling to face up to 
the challenges of the emerging order have been threatened. Unfominately, it is not only 
some of those governrnents that are becoming history. More often than not, they pull the 
state and its people with them to the bottomless pit. In most cases, especially in Afiica 
with its heavy reliance on extemal trade and aid, this wind of change has blown from 
across the Atlantic. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights posits certain normative 
values as essential constitutive elements of a legitimate governrnent. While its preamble 
977 Obiora Okafor, "The Global Process of Legitimation and the Legitirnacy o f  Global Govemance" ( 1998) 
10 A.J.1. CL. at 250. 
978 Thomas Franck "Lcgitimacy in the international Systcm" (1988) 82 A.J.1.L 705. 
979 Okafor, supra note 977. 
recognizes the inherent dignity of the human person and the foundation of global peace 
on human fieedom and justice, Article 2 thereof enjoins al1 State parties to the 
Convention to respect divenity of political opinions.980 ïndeed, Article 2 further enjoins 
the parties to the Convention to fashion out constitutional and legislative processes for 
the effective enjoyment of political and civil rights in the domestic polity. Save for public 
emergencies wherein certain civi1 and political rights may be temporarily abndged under 
the nmow conditions stipulated in its Artcle 4, Article 5 of the Convention forbids any 
limitations on the enjoyment of civil and political rights by individuals and groups of 
individuals in state parties to the ~ o n v m t i o n . ~ ~ '  
The noms of the Convention expressly and implicitly recognize that civil and 
political rights can best be enjoyed in representative govemments which are transparent 
and accountable to-members of the state in an orderly and peacefûl manner. The General 
Assembly of the United Nations has equally underscored the elements of good 
govemance including the holding of £kee and fair elections at penodic intervals,gs' respect 
for human rights in al1 its ramifi~ations,~'~ movement towards strong anti-corruption 
measures and the pursuit of sound social poiicies by the governrnent. In effect, the 
9,984 concept of legitimacy of govemance is "philosophical, legal and political, and its 
central position within the international normative regime is well established. 
It would be simplistic to assert that the conflicts in Afiica and other trouble spots 
around the world, which threaten international peace, is necessarily a function of their 
h e t e r ~ ~ e n e i t ~ . ~ ~ '  Rather, the tinderbox is ignited by the punuit of policies, which run 
980 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 38 1. Set also, Stephen Stedman, 
"Peucernaking in Civil War (Colorado: Lynne Ricnner Publishers, 199 1 ) at 3. 
98 l International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 38 1.  
982 U.N.GAOR 45" Sess. Supp. No. 49. U.N.Doc. A/RES/45/150 (1990) 
983 Quashigab on "Protection o f  Human Rights" supra note 239 at 97. See also, Robert Jackson & Doreen 
Jackson., Conremporary Government and Politics: Democracy and A uthoritarianism (Ontario: Prent ice 
Hall, 1993) at 3. 
984 E.K. Quashigah "Legitimacy of Governments and the Resotution of ïntra-National Conflicts in Africa" 
( 1995) 7 A.J. 1. C. L. at 284. 
985 Quashigah. supra, at 289. 
against the grain of the Convention on Civil, and Political Rights and similar noms of 
international law designed to enhance a full and unfettered enjoyrnent of human r i g h t ~ ? ~ ~  
In Africa with a panoply of ethnic groups split across several states?*'the need for a 
scnipulous respect for these noms of international law cm hardly be overstated. 
,9988 ,989 Similarly, "fiscal federalism or "economic self determination which are irnplicit 
noms in the Convention on Civil and Political Rights and in the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural RighdgO must be scrupulously respected and enforced. 
A situation where people of a particular ethnic group are made to believe with reason that 
resources fiom "their" part of the country are unfairly used to develop other parts of the 
country at their expense does not bode well for civil stability. In the contemporary 
Nigeria, this is one area of concern which perceptive scholars fear to be a cause for 
concern capable of violently destabilizing that country. It is equally remarkable that the 
economic exploitation of crude oil in Southem Sudan by the Khartoum regime at the 
expense of the Southern Sudanese peoples fûels the civil war in that country. 
As the Liberian case has shown, a situation in which a certain group of people 
bonded by a cornmon hentage or ethnicity corners the wealth of the state for themselves 
cannot endure too long nor create a sense of belonging among those on the receiving end. 
According to Gambari, "one of the swiftest ways to the destruction of a state is to give 
preference to one particular tribe over another, or to show favow to one group of people 
rather than a n ~ t h e r . ~ ~  Similarly, the empowerment of the people by mass education 
needs to be encouraged to enhance transparency and faith in govemance.99' Democracy 
986 KCWheare, Federal Governmenf (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) at 1 1 .  
987 Quashigah, supra note 984 at 289. Sec also, Adila Abusharat "The Legal Relationship Between 
Multinational Oil Corporation and the Sudan" (1999) 43 Journal ofAfncan Law at 18. 
988 Quashigah, supra note 984 at 289. 
989 Henkin, How Nations Behave, supra note 453 at 203. 
990 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
w 1 Ibrahim Garnbari, "Paths to Safe Polity" Online~http:www.ngrguardiannews.com/new~ accessed on 
25 May, 1999. [Hercinafter Garnbari] 
99' Michael, Brown., "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Interna1 Conflict" in Brown, cd., 
Internarional Dimensions of Inremal Conjlicts. supra note 223 at 573-587. 
and its virtues can hardly he appreciated by those whom illiteracy have rendered 
impervious to extemal stimuli or contending ideas. Democracy and respect for human 
rights thrive in literate societies. The high illiteracy in Liberia enabled their oppression 
and domination. 
The short point in the above-mentioned factors and issues is that "the problem of  
civil conflict in Africa is essentially a problem of govemance.'*w3 It is not a coincidence 
that those Afncan States characterized by lack of democratic accountability, well 
fùnctioning judicial systems, gmss and systemic abuse of human rights, and ethnic 
politics994have found themselves enmeshed in civil conflicts. It is not being suggested 
here that democracy, good govemance and indigenous constitutions reflecting the culture 
and aspirations of a people would instantaneously conjure political stability and 
economic d e v e l ~ ~ r n e n t . ~ ~  Rather, good governmce in the long run, affords the best 
avenue for the prevention and management of grievances which lead to violent intemal 
c ~ n f l i c t s . ~ ~ ~  
Those Afncans who argue that the elements of good governance are of relevance 
only to the Western world are senously mistaken. It is as much ~ f n ' c a n ~ ~ ' a s  it is global. 
Indeed, of late, several Afncan countries at various international fora have declared and 
re-affirmed the direct relevance of good govemance to continental peace, economic 
progress, stability and collective securityw8 This is evident in the lune 1990 OAU 
993 James Busumtwi-Sam, "Redefrning Security Afler the Cold War" in supm note 741 at 258. 
994 Sean Murphy "The Security Council, Legitimacy and the Concept of Collective Securïty After the Cold 
War" (1984-5) 32 Colum. J. of Trunsn 'I Law (1994-5) 201. [Hercinafier, Murphy] 
99 5 According to the fmdings by the London Development htitute, "authoritarian mle is likely to generate 
higher domestic savings as a ba i s  for higher lcvels of growth whcther by forcing public savings or by 
promoting inegalitarian policies which indirectly assist growth." See Anna Shephard "The Economics of 
Democracy" (1992) African Report, March-April 1992 at 29. Cited in Quashigah on "Protection of H u m  
Riehts." Supra note 239, ibid. Reference may be made to Latin Amerka, Asia and Ghana. 
< ~ u m a n  Rights Throughout The World, Scicntific Amcrica. Online > 
hrtp:~i~su..sciam.corn:8011998~1298issue/l298numbers.html accessed on 6 April 1999. According to the 
report, two fifths of the world live under tyranny and another two fifths live under arbitrarily imposed 
reeimes which are hardly accountable. 
*'ohy Martin Ejidike. *'Human Rights in the C u i ~ r a l  Traditions and Social Pnctice of the Igbo of South 
Eastern Nigeria" (1999) 43 Journal of Afncan Law 71. 
wg., O.A.U. Summit Ends With Democracy Plea" Online~http.www/news2.bbc.co.uk~english/ca 
"Declaration on the Political and Socio-economic Situation in Afnca" recognizing the 
direct inter-dependence of collective security on good govemance in the continent.999 At 
the Afican Leadership Forum held in Kampala in May 1991 a conference on Security, 
Stability, Development abd Cooperation in Africa modelled on the European Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe offered a holistic framework on good govemance 
and collective s e c ~ r i t y . ' ~  The Conference clearly identified democratization, popular 
participation and accountability as the key to security and stability in the continent. 
Finally, at the 3sLh Surnmit of the OAU in Algiers, Algena held on 10-14 July 1999, the 
heads of state of AfEcan countries while acknowledging the points above adopted an 
unanimous resolution to "isolate any goveniment in the region that cornes to power by 
rrlOOl force of arms. In addition, the body resolved to suspend membewhip of any country 
under military rule. While one cannot really be sanguine about the seriousness of the 
OAU's resolve in this regard, the nse of the conscioumess of the inherent dangers of 
illegitimate govemance arnongst Afncan states is a welcome develoPment?" 
Another aspect of the problem is "the consistent relationship between national 
rr 1003 poverty and the level of respect for human rights which usually occasions civil strife. 
The economic situation in Afnca which has been notoriously worsened by grafi, 
corruption, appropriation and theft of the state purse by rulers has been fùrther 
complicated by continous drop in the pnce of commodities and a shift of Western 
attention to Eastern Europe. Legitimate govemance can hardly be sustained on empty 
wallets and stomachs. According to a United Nations Report, Afncan countries lost SSO 
billion between 1986 and 1992 as a result of falling commodity prices.'m It is interesting 
accessed on 2 1 July 1999. 
999 James ~usurn&i- am, "Redefming Security AAer the Cold War" in supra note 993 at 268. 
'Ooo Ibid. 
1001 Supra note 998. 
1 O01 Julius Nyerere, "How to Check Coups in Afica" OnlUie~http:www.ngrguardianncws.com~ncws/htm 
accessed on 26 May. 1999. Sec also, "ECOWAS Recognises Wanke" 
online~http:www.ngrguardianncws.comlnews/htm accessed on 26 May, 1999 
1003 Quashigah, "Protection of Human Rights" supra note 239 at 93. 
1004 Quoted in Quashigah, supra at 108. 
to note that the rebellion in Liberia was also fueled by the econornic downturn in that 
country. With the fa11 in revenue earnings and loss of foreign economic aid which 
hitherto flowed by virtue of Liberia's geo-political relevance under the Cold War, the 
incornpetence and illegitimacy of the Doe regUne became more pronounced. The fa11 of 
the Berlin Wall has both symbolically and practically pemiitted a massive movement of 
financial and human capital to that part of the world by West European and North 
Amencan govenunents and corpoations. In fact, the movement of scarce Afncan high 
skilled labour to Europe and Amenca may not be unco~ected  with the bad governance 
and consequent strife in e c a n  countries. It is not accidental that Afncan countries 
witnessing civil strife are those in which economic institutions have al1 but collapsed. The 
obvious loser is the African continent and its pe0p1es.l"~ 
The international comrnunity c m  avoid and reduce cases of intemal civil strife by 
other ways including revisiting the normative regime on the law on recognition of 
govemments and non-intervention.Im PLfrican countries have tended to ignore the 
negative normative impact of according recogniti~n'~~'to cut-throat warlords in control 
the capital city of their c o u n t r i e ~ . ' ~ ~ ~  It is quite revealing that in the Liberian cnsis, 
ECOWAS and the UN Security Councii passed resolutions declaring that they would not 
recognize any govemment in Liberia that emerged through the smoking barrels of the 
gun. If the Doe govenunent, which emerged by literally slitting the belly of President 
Tolbert had been denied international recogntion, the normative impact might have been 
enormous. 
The point is that the international commuinty would do well to collectively refuse 
IOOS Brown, supra note 993 at 14. 
1006 Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947) 
at 68. See also. Ham Kelsen, "Recognition in International Law: Some Theoretical Observations" (1941) 
35 A.J.1.L at 605. 
1007 Obiora Okafor "The Concept of Legitimate Governance in the Contemporary Municipal and 
International Legal Systems: Ari Interdisciplinary Analysis (LL.M Thesis, The University o f  British 
Columbia, 1995) at 16. 
1008 Okafor, supra note 977 at 25 1 .  
to sanctiQ raw rnight as right. Of course, there is practicai wisdom in not ignoring an 
effective govenunent but such governments need not be publicly recognized or consarted 
with as if coming to power on the bones and blood of victims of human nghts abuses is 
of no significance. Such public recognition expressly and implicitly conférs undeserved 
international legitimacy on the rogue government. The virtues of a collective and unified 
avoidance and shunning of such governments can hardly be overstated. M e n  the Doe 
governent  emerged, it is intereshg to recall that while some states refiised to recognise 
it, others chose to do "buslliess" with it. There is a high normative value in the inter- 
relationship of govemments. States would do well to actively explore the provisions of 
Article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights providing for the 
making of cornplaints to the Human Rights Committee (established by Article 28 of the 
Convention) regarding Miactions of the obligations created in the Convention. It is 
remarkable that no state, not even members of ECOWAS deemed it fit to lodge a formal 
cornplaint at the Human Rights Committee against the excesses of Samuel Doe. 
Afkican multi-lateral organizations should clearly articulate and publicize the 
criteria for good governance in their area and errant governments shouid not be welcorne 
in their fold. It is remarkable that this suggestion has just been embraced by the OAU at 
its Summit in Iuly 1999.1°09 This approach worked perfectly well in Lesotho in 1994. III 
that country, the King, for no ostensible reason, sacked the Prime Minister and appointed 
a new one.'o10 This arbitrary and illegal conduct threw the country into himioil. The 
Southem &can Development Comrnunity (SADC) immediately issued an ultimatum 
denying legitimacy to the usurper and threatened sanctions against the whimsical King. 
Whereupon, the King immediately restored of the Prime Minister to office. Similar 
attempts have failed elsewhere for lack of serious res01ve.~~" Scholars like  kaf for,'^'^ 
'Oo9 Supra note 998. 
Quashigah, supra note 984 at 304. 
101 1 When the Togolese tyrant Gnassingbe Eyadema murdered Sylvanius Olympio, states like Nigeria, 
Guinea and Sierra Leone successfbily debarred Eyadema fiom attending the inaugural conference of the 
OAU. However, "when Nknimah was overthrown in 1966.. . an attcmpt to deny the usurpers of 
~ranckl*'~ and ~ u n a n s a n ~ ' ~ ' ~ a g r e e  îhat such rneasures on delegitimation will have 
"normative, jurisprudential, political or socio-economic effect on both the rogue 
governrnent and on the international order. **IO15 
rr1016 If international law is to be "no more than congealed politics, such measures 
will aid, modifjr, and humanize the political processes by which international law is made 
and validated. Jurisprudentially, it may result in the nullification and invalidation of the 
official processes of the rogue governmnent in the eyes of the international 
c o ~ n r n u n i t ~ . ~ ~ ' ~  It may also d t  in loss of sovereiga diplornatic or jurisdictional 
immunities. Politicaily such govexnexnnts rnay not participate in and derive the benefits 
of mutual international intercourse. Economicaliy, they may be punished with sanctions 
and their assets fiozen or seized like those of the Ceciras regime in Haiti. In the normative 
sense, such measures will enhance the character of international law in its compliance- 
pull and strenghten its capacity to aîtract habitua1 ~bedience.'~" These lessons are 
immanent in the Liberian cri~is '~ '~and show up the inadequacies in contemporary 
assumptions and practices of international law. 
Turning to the Security Council, the systemic incoherence in the world order 
regarding the application or enforcement of international noms gives cause for anxiety. 
While the Security Council made the determinations that the situations in Iraq and 
Liberia respectively constituted threats to international peace, it responded differently to 
participartory legitimacy . . .failcd ..Congo, Guinca, Mali.. .rcfUsed to take part in the proceedings." See 
Bolaji Akmyerni " The Organization of Afncan Unity and the Concept of  Non-Interference in Interna1 
Affairs of Member States" in Snyder & Sathirathai, eds., supra note 600 at 78. 
'O1' Supra note 600. 
"13 T.M. Franck and M.M.  Munansangy The International Economic Order: I n t m a t i o ~ l  Law in the 
Making (New York: UNlTAR, 1982) i t  2. 
'O1' Ibid. 
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1019 Amos Sawyer, n e  Emergence of Aufocracy in Liberia: Trage& and Challenge (San Francisco: ICS 
Press, 1992) at 30 1. 
both crises. For Iraq, it amassed the greatest m a d a  and arsenal known to hurnanity to 
expel that country's forces out h m  Kuwait. On Liberia, it pontificated on peace and 
"approved"'020 of ECOWAS initiatives. 
The Security Council's refusa1 or unwillingcess to effectively intemene in Sudan, 
Congo and Sierra Leone gives room for regional assertiveness and hegemonism. The 
apparent inconsistency inherent where "the butchers of Tiananmen and the Butcher of 
Ham are embraced so that the United Nations can repel the Butcher of Baghdad, r r lO2 l  
undermines the international order of security. One is aware that political and meta-legal 
considerations have largely detennined Security Council's articulation and execution of 
its responsibilty. 
However, in the diaiectical interaction between nonnative idealism and the 
national inter est^'"^ of the Security Council permament members, the defeat of the 
is a tragedy. In the prescient words of Edward C m ,  
[Tlhe ideal once embodied in an institution, ceases to be an ideal and 
becomes the expresion of a selnsh interest, which must be destroyed in the 
narne of a new ideal. This constant interaction of irreconciliable forces is 
the stufT of politics. Every political situation contains mutually 
incompatible elernents of utopia and reality, of morality and power.1024 
Although this prognosis is no cause for despair, international lawyers should use the 
unfortunate circurnstances as ventable materials for examining ways of dancing the 
contemporary regirne of collective se~u.rity,'~~~rnost pr bably beginning with refonn of 
the Security ~ o u n c i l . ' ~ * ~  Be that as it may, the question is beyond the immediate scope of 
'Ox UN SCOR, 47& Sess., 2974m Mtg., U.N.W.  S/PV: 2974 (1991) Provisional Verbatim Record, 
Statement of the Pprcsident, Mr. Bagbeni Adcito Nzcngeya. " The members of the Security Council 
commend and approve of the efforts made by the ECOWAS Hcads of States to promote peace and 
normalcy in Liberia." 
'O" Michael Reisman, "Somc Lessons From Iraq: International Law and Democratic Politics" f 64 Yale 
Journal of Internationl Law at 203. 
'OE H e n . ,  How Notions Behave, supra note 453 at 33 1 
1 0 3  Supra note 977 at 260. 
'O2' Reproduced in Okafor, ibid. 
IOzs ibid. 
1 O26 There are heated arguments that the Security Ccouncil has become a "rubber stamp" for U.S foreign 
this thesis. Having dispenseci with those issues, the next section explores ways and means 
by which regionai arrangements may best be utilized for securing collective security 
within the h e w o r k  of the United Nations Charter. 
policy . See Okafor, ibid. Various suggestions have been made in this regard. Ranging £tom complete 
abolition of the veto powcr, expansion of the veto powcr to make it more rcprcsentative of the regions and 
cultures of the worid, et cetera. 
6.3: REGIONAL BODIES AND COLLECTIVE SECUIUTY 
In the 'world order perspective', the traditional separation of law and 
politics is abolished and the legal scholar takes on the persona and the rote 
of the politically+mgaged rhetoncian and activist.. .a solidarist direction. 
The mode1 rests on the desire to direct international legal studies towards a 
populist global condition in which every man, woman and child on earth 
may live in peace and harmony, can be confident of political and social 
dignity and can live in a balanced natural environment. No enlightened 
person would disagree with any of these goals. Problems only arise in 
attempting to know how best to pursue them. Should they be pursued 
within the fiamework of the state system? Can they be pursued outside 
that fia~nework?'~~'  
Those who suppose that the legal system is a self suficient set of 
rules existing outside of its participants and constraining lawyers and 
judges to acts against their consciences will always be prevalent among 
lawyers, judges and legal historians. Those who think that every human 
action can be explained by the necessities of the prevailing social 
environment and the requirements of nati0m.l security will always be 
common among anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists. But 
every so often in a human heart the ice will thaw, and a human person will 
acknowled e his responsibility for other human persons he has 
touched. 104' 
Diverse scholarship on the desirable relationship between regional organizations and the 
United ~a t ions 'O~~in  the maintenance of international peace and security have identified 
the salient battle for ~u~remac~~~ '0be tween  th se two regimes. In spite of the clear 
primary role of the Security Council in the maintenance of global peace, centnpetal 
forces of regionalism tend to give the impression that both regimes are at par or at worst 
in a giadiatorial stance. This state of affairs is reminiscent of the wars of junsdiction 
fought by the English Courts of Admiralty and the Kings Bench in the 1 7Ih century and is 
perhaps attributable to the self afflicted paralysis of the Security Council. 
That the Secwity Council apparently takes action mainly when the interests of its 
Io" Robert Jackson, supra note 446. 
1023 Roger Clark, supra note 3 at 83. 
1 O 2 9  Berhanykun Andemicael ed., Regionalism and the United Nations (New York: Oceana Publications, 
1979) at 225. 
1030 F-C-Okoye, International Law and the New Af~can States (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1972) at 157. 
permanent members are involved can hardly be denied. Witness its action in Haiti and in 
Iraq where the interests of a superpower were involved. Compare that with its inaction in 
the Chechnya and Tibet crises where the interests of other permanent rnembers are 
involved. If those are juxtaposed with its complete indifference to the chronic conflict in 
Southern ~ u d a n , ' ~ ~ ' e m ~ t ~  exhortations on Burundi, Ethiopia, S i e m  Leone, Zaire, 
Guinea-Bissau and several other places, the realpolitik becomes obvious. Where it does 
not clearly abdicate its role to maintain peace, it becomes a ventable avenue for 
~ 1 0 3 2  ineffective "conciliatory, hortatory or condemnatory rhetoric and platitudes on peace. 
This situation apparently affords fbel for the emergence of regional or ad-hoc 
actions to secure global peace independent of the Security Council. This trend is 
dangerous. The situation is hardly helped by the Charter of the United Nations in its 
provisions on the proper role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international 
peace. The Charter is not an examplar of precision and clarity in legal draftmanship as it 
does not delimit with relative certainty the boundaries and terrns of association beniveen 
regional organizations and the Security Council. Thus, the task of delimiting and defining 
this important relationship appears to be a fùnction of uncoordinated state practice. 
Towards striking a balance between the Security Council and regional initiatives a few 
suggestions denved fiom the ECOWAS action in Liberia are worthy of consideration. 
As an aside, the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter, which provides for a 
unified military force capable of securing peace in troubled states need not be realized 
literally but certain innovative arrangements are possible. Instead of the standing army 
contemplated by the Charter, the United Nations Secretariat would do well to actualize its 
currently proposed arrangement whereby units of the Armed Forces of some states will 
be specially designated a United Nations force ready to be deployed at short notice.lo3' 
1 0 3  1 Wole Soyinka, n e  Open Sore of A Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996) at 25. 
'O3' A. Cassese, The Cunent Legal Regdation of the Use of Force (Mutinus Nijhoff, 1986) supra note 743 
at S I  1. 
'O3' "Nigeria. 2 1 Oihers loin Global Peacekeeping Outlit" The Guardian, 31d April 1999. Online 
While this arrangement is being examined, it is perhaps more fiuitful to examine how the 
existing regional bodies may be harmonized and their abilities and potentials harnessed 
for securing global peace within the existing fiamework of the Charter. 
On how regional bodies may be incorporateci in the maintenance of international 
peace by the Security Council, Tom Farer has pertinently suggested that the existing 
relationship between the United Nations and the various regional bodies be urgently 
redefined for The =ope of the respective autonomy and areas of competence 
and expertise of regional organizations should be clearly established. A situation like 
Liberia's where ECOWAS, an organization designed for regional economic integration, 
grapples with the problerns of peacekeeping and rnilitary enforcement of peace leaves 
much to be desired. It lacked the experience, infiastructure, logistics and personnel for 
the task and these obviously affected its performance in Liberia. 
Although the Charter does not define the relationship between the United Nations 
and regional ~ r~an iza t ions , '~~ '  it would be prudent to categonze and delimit them 
depending on their constitutive treaties, focus and specialized competence. At the 
moment no one can say with appreciable certainty which regional organizations in any 
part of the globe could function under chapter 8 of the UN Charter. At the moment, 
another economic body known as the Southern Afiican Development Commission 
(SADC) is wrestling with the intricacies in of peace enforcement in  aire.'^^^ Regional 
bodies dealing with educational, scientific, economic, environmental or o&er diverse 
concerns should be so clearly recognized and their areas of special competence and 
expertise delimited. This is probably the better way in which the envisaged closer 
cooperation between both regimes could be enhan~ed. '~~ '  Peace enforcement should not 
>hnp:l/www.ngrguardiannews.com accessed on 3"' April 1999. Note that the same approach is being 
pressed by the Francophone countries in West Afnca for the ECOMOG. 
1034 Farer, supra note 527, ibid. 
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be an "ail-corners" affair. The much expected regime of close cooperation between the 
UN and regional organizations should be on a clearly established basis of recognition of 
cornpetence. 
Further, regional bodies should be encouraged to exchange information with the 
Security Council. This can be achieved by inviting them to attend meetings of the 
Security Council where matters of security affecting their respective regions are in issue. 
The Secunty Council and regional organizations should have the mutual powers of 
introducing matters to the respective agemda of each organ w h m  necessary.'038 Where 
such efforts to cornpel the active involvement of the Security Council fails, the regional 
body may ask for the Security Council's authorization to intervene in the conflict. If this 
arrangement was in place, the reactionary efforts by Zaire and Ethiopia at the Security 
Council which prevented a timely response by the CounciI to the Liberian crisis would 
probably have been obviated. Similarly, it would obviate the inherent danger of abuse in 
ex post facto ratifications. 
A syrnbiotic relationship between regional organizations and the Security Council 
should be fostered. 1039The present fluid and distanced relationship between the Council 
and regional organizations on security is undesirable. The former Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, Boutros-Boutros Ghali in apparent rationalization of this fluid state 
of affairs hailed it as affording some "usehl fiexibility conducive to a rich variety of 
,rIû40 complementary roles. Arguing m e r ,  he posited that "just as no two regions or 
situations are the sarne, so the design of cooperative work and its division of labour must 
,*IO41 adapt to the realities of each case with flexibility and creativity. While these glonous 
words for the contemporary regime of relationship between the United Nations and the 
regional bodies have some element of truth, unfortunately there is no design of 
1038 Supra. 
Ibid. 
10.80 Boutros Ghali, Agenda for Peace, supra note note 8 12 at 60-5. 
I M 1  /bid. 
cooperative work, the existence of which the Secretary General assumed. And that is the 
cmx of the problem. 
It is perhaps pertinent to recall that the former Secretary General of the United 
Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali took an unprecedented step in 1994. On August 1, 1994 
he held a meeting with the heads of al1 regional organizations committed to the 
maintenance of regionai security such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
the European Union (EU), League of Arab States, NATO, OAU, ECOWAS et cetera.Io4' 
At the meeting, it was reiterated that United Nations has the primary responsibility but 
the need for some decentralization of that mandate under the Charter was acknowledged. 
What then shall be the nature of this much heralded era of decentraiization of authonty? 
From a sober examination of the relationship between the ECOWAS and the 
Security Council in the management of the Liberian crisis, it can hardly be gainsaid that 
some element of clear devolution and decentralization of authority is necessary. The 
contemporary practice by which regional bodies like NATO, ECOWAS and the SADC 
literally determine by themselves, the existence or otherwise of threats to international 
peace, by-pass the Security Council by fomulating and enforcing perceived responses 
thereto, is not only illegal but extremely dangerous. Indeed it strikes at the very root of 
the essence of the existence of the Security ~ouncil.'"' The question of primary 
jurisdiction in maintenance of peace, globally or regionally, can hardly be resolved in 
favour of regional bodies.'044 Where the Security Council is unable to act, it may then 
clearly and with a rather narrow margin of latitude, authonze a regional body recognized 
as existing for the purposes of chapter 8 of the Charter to deal with the matter. In such a 
situation, the Security Councii may still retain political and moral control over the 
intervention. Such a delegation of authonty should be on very clear tems leaving no 
p~-- 
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room for an extended and tortured expansion by a regional body. For instance, the 
mandate to a regional body to intervene rnay be limited in time and renewable by the 
Security Council every three months. 
The redefinition of the relationship between regional organizations and the 
Security Council should not only be articulateci before the emergence of crisis situations 
but where violent conflicts arise which threaten international peace, the role of the two 
regimes should be clearly defined. A few lessons derived fiom the ECOWAS action in 
Liberia may be helpfùl. Owing to the proximity of regional organizations to the 
c o n f l i ~ t , ' ~ ~ ~  it is not difficult to foresee a situation where blinded by the dusts of the 
conflict, regional organizations bring their own agenda and perspectives to the conflict 
and thus rnay compound an already grave and complex s i t ~ a t i o n . ' ~ ~  in the Liberian case, 
it was no secret that the Francophone States and their Anglophone counterparts brought 
their mutual suspicions and prejudices to bear upon their perception of the p r ~ b l e r n . ' ~ ~ ~  
However, the maintenance of international peace and security by the Security 
Councit does not necessarily mean that the Security Council must be involved in every 
minute aspect of crisis detection and peace enforcement. It may deiegate some of its 
functions to regional bodies and yet maintain direct control of the extent of the use of 
force and formulate general policies behind such actions. In the circumstances, it is 
suggested that in addition to those non-permanent members of different continents sitting 
as members of the Security Council, regional organizations with security interests should 
be relied upon for information regarding the state of security in their respective regions. 
This acknowledges that regional organizations are best situated to appreciate the 
emergence of threats to international peace at their earliest stages, yet it hardly addresses 
the problem of absence of standing at the Security Council of regional bodies. This is one 
IM5 Dan Lindley, "Collective Security Organizations and Intemal Conflict" in Brown, ed., supra note 223 
at 556. 
1046 Binaefer Nowrojee, supra note 86 at 138. Sec also, Ghali, Agendajiw Peace. supra note 8 12 at 3. 
IM7 Ibid, at 14 1 .  
way by which the m a h g  of a determination by the Security Council of the emergence of 
a threat to internationl peace could have appreciable objectivity. 
How will the information relevant for the making by the Security Council of the 
determination that there exists a threat to international peace in a porticular case be 
effectively used if the regional bodies on security have no competence to table such 
issues as part of the agenda of the Security Council? It is probable that the information 
gathered by the regional bodies in the exercise of their advantages of proximity to the 
emerging threat to peace rnay end up as a buiky and dust ridden file in an obscure office 
at the United Nations. If the information is passed on to the continental representatives at 
the Security Council, chances are that it may never see the light of day. The case of 
Libena is in point.'048 
Therefore, there is a need for a review of the procedural rules of the Security 
Council to enable regional bodies, relying on their perceived higher margin of 
appreciation of threats to international peace, to table such emerging crises before the 
Security Council. This necessarily calls for a clearer definition of the scope of authority 
of regional bodies and how best they can be utilized while remaining under the direction 
of the Security Council. There is hardly any denying the reality that a concerted global 
approach to conflict prevention, management and resolution is far more preferable to 
regional initiatives. 
The question of fùnding of operations has profound implications that have to be 
resolved. The situation in Liberia is again instructive. In the ECOWAS action it has been 
estimated that as at 1994, the surn of $90 million was expended. Of this sum only S18.4 
was contributed by the United Nations Trust Fund. Seventy per cent of the balance was 
borne by ~ i ~ e r i a . " ~ ~  Several of the West African troops in Libena were paid their 
- -- 
1018 On the sometimes ugIy face of African politics on issues of coliective security, see Michael Wolfers. 
Politics in the Organitation ofAfrican Unity (London: Methuen, 1967) at 92.See also T.A. Irnobighe, "An 
African High Command: The Search for a Feasible Strategy of Continental Security" (1980) 79 Afj-ican 
Aflairs at 315. 
I M9 Binaefer Nowrojee, supra note 86 at 147. 
salaries directly from their respective govemments. Several West Afkican States could 
hardly afford the cost of keeping their troops in Liberia This necessarily raised at least 
two dangers. 
First, as the salaries were in some cases unpaid for rnonths, some of the 
peacekeepers began to engage in activities incompatible with their peacekeeping status. 
Substantiai and senous cases of looting, expropriation and theA of Liberian assets by the 
ECOMOG peacekeeping troops have been widely reprted. 'OM Extortion of the 
traumatized Liberians by the ECOMOG peacekeepm were also reported.'"' Second, 
regional enforcement actions have shown that they are more or less unilateral in character 
even when masked in the toga of the regional machinery. This is more pronounced in the 
aspect of funding and when the peacekeepers are paid from the respective accounts of 
their different countries. Loyalty is split and those contrîbuting countries who can afford 
to pay their soldiers are more likely and able to hijack the supposed regional and 
collective effort. 
The ECOWAS action in Liberia was largely dominated and inspired by the 
military govemment in Nigeria. Of the 12 billion United States dollars spent by 
ECOWAS in the cnsis, Nigeria accounted for 8 billion dollars.'052 Hence, the impression 
and allegation that the ECOWAS action in Liberia was in fact a Nigerian quest for 
hegemonial control of West Afnca. Similar allegations are present in the ECOWAS 
intervention in the Sierra Leonean crsis.'OS3 The NATO intervention in Kosovo cnsis has 
equally been perceived as a US attempt to impose its will and ideology in the ~ a l k a n s . ' ~ ~ '  
The current SADC intervention in the Zairean crisis has equally been inspired by 
Zimbabwe whose Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, is known to harbour ideas about 
IO50 Terrence Lyons, "Liberia's Path From Anarchy to Elcctions" (1998) 97 Currenr Hisrory at 229-33- 
'O5 Ibid. 
los' Ibid. 
1053 Sylvester Ekundayo "ECOMOG-A Mode1 for African Peacckeepirig" Afirfircanews Oct. 16, 1998, at 12. 
1054 Chomsky, supra note 956. 
Zirnbabwean leadership of Southern A£ii~a'"~ To reduce and possibly avoid this 
debilitating suspicion when regional enforcement actions are in place, the b d s  for the 
maintenance of peacekeeping troops should be in one pool regardless of the contibution 
of any state and managed by the civilian administative body of the relevant regional 
~ r~an iza t ion '~*~and /  or with the UN. 
In addition, a professional civilian staff to monitor and document the excesses of 
the military aspect of the enforcement actions should be institutionalized and made 
answerable to the office of the Secretary-General o f  the United Nations. This should be 
made to work in liasion with that regional organization and should also serve as a 
clearing ground for regional bodies already at work in trouble spots. Unlike the UN 
Special Representative or High Commisioner which are usually appointed after the 
conflict has been resolved, this kind of agency would serve as information gathering and 
collation centre during the edorcement of peace by a regional organization so as to 
ensure that human rights abuses by peacekeepers and warring factions are not lefi 
undocumented and ~n~unished.'~~~ In the Liberian case, the ECOMOGNNOMIL 
peacekeepers were alleged to have abused women and young girls, siring over 25,000 
children in the process.1058 A UN Special Represenative who merely visits refugees fiom 
the conflict and aies back to New York to deliver "a special report" is absolutely useless 
in the documentation and collation of incidents of human rights abuses perpetrated in the 
field of conflict. 
On the sexual abuse of Liberian women and girls, the Nigerian dominated 
contingent with over 5,000 troops in the ECOMOG accounts for 50 per cent of the 
number of children bom to the peacekeepers, the remaining 50 per cent is split by 
IO55 Schism in SADC Over Congo Wa.r Online> ht~://www.6dav.co.~98/08/0820/news/.hmi visited on 
2511 1/98., supra note 975, ibid.. 
1 OS6 Brown, supra note 223 at 556. 
1057 William NeiI " Human Rights Monitoring versus Political Expcdiency: The Experience of the OAS 
Mission in Haiti". 8 Harvard Human Rights Journal (1995) at 101. 
1058 Jeff Cooper, "Tracing Missing Fathers" World News, Inter Press Service, 23 Octobet 1998 onl in6 
~vww.oneworld.or~~i~s/oct98 h ml accessed on 22 July 1999. 
Ghanaian, Guinean, the Gambian and Sien Leonean fathers.Io5' Most of the girls were 
between 13 and 16 years of age and reportedly had affairs with ECOMOG soldiers in 
return for food and protection during the war.lo6' in the absence of an effective civilian 
machinery to supervise the conduct of ECOMOG troops in Liberia, over 85 per cent of 
the young girls sexually abused by the peacekeepers are yet to locate the soldiers nor 
establish contacts between them and the "ECOMOG Children." Sadly, a combination of a 
paucity of reliable documentation of the atrocities by the warring factions and the 
peacekeepen, and the absence of the necessary political will has made it impossible for 
criminal charges to be pressed against the perpetrators of atrocities in the conflict. 'O6' 
Furthemore, the noms on intervention should be codified. Just as the United 
Nations International Law Commission has researched and codified several applicable 
noms, it is high time a body of experts evaluated the cases of multilateral enforcemenî 
actions and came up with principles which may be adopted by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations in the form of a Dedaration. In this context, a few suggestions may be 
worth trying. 
First, no regional enforcement action may be countenanced without the express 
authorization of the Security Council first sought and obtained. Ex postfacto ratifications 
of unilateral regional enforcement actions leave ample room for abuse and arbitrariness 
and does great damage to the normative order on the use of force. Second, no regional 
organization purporting to enforce the peace may enter a field of conflict without an 
effective cease-fire in place. The attack on ECOMOG troops by the NPFL rebels was 
Iargely a function of the absence of a prior effective cease-fire before the ECOMOG 
331062 purported to enforce the "cease-fire. This factor also contributed to the protracted 
nature of the conflict and actual intervention and literally made ECOMOG a party to the 
'0s9 /bid. 
'O"O Ibid. 
'O6' Abraham William, "War Crimes Tribunal for Liberian Warlords" ( 1996) vol. 1 1 ,  The Perspective at 6.  
lm' James Busurntwi-Sam, "Redefming Sccurity After the Cold War" in supra note 993 at 276. 
conflict. Third, there must be clear lines demarcating the combatants themselves and the 
interventionist forces. A situation in which the rebels, the vestiges of the government 
troops and the ECOMOG peacekeeepers had little or no clear lines of demarcation 
contributed to the high casualty rate and chaotic nature of the conflict and its resolution 
by the interventionist forces. Similarly, the absence of a clearly demarcated line of 
conflict and intervention obscured the apportionment of responsibility for human rights 
abuses perpetrated in the conflict. 
If serious abuses of human nghts are perpetrated in areas where the lines of 
separation are not clear, it is very easy for the crime to go undetected, and if detected, to 
remain unpunished. Fourth, the interventionist force m u t  be clearly n e ~ t r a l . ' ~ ~ ~  This may 
best be achieved by a prior express authonzation of the Security Council and scmpulous 
cornpliance with the regional organization's constitutional mechanism. The fudgy and ad 
hoc manner in which ECOWAS approved and "ratified" its decision to intervene in 
Liberia cast serious doubts on its neutrality and this in turn impacted negatively on its 
perception by the warring factions. 
Fifth, the mandate of the regional enforcers of peace must necessarily be subject 
to the ovemding authority of the Secwity Council. Finally, to secure collective security, 
we must first secure social distributive justice. Within the Ahcan context with a 
multitude of ethnic groups split across different fiontiers of that continent's fifty-three 
countries, the practice of a holistic conception of collective security and distributive 
social justice secured by good govemance is the antidote to the needless civil conflicts 
ravaging the continent. Collective security and social justice, in the words of Nigenan 
novelist Chinua Achebe, are "two sides of the same coin. r91064 
- 
1063 Sup ru. 
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6.4 CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examuied the legdity of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia 
within the standpoint of collective security in a dynamic world. The Liberian state in its 
structure, polity and organization raises questions as regards the nature of statehood in 
Afnca, mode of governance and raison d'ene. With this cornes the urgent need for a 
redefinition of the parameters of govemance in Afnca. Further, the causes of the Liberian 
conflict raise interesting issues conceming the impact of global events and phenornena on 
the stability and secunty of most Afncan States. The intervention itself marked the first 
active collaboration in peacekeeping by a regional organization with the United Nations. 
This unprecedented development presents an interesting bu? potentially dangerous 
precedent. This thesis has also explored some of the aspects relating to the Charter 
regime on the use of force especiaily the relationship between chapters 7 and 8. 
Some concluding observations are now pertinent. First, although heavy weather 
has been made about the colonial legacy in AfEca of the Berlin demarcated boundaries, 
the instability and civil crises in that continent are essentially a question of bad 
governance. The Berlin boundaries may inflame and exacerbate those conflicts when as a 
result of decay in the polity they arise. The direct link between legitimate govemance and 
stability in the state is now deservedly well established. Second, the regime on 
recognition of governments needs urgent reappraisal. Regarding the intervention, several 
issues are raised. First, it raises the question of whether a regional organization can use 
force to maintain peace within its area of relevance, given the paralysis of the Security 
Council and the increasing marginalization and marginality of Africa in global relevance. 
With notorious UN indifference or half-hearted responses to militaristic conflicts in 
Sudan, Zaire, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Uganda and 
Somalia, Burundi, and other flashpoints in Afnca, the temptation for relatively powerfbl 
neighbouring states to seize the initiative and intervene cannot lightly be discounted. 
This is moreso, when the chords of ethnic affiliations have surviveci the European 
knife of division of Afnca at the 1884 Berlin Conférence. One can only refer to the 
Watutsi (Tutsi) crisis in CentralEast Africa which has found expression in the infarnous 
Rwandan genocide, Zairean war, and severai other ethnic motivated crises in that part of 
the continent. Consequentl y, the dangers of abuse inherent in the ECO WAS precedent 
may be worse than the Security Council's notorious indifference. The imperative 
question that arises is how to improve the relationship between the Securîty Council and 
regional organizations in the maintenance and enforcement of peace. 
In this context one cannot fail to question the role and responsibility of members 
of the UN Security CounciI, especially the permanent members. 1s their pnmary 
responsibility to global concerns held hostage by their selfish and national interests? If 
the permanent members of the Council look out for their respective national interests at 
the expense of their responsibility to the globe, the attitude is orninous. The diversity of 
the issues raised in the Liberian conflict and the consequent military intervention by 
ECOWAS are almost infinite. However, in examining some of them, this thesis has 
located the seeds of the conflict, not only in Liberia's (and by parity of reasoning, other 
African states') histoncal foundations but in contemporary factors. It has also identified 
the catalysts of such crises within the international framework. 
Further, it has examined the relevant doctrines on the enforcement of peace in the 
context of contemporary state practice and the prognosis is that the world is at risk of an 
era when regional organizatiow assume primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
global peace on theü own terms without substantive reference to the United Nations 
Security Cowicil. Unilaterdism which has been veiled in multi-lateral actions is 
becoming rampant and the Security Council is increasingly asniming the diminished role 
of a "legitimizer", and ratifier of its hijacked legal responsibility. There is no indication 
that this trend would not continue and its impact on the Charter law would be enormously 
negative. If the concept and practice of collective secwity must have meaning at 
international law, it must not only be by a collective effort through a iegitimate, 
representative and responsible Security Council but must also perceive of security in its 
holistic character, unabriged or defiled by parochial pretensions of powerfiil states. 
Perhaps this thesis should be closed with the words of Polish contemporary poetess, 
Wislawa ~ z ~ m b o r s k a . ' ~ ~ ~  
Oh, the leaky boundaries of man-made states! 
How many clouds float past them with impunity; 
How much desert sand shifts fiom one land to another, 
How many rnountain pebbles tumble into foreign soi1 
In provocative hops! 
IO65 Quoted in James Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier-Exploring Gorvemance in a 
Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge Univmity Press., 1999) at 45 1. 
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